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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Background: Governments and donor agencies have been grappling for decades with how to
design and implement food aid programs in developing countries.  Despite the enormity of cross-
country food aid transfers, which were running as high as 15 million tons annually during the
early 1990s, very little is known regarding how well food aid is targeted to intended beneficiaries
by local governments and NGOs.  The lack of rigorous monitoring assessments has impeded the
ability to learn from past experience and to develop improved systems for allocating food aid in
the future.
Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world and has suffered two major famines in the
past 25 years, in 1973 and 1984/5.  It has also received almost 10 million metric tons of cereal
aid from 1984 to 1998, an average of almost 10% of national cereal production over this period. 
Concerns have recently arisen in Ethiopia over the extent to which food aid reaches the poor and
whether the logistical apparatus of food aid distribution is able to flexibly adjust to yearly
changes in the geographical incidence of vulnerability.
Objectives and Methods:  This paper identifies the factors driving the allocations of food aid in
Ethiopia. We determine both how food aid is allocated across rural regions, reflecting the
targeting criteria of the federal government, as well as how aid is allocated within regions,
reflecting the decisions of local authorities and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 
Devising a measure of “need” is difficult and controversial and there is no consensus on how to
do so.  It is agreed by most analysts that income is an imperfect measure of need, yet it is
arguably the best single indicator of need in the absence of more detailed anthropometric
information.  Econometric analysis is used to examine the degree to which food aid is targeted
according to pre-aid per capita household income, as well as to other factors.  The paper also
identifies factors associated with low incomes at regional- and household-levels, in order to be
helpful to donors, NGOs and governments in their efforts to improve the targeting of food aid.
Data are drawn from the Food Security Survey (FSS), fielded on a subset of the 1995/96 Annual
Agricultural Sample Survey by the Ethiopian Central Statistical Authority.  The data covers
4,112  households in 348 weredas (i.e., local administrative units of which there are about 450 in
rural Ethiopia).  To examine the validity of the data, we calculated the amount of food aid
received  at the regional level from the FSS sample households and compared these results with
actual food aid distribution records of the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission
(DPPC).  The  results showed striking similarities, and provide a robust external test of validity
of  the FSS and CSA data sets (Clay, Molla, and Debebe 1998).
 
Food Aid in Ethiopia:   Food aid in Ethiopia has historically taken two major forms:  free
distribution (FD), which is generally categorized as “emergency” distribution, and food for work
(FFW), which attracts labor to help build assets such as roads, terraces, and dams in the process
of channeling food to needy areas.
FD and FFW allocations are made in two stages: From federal authorities to weredas; and  from
wereda authorities to local Peasant Associations which distribute the food to beneficiaries. A v
critical element of this two-stage process is that while the amount of food to be allocated to each
wereda is determined at Federal level (using input from local levels), the actual beneficiaries are
designated at the local community (PA) level.
FFW is often referred to as “development food aid.”  Quite often, completion of planned
activities takes precedence over targeting the neediest households for participation. Because
most FFW programs are planned in advance for multi-year periods, and involve allocations that
are largely fixed regardless of current crop assessments, one might expect that FFW should
exhibit less income-based targeting than free distribution programs.
Seven Major Findings 
• The first finding upholds the need for targeting even in very poor countries.  While the
argument is often heard that targeting in poor countries is not necessary or cost-effective
because the majority of rural households live in absolute poverty by current world standards,
our findings show very large relative disparities in incomes and assets across rural
households in Ethiopia. The poorest 25% of households in rural Ethiopia had less than 190
birr per capita, while the highest 25% had more than 595 birr per capita.  At the extremes of
the income distribution, the poorest 10% had less than 104 birr per capita, while the highest
10% had over 834 birr per capita.  Households at the low end of the income distribution are
much more likely to be food insecure and require food aid.
These findings from Ethiopia are not unique – almost all survey data from Sub-Saharan
Africa show a high degree of relative variation in incomes and assets across regions and
across households within regions.  These findings imply that targeting of food aid to the
poorest of the poor remains an important objective in food aid programs.
• The second conclusion sheds light on the effectiveness of alternative targeting strategies.
There is considerable debate in Ethiopia on whether scarce targeting resources should be
used to (a)  identify the most needy areas and put less emphasis on identifying needy
households within targeted areas, or (b) allocate  targeting resources equally to  identify the
most needy households within areas as well as the most needy areas.  The merits of both
strategies depend largely on whether there is greater variability in needs across geographic
areas or within areas.  To examine this issue in Ethiopia, we ranked all weredas in the
national sample (n=348) according to their mean per capita income and plotted these values
against the percentage of households in each wereda falling into the bottom per capita
income quartile ranked nationally.   
Figure 9 (page 65 in the main report) shows a negative but highly variable relationship.  For
example, at the 25
th mean income percentile (vertical dotted line), as many as 60% or as few
as 20% of the households belonged to the poorest national income quartile.  Because of wide 
within-wereda variation in per capita income, the poorest 25% of the weredas in 1995/96 (i.e.
those to the left of the vertical dotted line) were found to contain only 54% of the nation’s vi
poorest households (those falling into the bottom per capita income quartile, ranked
nationally).  The other 46% of households in the bottom national income quartile were
scattered throughout the other 75% of the weredas.   These findings indicate that a large
share of the poorest people in the country are not located in the poorest weredas in the
country, and that a targeting strategy that focuses only on relatively poor weredas would miss
a large percentage of needy people.  These findings point to the importance of targeting both
across regions and within them, although the relative costs involved are not addressed here.
However, identifying and including the poorest weredas for food aid distribution is clearly an
important element of a well-targeted food aid program.  Each of the 348 weredas in our
national sample was plotted in Figure 9 as an “x” if food aid was received within that
wereda, and as an “o” if no food was distributed.  Out of the 127 weredas receiving food aid,
only 47 were contained in the poorest mean wereda income quartile (to the left of the vertical
dotted line).   Of course, even if income were the sole criterion used to determine which
weredas should receive food aid, we would expect to see less than 100% targeting of poor
weredas due to incomplete information on wereda incomes at the time that food aid
allocations need to be made.  This raises the question of whether there are observable
indicators that can be used to improve the identification of poor and vulnerable regions, as
well as low-income households within regions.
• A third conclusion is that, at the national level, food aid was targeted only to some
extent according to income.  Poorer households and poorer weredas had higher
probabilities of receiving food aid than households or weredas with higher per capita
incomes.  But this varied considerably across regions.  Overall, the probability that a
particular wereda (local administrative unit) would receive  free food varies from  30.4% for
the 25
th percentile of wereda mean log per capita income, to 24.1% for the 75
th income
percentile, to 21.1% for the 90
th income percentile. Assets, such as size of landholding and
livestock ownership, were not related to food aid allocations.  Long-term rainfall, in most of
the estimated models, was correlated with food aid allocations, even though wereda-level
incomes were not significantly related to long-term rainfall.
• Fourth, the fact that only 30% of the poorest weredas received food aid indicates that,
at least in this particular year (1995/96) and using income as the criteria of need, there
were very large targeting errors of exclusion.  Over the national sample, the probability of
receiving food aid was 35% or below, other factors held constant, even for the poorest
weredas in the country.  These findings suggest that the amount of food aid distributed in
1995/96 was inadequate to meet the needs of households under the 25
th per capita income
percentile.  The finding of large targeting errors of exclusion is consistent with the findings
of Clay, Molla, and Debebe (1999).
• Fifth, free distribution of food aid was generally more effectively targeted according to
household income than food for work.   However, there were wide variations in the extent 
of targeting across regions.  Free food was most effectively targeted to the poor in Amhara
Region, and least effectively targeted in the South.  Food for work was targeted to the poor
most effectively in Tigray, but was almost totally unrelated to household per capita incomes vii
in Amhara and the South.  There are difficulties in accommodating the dual objectives of
food for work, which include development objectives as well as hunger alleviation.  At
policy levels, donors and government regard both objectives as important, but at the field
level there is often less emphasis on the need to promote these objectives simultaneously. 
While emergency food aid is programmed annually and is designed to respond to changes in
the spatial incidence of vulnerability from one year to the next, development food aid (i.e.,
FFW) by contrast is essentially programmed on a multi-year basis in selected areas
designated for development projects.  Such development-oriented food aid is typically
programmed up to five years in advance, which means that there is less flexibility to relocate
FFW operations in response to short-term changes in vulnerability.  Targeting of FFW food
was also likely to have been impeded by the practice of offering wages to participants that
typically exceeded prevailing agricultural labor wages.  Other studies have examined the
potential to improve food aid targeting through careful selection of cereals for work rations
whose consumption tends to be inversely related to incomes.
• Sixth, there were significant differences in the amounts of per capita food aid allocated
regionally, which were not related to observable household and wereda level
characteristics.  Weredas in Tigray Region were more likely to receive both free food and
food for work than households in other regions even after controlling for income levels,
assets, long-term rainfall and short-term rainfall shocks, and other household and wereda
characteristics.  These findings are highly consistent with earlier findings of Clay, Molla, and
Debebe (1999).
• Lastly, the single most important factor associated with who received food aid in our
survey year was who received food aid in the past.  This was true at both the wereda-level
and household-level.  We also found that the current spatial allocation of food aid is highly
correlated with the regions of greatest need during the 1984/85 famine in Ethiopia.  On its
face, it is unclear whether historical use should be interpreted as indicating that inertia is
driving current allocations, or whether unobserved, time-invariant factors related to chronic
needs are important.  In an attempt to differentiate, albeit imperfectly, we find that the
poorest areas of the country in 1995/96 were generally not the ones hardest hit by the famine.
And after controlling for historical needs during the 1980s, it is the recent 1990s pattern of
food aid allocation that is most important in determining receipt in the 1995/6 survey year;
i.e., the 1980s pattern of vulnerability has little explanatory power over and above the more
recent pattern of allocation in the 1990s in influencing current food aid allocations. 
From these results, and the fact that current weather shocks have only a small impact on
allocations, we  conclude that there is a degree of inertia in the allocation of food aid
geographically over time.  This inertia may arise from high fixed program costs, rigidities in the
governmental process of determining food aid allocations to local administrative units, political 
income transfer objectives, or possibly other reasons.  This spatial inertia, whatever the exact
cause(s), is a factor that has so far been ignored in both the theoretical targeting and the policy-
related food aid literature. viii
Implications for Food Aid Programming, Policy and Future Research:  What can be done to
improve targeting effectiveness in the future?  Although government policy papers clearly state
that food aid should be targeted to only the neediest households, they do not indicate specifically
how to identify the needy.  Econometric analysis in the report reveals that for purposes of
identifying weredas with low incomes (both per capita and total household income), there was a
small set of variables that consistently were associated with need.
• weredas in the Southern Region;
• weredas lacking tarmac or all-weather roads;
• weredas in which a large portion of cropped area was damaged due to drought, pests, or
disease;
• weredas with relatively small average land holdings; and
• weredas with a large percentage of female-headed households with no adult male in the
family.
Food aid programs could do more to utilize such indicators for targeting vulnerable weredas.
Within weredas, households with relatively low incomes and animal assets were associated with:
• small landholding size;
• the percentage of household cropped area affected by disease and drought;
• female-headed households with no adult male in the family; and 
• the percentage of family members that are young children.
By targeting food aid according to these indicators, local authorities could have improved the
share of food aid going to the poorest households within weredas, at least in this particular
survey year.  Further analysis is necessary to gauge how robust these indicators are across years
with different weather and harvest conditions.
In recent years in Ethiopia, government policy statements indicate a priority on targeting the
poorest weredas in the country and then distributing food aid widely within these weredas. 
However, this study indicates that such an approach may miss a large percentage of the poorest
households.  As discussed earlier, many poor people that are not located in the poorest areas of
the country, and that a strategy focusing only on targeting poor areas would miss a large
percentage of needy people.
There is still a great deal that is unknown about the actual implementation of food aid programs
in the field.  We observe that targeting effectiveness varies, sometimes greatly, between regions. 
But there is little available information on how implementation of food aid programs differed 
across these areas (e.g., how authorities identified the vulnerable, the targeting criteria used, how
supply channels were organized).
This kind of descriptive information could prove useful to match up with findings such as those
presented in this paper to better understand what kind of operations lead to relatively effective
targeting and vice versa.  Closer collaboration between researchers and implementors of food aid ix
programs in the field could help to produce more effective targeting and monitoring systems. 
This would shed considerable light on the enduring “black box” stage of food aid programs -- the
criteria and forces driving food aid allocation at the local level. x
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1.  INTRODUCTION
Governments and donor agencies have been grappling for decades with how to design and
implement food aid programs in developing countries.  A major recurrent issue of food aid
programs, as with other transfer programs, is how to target aid to intended beneficiaries.  In
Africa, concerns over increased hunger and declining availability of food aid from donor
countries have spawned renewed interest and debate over how food aid programs can be
designed to ensure that food reaches those who need it the most (Sharp 1997; Clay, Molla, and
Debebe 1999; Barrett 1998; Maxwell, Belshaw, and Lirenso 1994; Basu 1982).
The lion's share of past literature on food aid has concerned itself with the disincentives issue –
the effect of food aid distribution on local food prices, production incentives, and labor
allocation.  These issues are arguably still unresolved.  Yet despite the enormity of cross-country
food aid transfers, which were running as high as 15 million tons annually during the early
1990s, very little empirical work has shed light on the issue of targeting, even though interest in
poverty alleviation and targeting of anti-poverty programs has greatly heightened during the
1990s.
1  Furthermore, as the availability of world food aid declines, as it has in the 1990s,
2 the
importance of effective targeting is likely to increase.
1.1.  Objectives
This paper quantifies the factors underlying the allocations of food aid, both across and within
rural regions, by the Ethiopian government, together with local and international non-
governmental organizations (NGOs).  The paper examines the degree to which food aid is
targeted according to pre-aid per capita household income, as well as to other factors.  The paper
also attempts to disentangle two competing explanations for the observed continuity of food aid
allocations to particular areas and households: that the recipient areas are chronically needy; or
that needs shift geographically from one year to the next, but that fixed costs in setting up
operations and in the process of identifying needs lead to inertia in the location of food aid
programs over time.  Data are drawn from two linked rural household surveys in 1995/96, to
which we merge information on local rainfall and historical assessments of food aid needs.  We
focus on "reduced form" specifications in which as little structure is put on the decision rules as
possible, because so little is known about these decision rules and their implementation at the
village level.3During the 1990s, Sub-Saharan Africa has been receiving as much as one-third of all food aid delivered in the
world (WFP, website statistics).
4Figure 1 and the other figures in this paper  are created using locally weighted smoothed scatter plots (LOWESS),
(Cleveland 1979) with window length set at .6 or .7 of the neighboring observations.
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1.2.  Background
Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world and has suffered two major famines in the
past twenty-five years, in 1973 and 1984/5.  It has also received enormous amounts of food aid
over the past several decades, almost 10 million metric tons from 1984 to 1998, an average of
almost 10% of national cereal production over this period.  In bad production years food aid has
been as high as one-fifth of domestic production.  In the late 1980s, Ethiopia was receiving
roughly  25% of all food aid deliveries to Africa, and as late as 1996 was still receiving 20%.
3 
The national and international responses to famine and vulnerability in Ethiopia since the mid-
1980s have arguably been a success story of humanitarian assistance.  However, recent concerns
have arisen in Ethiopia about both targeting effectiveness and potential long-run impacts (e.g.,
Commission of the European Communities 1993; Sharp 1997; Clay, Molla, and Debebe 1999;
USAID 1998; Joint Danish Ethiopia Development Programme 1999).  The Ethiopian
Government’s concern with these issues is reflected in its National Policy on Disaster Prevention
and Management (Transitional Government of Ethiopia 1993).
Given the large amount of food aid coming into Ethiopia, it is important to know whether and
how it is being targeted.  Devising a measure of “need” is difficult and controversial, and there is
no consensus on how to do so.  It is agreed by many analysts that income is a very imperfect
measure of need, nevertheless, it is readily available from many household surveys and is
arguably the best single indicator of need in the absence of detailed anthropometric information. 
Figure 1 shows the bivariate relationship between food aid receipt and the log of household per
capita income.  Both the percent of the value of total food aid of total rural household income
(including aid), and the probability that households receive some form of food aid are negatively
related to the log of per capita pre-aid income.
4  The share of food aid in total income ranges
from 2% to 8%, while the probability of receiving aid varies from near 30% (for low levels of
income) to roughly 10% (for households at the high end of the income distribution).  Over 70%
of households at the very bottom end of the income distribution received no food aid.  Moreover,
the value of food aid received per capita is roughly constant across per capita pre-aid income
levels.  Since the 1995 cropping year was a good one, it is perhaps surprising that households in
the high end of the income distribution have a non-trivial chance of receiving some form of food
aid.
In countries such as Ethiopia, where the majority of the rural population live in absolute poverty
by current world standards, the argument is often made that targeting of food aid is not necessary
because almost all households are needy.  Dercon and Krishnan (1998) estimated that the
average poverty line in rural Ethiopia for 1995 was approximately 600 birr per capita (a log
income of 6.4), which, as can be seen from Figure 1, exceeds the per capita income of about 75%
of the rural households in Ethiopia.  3


























Percentage of Households Receiving Food Aid
Percentage of Food Aid out of Total Income
Figure 1. Household Food Aid Allocation by Ln Per capita Pre-Aid Income
Note
: Dotted lines are drawn at the 25
th, 50
th, and 75
th percentiles of ln per capita pre-aid income, corresponding to 190,
345, and 595 birr.
However, Figure 1 also shows that there is considerable variation in rural household income,
being 190 birr per capita at the 25
th percentile, and rising three-fold to 595 birr per capita at the
75
th percentile.  Per capita incomes at the 10
th and 90
th percentiles were 104 birr and 834 birr,
respectively.  Despite the fact that most households are poor in absolute terms, there is clearly
substantial variability in the extent of relative vulnerability across rural households, as measured
by per capita income.  This would imply that targeting of food aid to the poorest of the poor
remains an important objective in food aid programs.
In addition to targeting by income, there has been important targeting by region.  Table 1
indicates that the Tigray Region and the North Wello area of Amhara Region received relatively
large amounts of food aid in 1995/96 – almost five times the national per capita average – yet do
not have abnormally low household incomes or an abnormally large fraction of its people in the  4
Table 1. Food Aid Distribution in Ethiopia, 1995/96
Killil
A Domain






































. number number – birr –  – percent – – percent –  —     percent     —   birr/capita
Tigray all 31 162 546.7 15 60 55 35 36 41
Amhara N. and S. Gonder 17 154 421.5 18 11 21 19 10 16
E. and W. Gojam, Agewawi 31 234 562.3 17 2 2 0 2 1
N. Wello, Wag Hamra 13 178 356.0 23 93 69 61 16 43
S. Wello, Oromiya, N. Shewa 31 194 458.5 19 46 35 24 11 11
Oromiya E. and W. Wollega 32 219 451.0 29 0 6 3 4 1
Illubabor, Jimma 29 223 672.7 11 0 4 4 0 0
N. and W. Shewa 30 198 674.8 6 1 9 3 7 1
E. Shewa, Arsi, Bale, Borena 30 183 704.1 16 8 13 7 9 2




Yem, Keficho, Maji, Shekicho  15 180 449.3 24 0 2 2 0 0
N.&S.Omo, Derashe, Konso 20 179 212.4 66 9 26 16 17 8
Hadiya, Gurage, Kembata 16 175 328.9 39 4 22 13  12 5
Sidama, Gedeo, Burji, Amaro 14 125 488.3 26 1 6 4 2 1
Others Somali 5 71 307.3 34 46 10 10 1 2
Beni-Shangul 4 66 291.6 35 0 3 3 2 1
Gambela 5 55 318.0 51 0 51 33 18 21
Harari 1 43 671.5 21 18 14 7 7 3
Addis Ababa 5 53 1227.8 15 0 0 0 0 0
Dire Dawa 1 40 239.5 50 7 75 8 75 38
Total 348 2,867 487.7 25 17 20 13 10 9
Note:   A)  Killil (Region) is the largest regional unit in Ethiopia.  These are disaagregated into “domains,” an amalgam of zones, which constitute the next highest administrative unit.  Weredas are relatively small administrative units. 
There are approximately 460 rural weredas in Ethiopia.   B)  Income quartile is calculated nationally.  C)  As determined by the Government Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (and its government precursors).  D)
Total value of free distribution and food for work divided by area population.5Child stunting is usually defined to be having height that is less than 2 standard deviations below some reference
mark that is adjusted for age and gender.  Stunting is widely considered to be a very good marker for cumulative
health (Falkner and Tanner 1986).  While child stunting is often related to household incomes or assets, the
relationship is not always strong and many other underlying factors also affect height (see Strauss and Thomas
1995, for a review).
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poorest national income quartile.  In fact, many of the areas of Ethiopia containing the greatest
proportion of households in the bottom national income quartile (e.g., parts of the Southern and
Oromiya Killils, and the combined “other” Killils) received relatively little food aid in1995/96.  
Nutritional studies indicate that Tigray has somewhat higher levels of child stunting than the
national average (World Bank 1999), so that using only income to target may result in missing
many needy persons.
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1.3.  Chronic Needs Hypothesis vs. Inertia Hypothesis
We start with the observation that the current spatial allocation of food aid in Ethiopia is highly
correlated with the spatial pattern of vulnerability as determined by the Government during the
1984/5 famine (columns c and d of Table 1).  There are several possible explanations for this
observation.  First, the spatial incidence of poverty and food insecurity in 1995/6 may still be
very correlated with that of 1984/5, which would justify a high degree of spatial continuity in
food aid operations year after year.  We refer to this as the “chronic needs” hypothesis.  A
second possible explanation, however, is that there may be “inertia” in program operations or
allocation procedures, leading to rigidities in the spatial pattern of food aid distribution in spite
of potentially significant changes in the spatial incidence of vulnerability and poverty from one
year to the next.  This inertia hypothesis was first identified by Clay, Molla, and Debebe (1999).
There are several explanations for the possibility of spatial inertia in food aid distribution.  First,
fixed costs in program operation may arise in the development of supply channels, linkages to
local communities, and field-level infrastructure for identifying vulnerable groups and delivering
food to them.  In such cases, governmental or NGOs may rationally prefer not to move their
operations, if for example they are interested in minimizing their costs of distributing a given
volume of food aid to recipients.  Also, government and donors may prefer to distribute food
through well-performing NGOs that operate only in certain areas.  Moreover, the use of food aid
for development purposes often entails the programming of food aid to particular areas on a
multi-year basis, which creates rigidities in the spatial allocation of aid, especially food for work.
A second possible class of inertia explanations involve political economy issues at both the
central and regional government levels.  For example, the central government may have income
transfer objectives which it seeks to promote through food aid allocations.  Also, the procedure
for identifying food aid needs may be susceptible to a degree of lobbying by local communities. 
Communities that have received food aid in the past may learn how to influence subsequent
central government food aid decisions more effectively by better utilizing private information,
for example, leading to continuity in historical allocation patterns.6Jalan and Ravallion (1998) make the same point regarding targeting poverty alleviation programs when there is a
large transitory component to income, as they find in China.  They do not consider the possibility of high fixed set-
up costs, however.
7For instance if one is close to a means cutoff then it may be in one's interest to misinform, or to act, so as to make
one eligible.  The targeting literature has considered ways to induce self-selection to avoid such behavior, including,
for instance, imposing work or other unpleasant requirements, such as mandating that recipients live in a poorhouse,
as done in 19th century England.
8See Clay, Molla, and Debebe (1999) for an exception.
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A high degree of “inertia,” i.e., inflexibility in the location and amount of food aid distributed
from one year to the next, affect how much targeting is optimal.  If, for example, fixed costs is
the reason for inertia, then presumably the degree of optimal targeting would be lower if needs
change frequently.
6  The theoretical literature on optimal targeting rules (Besley and Kanbur
1988, 1993; Besley and Coate 1992, 1995; Besley, Coate, and Guinnane 1993; Besley 1997)
explores how optimal targeting rules would vary according to the information authorities have
regarding household or individual needs.  Papers to date have considered issues of moral
hazard.
7  These models are mostly static and, therefore, do not consider the implications of
having high fixed costs of program establishment.  Nor does this point seem to have been raised
to date in the small empirical literature.
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A better understanding of how the spatial incidence of vulnerability changes over time – or
whether it is recurrently concentrated in the same areas year after year – may help inform
governments and donors about how much emphasis should be put in the design of food aid
programs on flexibility in adjusting the location of operation.  If the information indicates that
needs are fairly stable over space, then fixed costs of distribution would be less of a problem. 
On the other hand, if needs do change over time, flexibility in operation may be warranted
greater emphasis in the design of food aid programs.
1.4.  Previous Empirical Studies of Food Aid Targeting
Very few studies have tried to infer targeting rules from micro data for safety net or other social
programs in developing countries.  Recent studies have quantified how subsidies such as for
health facilities, school attendance, or food are distributed across income groups (see, for
example, the papers in van de Walle and Nead 1995; or Pinstrup-Andersen 1988).  Yet most of
these studies just show cross-tabulations against income deciles and do not consider other
potential factors statistically.  Nor, in general, do they examine how safety net programs are
targeted across geographical areas (see Datt and Ravallion, 1993, for an exception).  Recently,
there has been a burgeoning interest in empirical political economy, in measuring how
underlying demographic and other factors affect government expenditure and tax behavior, for
instance Besley and Case (1995), but few of these examine a specific social safety net program,
and certainly not food aid in a developing country.9Reardon, Matlon, and Delgado (1988) discuss regional targeting of food aid in Burkina Faso in the early 1980s. 
However, their sample has only 3 regions so they are not able to analyze the factors that underlie the allocations
across regions.
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With respect to food aid, very little multivariate household-level analysis related to targeting has
been conducted.  Few papers have examined how unconditional food transfers, so-called “relief
aid,” are allocated, in part because household data on the receipt of such food transfers is usually
unavailable.
9  In the case of food for work there have been studies that have examined
determinants of household participation in such programs (e.g.,  Ravallion, Datt, and Chaudhuri
1993; Datt and Ravallion 1994, 1995; Kumar et al. 1993), as we also do, but none of the prior
studies has analyzed why such programs are distributed across areas in the way in which they
are.  Furthermore, because of the nature of the data that we use, we are able to examine
conditions underlying not only current (i.e., survey year) receipt of food aid, but also chronic use
over the past five years.  We are furthermore able to analyze the attributes of households who
formerly received food aid but have stopped receiving aid or participating in food for work
during the survey year.  Finally, we are able to begin to measure the importance of past
allocation patterns in explaining current period allocations as well as the influence of past
assessed needs.
1.5.  Organization of Paper
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes institutional aspects of food aid programs
in Ethiopia that are especially germane to understanding our specifications and results.  Section 3
draws on the theoretical literature to show the reader what our results would look like if food aid
were perfectly targeted under certain strong assumptions.  Section 4 presents the data sources
and sample characteristics for the analysis.  Section 5 explains the models and variable
construction.    Section 6 presents and interprets the main results of the models at national level. 
Section 7 examines differences in targeting effectiveness across the four regions of Ethiopia
where sampling procedures in our survey were adequate to be considered representative –
Oromiya, Amhara, Tigray, and the South (SNNPR).  Section 8 examines the determinants of
chronic recipients of food aid and the characteristics of households recently exiting from
program participation.  Section 9 assesses the degree to which the very strong continuity of food
aid operations in particular areas reflects chronic needs versus inertia.  Section 10 synthesizes the
study’s conclusions and policy implications.10The major food aid commodities distributed in Ethiopia are cereals (93%).  Wheat in particular constitutes the
largest share and accounts for about 80% of the total volume of food aid supplied between 1992-1995. Sorghum and
maize account for about 8% and 3% respectively, while oils and fats make up another 3% of the total.
11There were regional droughts in 1987/88, which may explain the large amount of food aid in that year (von Braun,
Teklu, and Webb 1998), but the level was not related to the national level of production.
12A trend regression of cereal food aid from 1984/5 through 1993/4 results in a coefficient of .017 with a standard

























































2.  FOOD AID IN ETHIOPIA
Figure 2 plots national production of cereals and of food aid (with different scales).
10  Notice that
there is not a close medium-run or even short-run correspondence between the two series.  While
there is a negative relationship in some years between production and aid, in 1986/7 for instance,
in other years, 1987/8, there is not.  In 1987/8, three years after the 1984/5 famine was over, food
aid remained extremely high, at nearly 1,000,000 tons, despite national cereals production
having recovered substantially.
11  In the medium-run, cereals production has trended upwards
over the 1985-96 period, but food aid did not trend downward until after 1994.
12 
Figure 2. Annual Grain Production and Food Aid in Ethiopia, 1974-199713A third form, cash for work, has been used only sparingly in Ethiopia and is not addressed here.  Also, so-called
“program” food aid, which is food that is sold on local markets (not directly given to households) for local currency
which is then used for general budget support, has not been much used in Ethiopia with the exception of U.S. Title
III food aid since 1995 which has been used for emergency relief.
14During the 1984/5 famine camps were set up at which food aid was distributed.  Now food aid goes directly to
permanent villages.
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The apparent lack of correlation between production and food aid over this period is at least
partially due to the increased emphasis in the late 1980s on expanding the use of food aid from
famine relief to "rehabilitation", the use of food as a wage pool to recruit labor to build perceived
useful local infrastructure (Webb, von Braun, and Yohannes 1992).  By the early 1990s, such
efforts to “link relief to development” became popularized and integrated into the food aid
programs of both donors and the government.
In 1974 the Ethiopian government established the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC)
to monitor the incidence of food insecurity across the country and coordinate food aid activities,
including those of international NGOs.  In 1985, 48 international NGOs were operating relief
projects in the country.  In the mid-1990s, 50 were active (Webb and von Braun 1994).  Local
church and other organizations have also been quite active historically (Webb, von Braun, and
Yohannes 1992).  Historically, NGOs handled nearly 80% of relief food distribution in the
country, with the balance undertaken by government.  Since the early 1990s, however, this has
increasingly been taken over by the federal Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission
(DPPC, which in 1993 was organized from the old Relief and Rehabilitation Commission).
Currently, NGOs are allowed to handle and distribute only “development” food aid, which is
used as wage payment in labor-intensive area development projects.
Food aid in Ethiopia has historically taken two major forms:  free distribution (FD), which falls
under the category “emergency” distribution, and food for work (FFW).
13   Most FFW activities
are categorized as “development” food aid programs since they focus on developing assets such
as roads, terraces, and dams.  However, some food for work programs in Ethiopia are defined as
emergency programs (e.g., Employment Generation Scheme) that is designed to target the
neediest able-bodied people.  We briefly describe the policy objectives and implementation of
these two food aid types.
2.1.  Free Distribution
FD programs in Ethiopia distribute cereals and cooking oil directly to households.
14  Allocations
are made in two stages: From federal authorities to weredas (i.e., local administrative units
roughly akin to a county); and  from wereda authorities to local Peasant Associations (PAs)
which distribute the food to beneficiaries.  The administrative mechanisms used at each level are
distinct (Sharp 1997).  In the first stage, the wereda administration determines the number of15The exact criteria used to determine "needs" could not be clearly established through liaison with DPPC, and
interviews with local officials indicated that the process is to some degree vulnerable to different interpretations of
neediness by local officials across weredas.
16There is little attempt to self-target food aid, i.e., provide foods that are eaten primarily by the poor, as was the
case, for instance, in Mozambique in the early 1990s when food aid consisted largely of yellow maize, a staple of
the poor (Tschirley, Donovan, and Weber 1996).  In Ethiopia, food aid is predominantly (80%) wheat, which is
considered a normal good in both rural and urban areas (Kebede, Jayne, and Tadesse 1996).
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households “in need” within each wereda.
15  These assessments are forwarded to, and revised by,
the Zonal and Regional Administrations, and ultimately the federal-level DPPC.  The DPPC then
revises (generally downward) the number of households determined to be in need and the
amount of food aid required for each wereda based on historical patterns, the potential supply of
food aid to be pledged by donors, and the DPPC’s own field-level food insecurity assessments. 
At this stage an appeal is launched by the Federal Government for food aid, specifying the
amount of food and number of households in need after aggregating across all weredas. 
However, almost always, the amount of food aid pledged by donors falls short of the
requirements as expressed in the appeal, which leads to further downward revision of allocations
to weredas.
The second stage begins after the federal DPPC has finalized allocations to each wereda. 
Wereda DPPCs then assign allocations to individual PAs (there are typically about 30 PAs
within a wereda).  Then the PA leadership prepares a list of beneficiary households against the
assigned allocation.  According to the Government’s National Policy for Disaster Prevention and
Management (Transitional Government of Ethiopia 1993), local-level responsibility for selecting
food aid beneficiaries lies with the wereda administration, but implementation is actually carried
out by elders and community representatives at the PA level. Neither the DPPC nor NGOs have
control over the selection of beneficiaries at the PA level.  The critical element of this plan is,
that while the amount of food to be allocated to each wereda is determined at Federal level
(using input from local levels), the actual beneficiaries are designated at the local community
(PA) level.  Of course, PA leaders are urged to use a set of selection criteria to determine which
households are eligible, including livestock ownership, grain production, assets, income, being
unable to work because of illness, having no family support network, and household size (Sharp
1997).
16  We will explore below the extent to which this is true empirically.
2.2.  Food for Work
Ethiopia’s official food aid policy states that no able-bodied person should receive food aid
without working on a community development project in return. This is complemented by
targeted free food aid for those who cannot work. The official goal, as described above, is to
expand work-based food aid to the point where it accounts for 80% of all distributions (World
Food Programme 1995).  However, household-level data show that, of the total kilocalories of 17There are several reasons why the work in exchange for food is apparently underutilized.  First, food aid is
sometimes available for distribution to locations considered “in need” without a work project having been
identified.  Second, anecdotal reports indicate that in situations where the technical input for food for work projects
is unavailable, the food aid may be distributed to households with the condition that work will be expected at some
point in the future.  Lastly, the work requirement for receiving food is sometimes waived if the community is
considered weak or stressed as a result of transitory food insecurity.
18An exception is "Employment Generation Schemes" (EGS) mechanisms for distributing emergency relief that
require participation in public works and tend to expand or contract based on needs and availability of relief
resources. 
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food aid received nationally over a full twelve-month period in 1995/96, only 35% involved
work in exchange for the food (Clay, Molla, and Debebe 1999).
17
FFW takes the form of public works programs in historically food deficit or degraded areas. 
This type of food aid is often referred to as “development food aid.”  Quite often, completion of
planned activities takes precedence over targeting the most food insecure households in the
allocation of FFW programs.  Most FFW activities are planned and resource allocations are
committed a year or more in advance – regardless of current crop assessment conditions.
18  Some
examples of regular food for work are: U.S. Title II food aid distributed through NGOs in
historically drought prone areas; WFP’s Project 2488 which is executed through the Ministry of
Agriculture and aims mainly at rehabilitation of degraded areas; and Canada’s multi-year food
for work program implemented by NGOs in historically food deficit areas.  Because most FFW
programs are planned far in advance and for multi-year periods, one might expect that FFW
should exhibit less income-based targeting than free distribution programs, at least with regard to
which weredas get targeted.
Rules determining participation in FFW programs have varied widely (Sharp 1997).  In some
cases self-targeting has been used, by which households decide whether to send members to
work at the offered food wage.  Typically a given project pays a constant daily food wage, not
differentiating by the human capital of workers (Disaster Prevention and Preparedness
Commission 1997).  In the past, offered wages have typically been higher than local market
wages (Webb, von Braun, and Yohannes 1992; Sharp 1997), which should result in much less
income targeting than in a low wage regime.  Ration amounts are based on daily nutritional
requirements of a cereal-based diet for an average family of six persons.  Also, on some food for
work projects, beneficiaries are paid an additional amount of food aid as an allowance for
transport when the project area is at a significant distance from where they live (Relief Society of
Tigray projects, for example).  Providing in-kind wages higher than local wage rates for manual
labor is often justified by the contention that poverty is endemic in many rural areas, so that
targeting is implicitly not needed, plus a concern that a "livable" wage be paid (Disaster
Prevention and Preparedness Commission 1997).  However, programs in other areas have
targeted FFW opportunities more narrowly to specific types of households.  In these schemes, a
local community group chooses households who will be eligible for participation based on some
underlying criteria, which may be easily measured or not.  In some cases there is de jure   12
rationing of either spaces (restricting the number of eligible participants per household) or time
allowed per person.  Other factors that are claimed to be used to target households are poverty,
livestock and other asset ownership, crop production, and size of landholding (Sharp 1997).
2.3.  Flexibility Versus Inertia in Spatial Allocation of Food Aid
Emergency or relief food aid is programmed annually, and is designed to respond to changes in
the spatial incidence of vulnerability from one year to the next.  Both Canada and the U.S. make
pledges of their emergency food either through WFP or directly to DPPC.  By contrast, all
development food aid (i.e., FFW) essentially is programmed on a multi-year basis in selected
areas designated for development projects.  Such development-oriented food aid is typically
programmed with a five-year time frame, in which the amount of food targeted for recipient
weredas is based on the amount of work-days needed to accomplish the task.  Ostensibly, there
are heightened efforts to use food aid to simultaneously meet both relief and development
objectives (e.g., the EGS program, in which FFW activities are explicitly targeted to areas and
households in need).  The nature of the activities of the sponsoring NGO influences how flexible
they are in moving from one area to the next according to need.  For example, Lutheran World
Federation specializes in using FFW for soil and water conservation investments, which means
that they are able to relocate their operations more easily and within a shorter time span than
most other NGOs that tend to be involved in “integrated area development” activities in specific
weredas that span several years.  In general, however, we hypothesize that there is considerably
less flexibility in targeting vulnerable weredas and households through FFW operations than FD
programs, i.e., a greater degree of inertia despite changes in the spatial incidence of
vulnerability.  13
3.  FOOD AID TARGETING:  CONCEPTUAL ISSUES
Food aid targeting is defined as “restricting the coverage of an intervention to those who are
perceived to be most at risk” (Jaspars and Young 1995).   “Most at risk” can be defined in
various ways and may have numerous dimensions (e.g., nutrient intakes, purchasing power,
assets, anthropometric or other health indicators).  Ethiopian Government statements on food aid
indicate that it is intended to redress both poverty and malnutrition (Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia 1996).  Most analysts agree that household income is highly indicative of
poverty, although it represents only one component of many (e.g., World Bank 1990). 
Household income is much less strongly related to nutritional intakes, though among the poor
the relationship is stronger (Strauss and Thomas 1995); while nutritional status (heights and
weights) tend to be related to income as well, again the relationship is not as tight as might be
thought (Strauss and Thomas 1995). 
For the sake of tractability and based on the empirical data available from Ethiopia, we focus on
income-based measures of need, acknowledging that this emphasizes the poverty alleviation
objective of food aid.  We also determine the relationship between food aid and numerous other
household and community influences.
One may be tempted to argue that since poverty and food insecurity are pervasive in Ethiopia,
there is no need for targeting.  However, as shown previously, there are wide variations in per
capita incomes across weredas and across households within weredas, even though most rural
households in Ethiopia would be considered poor by world standards. Also, the availability of
food aid has always been short of perceived need, strengthening the argument for targeting the
most needy households.  Nevertheless, targeting is not without cost.  There is a tradeoff between
precision in targeting and its associated costs, particularly when governments have incomplete
information regarding who is truly in need (Besley and Coate 1992;  Van de Walle 1998).  Also,
to elicit political support for food aid to the poor, it may be necessary to have leakages to the
non-poor (Besley 1997).  Nevertheless, targeting, and perhaps significant targeting, is likely to
be part of a socially optimal distribution system.
What would the household-level graphs such as Figure 1 look like if targeting programs were
complete?  Conversely, what would Figure 1 look like if targeting programs were completely
untargeted (either randomly targeted or if available food aid was distributed equally to all
households)?  While no program can be expected to target the poor perfectly, it is useful to
describe the shape of such a graph as a benchmark against which to assess the empirical results
presented below.
Figure 3a plots households’ pre-aid income levels (on the horizontal axis) against their adjusted
incomes after counting the value of food aid received (on the vertical axis), following Besley and
Kanbur (1993).  Households whose pre-aid income is below the poverty-line threshold (PL)
receive aid such that their after-aid income is brought up exactly to the poverty line.  For
example, a household whose pre-aid income level is at point x would receive food aid worth z in   14
order to bring that household’s income up to the poverty line income.  The shaded area
represents the value of food aid transferred to households below the poverty line.  Households
whose pre-aid income is greater than the poverty line receive no food aid.
Figure 3.  Food Aid Targeting under Ideal and Less than Ideal Conditions  15
We might expect to see results similar to that displayed in Figure 3a only under the highly
unrealistic conditions that:
• food aid authorities have perfect information on who are the vulnerable and the
extent of their vulnerability; 
• there are no fixed costs in the organization and implementation of food aid
programs; 
• government’s only objective in food aid programs is to minimize the number of
vulnerable households; and  
• food aid resources are sufficient to meet the needs of all households below the
threshold poverty line.
This “ideal” situation in Figure 3a would produce results shown in Figure 3b (which shows the
bivariate relationship between income and the probability of receiving food aid) and Figure 3c
(which shows the bivariate relationship between income and the amount of food aid received). 
Under the ideal targeting assumptions stated above, the probability of receiving food aid would
be 100% for all households below the PL and zero for households above it.  The relationship
between household income and amount of food aid received under ideal conditions would
confirm to Figure 3c, in which the value of food transferred was just sufficient to restore the
recipient’s adjusted income to the poverty line.  Households with pre-aid income greater than PL
would receive nothing.
There is little expectation that food aid targeting, in practice, should conform to the patterns
reflected in Figures 3a-c.  Collecting information both at region level and household level is
costly.  And to the extent that there is fixed costs in the operation of food aid programs, the
correlation between the household vulnerability and receipt of aid should decline, certainly at
national level and most likely within weredas as well.  And there may be other objectives in food
aid transfers in addition to minimizing poverty.
Now consider Figure 3d, which is similar to Figure 3b but shows an “incomplete” degree of
income targeting.  The probability of receiving aid is still negatively related to income, but not
all households below the poverty line receive aid, a case commonly referred to as a targeting
error of exclusion (see Jaspars and Young 1995).   Moreover, some households above the
poverty line do receive food aid, representing targeting errors of inclusion.  In later sections,
we examine the relative magnitude of these two types of targeting errors.19Some 8 EAs were dropped because of security and accessibility inadequacies.  In Ethiopia, each EA normally
contains from 100-200 households.
20Actually, out of the FSS households, 126 are not in the ASS sample, for reasons that are not documented.  They
are more likely to be female headed, with half the land owned and a much greater likelihood of receiving food aid
compared to the 3,823 households in both FSS and ASS.
21We dropped households with gross incomes per capita less than 3 birr or greater than 20,000.
22The cuttings are taken from a randomly selected 16 meter
2 area within each chosen field.  The yield estimate is
blown up to a field production estimate using the actual field size measurement.
23Households tend to report more free food, relative to food for work, than is supposed to be the case according to
government plans (Clay, Molla, and Debebe 1999).  Anecdotal field reports indicate that food that was supposed to
be distributed in return for work was, in many cases, actually distributed freely, with no work obligation imposed. 
Consequently it seems reasonable to use the household's assessment of whether they explicitly worked for the food
received.
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4.  DATA SOURCES AND SAMPLES
The data come from the 1995/96 Annual Agricultural Sample Survey (ASS), fielded by the
Ethiopian Central Statistical Authority (CSA), and the Food Security Survey (FSS), fielded on a
subset of ASS households in 1996 by the CSA and the Grain Market Research Project.  In
addition, monthly rainfall data are taken from 40 rainfall stations distributed throughout Ethiopia
and matched to the locations of the household samples.  The 1995/96 Agricultural Sample
Survey uses the same frame of enumeration areas (EAs) as used to conduct the 1994 Population
Census.  Some 612 rural EAs are sampled out of roughly 60,000, with probability proportional to
population size.
19  In each of the EAs, 25 households are randomly selected, for a total of 15,374
households.  Out of these, 7 are randomly sampled to be in the FSS, some 4,112 households
total.
20  The FSS collected detailed information regarding amounts of food aid received by each
household, plus other information.  Of the households in both the FSS and ASS, we drop 86
because they are in one region, Afar, for which rainfall data was unavailable (Afar households
are mostly pastoral households) and another 8 because of gross outliers in income.
21  Further, out
of the roughly 25 ASS households per EA, 15 are selected for the collection of more detailed
field-crop information, including actual measurement of fields and cutting and weighing of crops
from the Meher (main) season.
22  Since the income variable that we use is constructed from field
cutting data, for reasons detailed below, our analysis sample is constrained to the field cutting
sample.  Of the 3,823 cropping households in the Food Security sample, 3,244 have field cutting
data for their Meher crops.  A further 377 households were dropped due to missing crop cut
information on at least some of their fields. The final sample contained 2,867 households in 348
weredas.  There are roughly 460 rural weredas in Ethiopia. 
Receipt of food aid is measured for each household in the FSS.  For the past year the respondent
is asked whether at least one member of the household participated in the food aid program.  If
yes, the type of program as reported by the household is recorded, separating free distribution 
from food for work, and by type of commodity received.
23  If aid was received, for each month  17
from June 1995 through May 1996 the quantities received were recorded.  Thus, all the food aid
variables are at the household level.
Free food was distributed in roughly 27.5% of weredas, and FFW programs operated in 21.5% of
weredas over the recall period.  However, only 13% of households report receiving free food and
only 10% took food under an FFW arrangement.  On average, about 40% of households receive
FD or FFW in weredas that receive food aid.  However, as shown in Table 1, both the proportion
of households receiving aid, and the amounts received, vary substantially across zones.  Over the
entire sample, 20% of the households received either free food or food for work.
To test the validity of the survey data, we examine how our FSS household-level results compare
with region-level food aid figures from the DPPC.  After converting food aid receipts into
kilocalories and then aggregating across months for the comparable 12 month period over which
the DPPC data is reported, we find striking similarities across all major regions (Figure 4). 
Overall, our survey estimates amount to 82.6% of the DPPC’s recorded deliveries.  Since the
DPPC estimates also include deliveries to urban areas and monetized food aid amounts, it is
expected that they should be somewhat higher than the survey estimates, which do not capture
urban and monetized food aid. This difference is especially evident in the “other killil” category,
which includes Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa, and Harrar, all predominantly urban regions. 
However, in regions where food aid has historically been most important, the household-reported
estimates of food aid receipt were highly consistent with DPPC estimates.  In Tigray, for
example, households reported receiving 278 million kcals of food aid compared with DPPC
estimates of 290 million kcals (a 4% difference).  Differences in Amhara Region were less than
8%.  Overall, we conclude that the household-reports of food aid receipts in our CSA-





































Tigray        Amhara        Oromya        SNNPR/SEPA Other Killil
Region
FSS Estimate DPPC Estimate
FSS and DPPC Food Aid Estimates
(June 1995 - May 1996)
Figure 4. Food Aid Distribution Estimates by Region, FSS and DPPC, June 1995-May 199624We do not feel that we have plausible identifying information, so we do not attempt any selection corrections.
25Finally, we also run upper-censored tobits on the percentage of households within each wereda that receive food
aid, including weredas in which all sample households are recipients.  We do not report those results as they are
quite similar to the household-level probits that use kill-zone, not wereda, dummy variables.
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5.  EMPIRICAL MODELS AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION
5.1.  Empirical Models
Evidence cited in Section 2 is consistent with a two-stage process in allocating food aid: first, aid
is allocated across regions and weredas by the federal DPPC; and  second, based on amounts to be
allocated to each wereda, beneficiaries are selected by local village committees of some kind. 
Furthermore, in the case of FFW, households must decide whether or not to work in exchange for
the food ration depending on their other labor opportunities.  For FD, only stigma would prevent a
household from accepting food, which seems unlikely in the context of areas in which food aid is
endemic.  These considerations suggest that estimation should be stratified by FD and for FFW,
and that further, a two-stage estimation strategy be used in which first we explain allocations
across local areas, corresponding to federal government decisions, and then within these local
areas, corresponding to local leaders' decisions.  The level of local area aggregation that we use is
the wereda, a local political unit akin to a county with population sizes that vary from under
20,000 to 200,000 (for further detail, see Clay, Molla, and Debebe 1999; and  Sharp 1997). 
Furthermore, since the graphs in Figure 3 suggest that the impacts of conditioning variables may
differ between whether households or weredas get aid and how much they get, we use a hurdle
model which distinguishes any receipt from how much.  We use probits to model whether
communities or households receive aid and ordinary least squares (OLS) to model how much
conditional upon receiving.
24  Thus, for both FD and FFW, we use probits to analyze which
weredas receive such food aid and truncated OLS regressions to examine the average amount per
household.  We do the same at the household level.  However, when analyzing household
allocations, only weredas having at least one sample household that received food aid of the type
being considered (FD or FFW) are included in the regressions.  
For each of the probit and truncated OLS regressions, we use a specification in which observable
household and wereda variables are used together with dummy variables at a more aggregate
region level, the killil.  In addition, we also use a specification with household level covariates
together with wereda dummy variables.  In these probit regressions only weredas in which sample
household distribution is incomplete (between 0% and 100%) get used.
25
In the case of food for work, participation by a household requires that an FFW project is present
in the community and the household must send an individual(s) to work.  If there are no binding
hours constraints, then a simple income maximization model can be considered in which a
household will send one or more members to work for food, at an implicit wage of w, if the
person's shadow wage, w
*, is less than w.  Thus observables used as covariates should be ones 26Schooling information is only available for the household head in both the ASS and the FSS.  Unfortunately no
health outcome information is available in these two surveys.
27Self-reports are also available, however CSA considered the crop cut data to be more reliable.  This is because
self-reports of production are reported in many different local units, and to convert into a common unit such as
kilograms, one has to use CSA gathered conversion factors of uncertain reliability.
28Belg is the second, short growing season found in areas with a bimodal monthly rainfall distribution.  The Belg
harvest contributes roughly 10% of total national cereal production. While both the ASS and FSS contains a
forecast of Belg production, it is a forecast, taken 2-4 months before harvest.  We do not consider this to be very
reliable as a harvest estimate and so exclude it from our income calculation.
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that help explain the potential market wage or the shadow wage.  Unfortunately the survey did
not record which household members worked for food aid, so that the analysis has to be done at
the household, not individual, level.
5.2.  Covariates
Since we have little ex-ante insight into the nature of allocation decisions, we use a variety of
covariates at the community and household levels that are likely to be exogenous to these
decisions and that may be known to government and NGO officials.  We divide these into
variables that attempt to measure household resources, household demographics, community
accessibility, community long-run agroclimatic potential, and short-run weather shocks, in both
the wereda-level and household-level models.
Household Resources:   The household resource variables we use are whether the head of
household has any schooling, the amount of land owned, and the log of household gross income
per capita.
26  For the wereda analyses, wereda means are included for each of these covariates. 
Gross income is the sum of production value for food crops in the 1995 Meher growing season
(harvest typically being from September through December) taken from crop cuttings;
27 plus
self-reported production value in 1995 for non-food crops such as coffee (no field cuttings were
taken for these crops); less cash costs for all crops combined (which is mostly fertilizer costs);
plus 20% of the value of livestock as an approximation to livestock income; plus an estimate of
off-farm cash income contributed by each household member over the past year prior to the
survey.  Free food receipts and FFW payments are not included in this measure, since we will be
attempting to explain them.  Unfortunately this income measure does not include any income
from the Belg harvest.
28  This is likely to be important in only a few areas of Ethiopia.  We test
the robustness of the main results in Section 6.3 by re-running the models after excluding these
areas.
The top two panel graphs of Figure 5 show how the probability of receiving food aid varies with
the log of per capita income, while the bottom two panels show how per capita amounts received




















































































































Figure 5. Free Distribution (FD) and Food for Work (FFW) by Ln Per capita Income
Note: Dotted lines are drawn at the 25
th and 75
th percentiles of ln per capita pre-aid income, corresponding
to 284 and 623 birr for weredas, and 190 and 595 birr for households.
Top left panel includes all weredas sampled in Ethiopia.  Bottom left panel includes only weredas in which
food aid was received.  Top right panel sample includes only households in weredas in which food aid was
distributed.  Bottom right panel includes all households that received free distribution and food for work,
respectively.
The left-hand panels graph the relationships at the wereda-level and the right-hand panels for
households.  The household-level graphs are conditioned on living in weredas that have some
sample households that receive aid (unlike Figure 1, which is unconditional).  One can see that
wereda participation rates are declining in mean log income for both FD and FFW, with the free
distribution receipt probabilities being higher than those for food for work by just over 5%,
across the distribution of mean incomes.  Per capita amounts received are also inversely related
to mean log per capita income for free distribution, but are constant for FFW.  At the household-
level, the FD and FFW participation curves are almost identical.  They display a gentle negative
slope until a log-per capita income of around 6, corresponding to just under the 60
th percentile,
but then participation drops off much more steeply for households with higher log per capita
incomes.  The amounts received per capita by households fall off with log per capita income for 29These years were chosen because earlier years had many missing observations for many stations.
30As mentioned, the Afar area was the one that did not have a rainfall station close by (and the nearest did not have
1995 data).  We consequently dropped that area, which only contains 61 households.  All weredas within a zone
were assigned the same long-run median rainfall.
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free distribution, but not for food for work.  Figure 5 strongly suggests that the probability of
receiving food aid is linearly related to our log income measure at the wereda level.  We use this
fact to justify our linear specification used in the regressions.  However, these bivariate figures
indicate, especially for FFW at the household level, that non-linearities may be important.  We
explore these possibilities in the empirical work as well.
Household Demographics:  We control for household size and the proportion under 9 years and
over 55.  We also allow for dummy variables if the self-reported head of household is a currently
unmarried woman, or a married woman.  We also allow for dummy variables if the head is
Moslem or Protestant (the omitted category being Ethiopian Orthodox, the major religion in the
country).  These are included to account possible religion-based allocation patterns that are
sometimes anecdotally reported in some areas.
Community Access and Agroclimatic Covariates:   Community access should be related to the
cost of providing food aid.  Ethiopia has notoriously poor infrastructure.  We have GIS (Global
Information System) data at the wereda level as to whether certain types of roads are present,
from paved roads to dirt paths.  Consequently we use five dummy variables, road type 1 being
the best conditioned road, followed by type 2, 3, and so forth.  We also know wereda-level mean
elevation (in meters), which will be related to agroclimatic conditions and possibly to
accessibility.  Elevation readings were taken using the Global Positioning System, a satellite-
based system to take such readings.
Rainfall is a critical factor related to cereals production in Ethiopia because farming is almost
entirely rainfed.  Drought-induced production shortfalls and consequent large cereals price
spikes were major causes of the 1984/5 famine in Ethiopia (Webb, von Braun, and Yohannes
1992).  We have available median Meher season planting rainfall (in millimeters) from 1988
through 1995.
29  These were derived by summing April through August rainfalls for these years
from data collected by 40 rainfall stations of the Ethiopian National Meteorological Services
Agency.  Each sample zone (an area whose size is in between a wereda and a killil) was matched
up to the closest rainfall station, provided there was at least one in the area 
30  As shown in
Figure 6, in rural Ethiopia long-run cropping season rainfall is related to wereda mean log per
capita income levels.  As can also be seen, wereda food aid deliveries are negatively related to
long-run rainfall.
Weather and Other Shocks:   We use two types of weather shock covariates.  First we use our
rainfall data and compute the differences between Meher rainfall in 1994 and 1995 and the
longer run median.  We use both 1994 and 1995 because our food aid receipt variables cover the



















































































Ln Percapita Pre-Aid Income
Prob. of Receiving Food Aid
Figure 6. Wereda Food Aid Allocation by Rainfall
Note: Dotted lines are drawn at the 25
th, 50
th, and 75
th percentiles of long-run average rainfall,
corresponding to 671, 772, and 1047 mm. 
criteria for food aid allocations up to at least the middle of 1995, while income from the 1995
crop year would be relevant in considering food aid allocations in late 1995 and 1996.
We also have available plot-level information from the Agricultural Sample Survey regarding
whether a plot suffered damage from too little rain, too much rain, or from pests and diseases. 
We construct three variables that measure the percent of household or wereda field area so
affected.  These plot-level "shocks" are only available for the 1995 Meher season, so we can't
infer changes from them.  We can tell how a particular household fares relative to the wereda
average in 1995, but some part of the "shock" may in fact be predictable.  Controlling for the
wider area rainfall shocks (that are deviations), one should interpret the plot variables as being
roughly the impact of variation within zones, because only a small part of the variation in the31A regression of percent of area affected by too little rainfall on the these other rainfall variables, plus elevation,
road type dummies and killil dummies has an R
2 of only .25.  The coefficients on long-run rainfall and on deviations
in 1994 and 1995 are -.0108 (t=5.4), -.0079 (t=3.1), and -.0136 (t=5.8) respectively.   Regressions of the percent of
area affected by too much rainfall or by diseases or pests on these same covariates have much lower R
2s, .047 and
.014 respectively.
32Unfortunately we do not know in which of the past five years food aid was received.
  24
plot-level drought variable is related to the community long-run and deviation rainfalls.
31   Hence
there is much independent variation of these plot-level shock variables.
Food Aid History:   As emphasized in the introduction, one of the central concerns of this paper
is the extent to which current allocations depend on past allocations, and if so, why.  While the
data are cross-sectional, we have two sources of information on past food aid allocations: one
direct and one indirect.  In the FSS questionnaire, respondents were asked whether they had
received free food or food for work in the past and if so, in how many years out of the past five.
32 
If the household is a recipient of food for free (food for work) in the 1995/6 year we subtract one
from the stated number of years receiving during the past five to get a measure of the number of
years of receiving food for free (food for work) during the four years prior to 95/96.  We create a
series of dummy variables if the household was a recipient during one, two, three or four of the
prior four years and use these to represent recent historical patterns of food aid allocation in
some of our specifications.  At the wereda level we take the maximum number of years out of
the prior four that some sample household received food aid and create a similar dummy
variable, separately for free distribution and food for work.
We also take the group of households who received some food aid during the past five years but
did not receive aid in 1995/6.  These households, which we call “exiters” are the subject of
analysis in Section 8.  Of the 165 weredas that received free distribution sometime in the past
five years, 78 did not receive any in 1995/96.  This phase-out is mirrored among households: out
of 782 that received free distribution during the past five years, 444 did not last year (food for 
work exhibits the same pattern).  On the other hand very few weredas who had no experience
with food aid in the past five years began receiving any in 1995/96.  The data indicates that a
larger number of weredas and households exited from food aid programs in 1995/96 than entered
into food aid programs.  This is consistent with the macro evidence presented in Figure 2
showing a general decline in the amount of food aid distributed nationally over the early 1990s. 
This raises a question as to whether households exiting from food aid are the better-off
households, or households with positive rainfall shocks (or at least without negative ones).  We
analyze this question in Section 8.
Insights on near-historical distribution patterns can also be obtained by calculating which
weredas and households have received food aid for three or more years out of the five years prior
to the survey (including the 95/96 survey year).  We refer to these households and weredas as
“chronic recipients,” and form binary dependent variables from them, which are analyzed in
Section 8.  Some 13.5% of weredas are chronic recipients of free food over the period 1991 to 
1996 and 9% are chronic recipients of FFW.  Among households in these chronic recipient
weredas, 31.5% and 19.8% are chronic recipients of free food and food for work, respectively.  25
5.3.  Organizational Presentation of Findings
Sections 6 through 9 present 15 regression model results.  These models are specified to account
for a number of different dimensions of food aid targeting: (1) federal vs. local food aid
allocation decisions; (2) free food vs. food for work; (3) factors determining whether a
household or wereda receives food aid vs. how much is received for those receiving; and  (4)
potential regional level differences in food aid.  To help the reader keep track of the various
results, we provide a brief road map here.  As discussed in Section 2, food aid allocations in
Ethiopia involve a two-step process.  The first step reflects the decisions by the Federal
authorities as to which weredas will receive food aid and how much: the second step reflects the
decisions of local authorities in determining which households will receive aid (and how much),
subject to the wereda-level allocation decisions of the federal authorities. 
Table 2 in Section 6.1 presents wereda-level determinants of the probability of receiving both
free food and food for work. The results are based on probit models that include all weredas
sampled at the national level.  These models reflect the allocation decisions of federal DPPC
authorities in their allocation of food aid to weredas.
Table 3 in Section 6.1 presents truncated OLS models, separately for free food and food for
work, of the amounts distributed among weredas in which that type of aid was distributed. 
Again, these models reflect the allocation decisions of federal authorities.
Table 4 in Section 6.2 presents household-level determinants of the probability of receiving free
food and food for work. The results are based on probit models that include all weredas in which
free food (in the FD model) or food for work (in the FFW model) was distributed.
Table 5 in Section 6.2 presents truncated OLS models of the amount of food aid distributed
among households in Ethiopia that received aid, again separated by type of program.
Table 6 in Section 7.1 presents probit models of the probability of receiving free food at
household level, based on separate regressions for each of the four regions in Ethiopia where
adequate data observations were available: Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya and Southern Regions.  
Table 8 shows how amounts of free food distributed to recipients varied by income and other
household and locational characteristics.  The observations include only households in weredas
where free food was distributed.   At this level of analysis, the amount of free food allocated to
each wereda has been fixed by federal level authorities.  Hence, these models measure the
allocation criteria of wereda and PA authorities.
Table 9 in Section 7.2 presents probit models of the probability of receiving FFW at household
level, based on separate regressions for the four regions.  Table 10 examines how amounts of
FFW received by participants varied by income and other household and locational
characteristics.  Again, the observations include only households in weredas where FFW
programs were in operation.  These models also measure the allocation criteria of wereda and PA   26
authorities.  Tables 7 and 11 summarize the relationship between household per capita incomes
and food aid allocations after controlling for other covariates.
Table 12 in Section 8.1 presents probit model results of wereda-level “exit” or discontinuation of
food aid programs.  The sample is composed of weredas that received free distribution or food
for work over the previous four-year period (1991/92-1994/95) for which recall data was
obtained.
Table 13 in Section 8.1 presents probit model results of household-level “exit” from food aid
programs.  The sample is comprised of households in weredas that received free distribution or
food for work over the previous four-year period (1991/92-1994/95) for which recall data was
obtained.
Table 14 in Section 8.2 presents probit models of the determinants of chronic food aid
participation at the wereda level.  The sample is comprised of all weredas sampled at national
level.
Table 15 in Section 8.2 presents probit models of the determinants of chronic food aid
participation at the household level.  The sample is comprised of households in chronic food aid-
receiving weredas.
Table 16 in Section 9 presents wereda-level probit models that assess the relationship between
spatial vulnerability and food insecurity during the 1984/85 famine and current food aid
allocation patterns.  The probit models are similar to those displayed in Tables 2 and 14 but with
the addition of a variable designed to measure spatial vulnerability during the 1984/85 famine. 
The sample contains all weredas sampled nationally.
Tables 17 and 18 examine the determinants of mean wereda and household income, both using
OLS.  The household-income models use both wereda-fixed effects and wereda-level
characteristics such as rainfall, road infrastructure, cereal prices, and regional dummies.  These
models are designed to identify easily identifiable and measurable indicators both total
household income and per capita income.33We report the marginal probabilities, and asymptotic normal statistics.  For dummy variables, the "marginal"
probabilities are calculated from discrete changes in the dummy variable, holding other variables constant at their
sample means.
34These probabilities are calculated as the mean over all sample points after changing the log of each wereda's mean
log per capita income to the appropriate amount (i.e., 5.5 for the 25
th percentile).  We use the same method to
calculate expected probabilities for other covariates.
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6.  RESULTS: NATIONAL LEVEL
6.1.  Regional and Community Allocations
6.1.1.  Probability of Receiving Food Aid
We begin with a discussion of the characteristics of weredas that received the different types of
food aid in 1995/6.  Table 2 provides the basic results.
33  We start, in columns 1 and 4, by
reporting the simple probits using only the killil region dummies.  One can immediately see that
Tigray Killil has a much higher probability of receiving aid than any other region, and
significantly so, the differential being especially high for free distribution.
In columns 2 and 5 we add the observable resource, access and agroclimatic, and shock
covariates.  The log of per capita income is significantly inversely related to participation, both
for free food and for food for work.  Increasing wereda mean log per capita income from the 25
th
(5.5) to the 75
th (6.2) percentile would decrease the probability of receiving free distribution
from 30.4% to 24.1%.
34  For food for work the predicted reception probabilities decline from
24.7% to 16.5%.  And yet the predicted probabilities of receiving free food or accepting food for
work when mean log per capita income is 6.6 (the 90
th percentile), are still substantially above
zero, 21.1% and 13.0% respectively.  Thus, although there is definite income targeting with
respect to the weredas that receive food aid, there is only a moderate difference in the probability
of being a recipient across fairly large differences in income.  No targeting is apparent with
respect to education of household heads or to mean land owned.
Of key importance is the finding that a high proportion of poor weredas were not allocated food
aid.  The probability of receiving free food was no more than 35% even for the very poorest 
weredas in the country, and is even less than that for FFW.  This indicates that either the amount
of total food aid available for distribution in 1995/96 was insufficient to meet the needs of all
poor weredas, or a large share of available food aid was distributed to relatively non-poor
weredas, or both.  We return to this issue later.
A potential reason why predicted wereda participation probabilities do not decline more as mean
log incomes increase is that there are still numerous households within the weredas with low
incomes.  To test this, we add to our basic specification the wereda variance of log per capita
incomes, a widely used measure of income inequality.  The only specification for which this  28
Table 2. Determinants of Food Aid Allocation: Wereda-Level Results (Probit
A)          
Free Distribution
(1 if at least one household in the Wereda
received FD)
Food for Work
(1 if at least one household in the Wereda
received FFW)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln (Per capita Income) -0.102 -0.020 -0.116 -0.051
(1.99)* (0.37) (2.85)** (1.55)
Fraction of households with some
education
-0.083 0.035 0.133 0.156
(0.67) (0.27) (1.37) (2.03)*
Mean household size -0.001 0.042 0.002 0.021
(0.04) (1.30) (0.08) (1.08)
Mean% of children (0-9 yrs) in households -0.006 -0.005 -0.008 -0.007
(1.86) (1.35) (2.91)** (2.91)**
Mean % of elder (over 55) in households  -0.005 -0.004 -0.007 -0.005
(1.19) (0.82) (1.98)* (1.91)
Fraction of female headed, not married 0.207 0.352 -0.054 -0.158
(1.06) (1.64) (0.35) (1.20)
Fraction of female headed, married 0.033 -0.003 0.457 0.334
(0.12) (0.01) (2.13)* (1.86)
Mean size of land owned -0.017 -0.029 0.005 0.008
(0.92) (1.05) (0.69) (1.36)
Fraction of Muslim households 0.126 0.127 -0.071 -0.081
(1.55) (1.48) (1.03) (1.43)
Fraction of Protestant households 0.064 0.033 0.085 0.131
(0.45) (0.22) (0.74) (1.31)
Fraction of livestock households -0.540 -0.545 -0.515 -0.480
(1.42) (1.24) (1.20) (1.35)
Mean % of plot area with shortage of rain 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(2.64)** (2.72)** (3.04)** (3.78)**
Mean % of plot area with flood 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.005
(1.33) (2.02)* (2.52)* (3.15)**
Mean % of plot area with crop disease or
insect problems
0.002 0.001 -0.000 -0.002
(0.93) (0.24) (0.18) (0.88)
Average rainfall 1988-95 (mm)   *10e-2 -0.025 0.002 -0.026 -0.007
(1.84) (0.11) (2.25)* (0.69)
Rainfall shocks in 1994 (mm)  *10e-2 0.012 0.027 0.009 0.011
(0.69) (1.43) (0.69) (0.99)
Rainfall shocks in 1995 (mm)  *10e-2 -0.025 -0.028 -0.009 -0.009
(1.68) (1.76) (0.74) (0.99)
Elevation   *10e-2 0.013 0.014 0.017 0.017
(2.18)* (2.15)* (3.46)** (4.12)**
History of Receiving Food Aid
B
4 years in last 4 years  (0,1) 0.792 0.868
(4.34)** (4.25)**
3 years in last 4 years  (0,1) 0.517 0.262
(2.95)** (2.33)*
2 years in last 4 years  (0,1) 0.295 0.425
(2.73)** (3.53)**
1 year in last 4 years  (0,1) 0.173 0.288
(2.30)* (4.22)**
Previous experience with the other type of




 D 0.494 0.502 0.126 0.299 0.380 0.339
(4.51)** (3.27)** (0.82) (3.02)** (2.60)** (2.28)*
Amhara 0.048 0.135 -0.074 -0.044 0.163 0.151
(0.66) (1.25) (0.67) (0.70) (1.61) (1.54)
Oromiya -0.119 0.017 -0.041 -0.090 0.147 0.148
(1.76) (0.18) (0.45) (1.51) (1.83) (2.03)*
Other Killils 0.231 0.474 0.292 0.051 0.399 0.337
(1.95) (2.88)** (1.66) (0.51) (2.40)* (2.02)*
Wald tests: For History  variables 24.7 ** 32.6 **
[0.00] [0.00]
                     For Plot level shocks 8.10 * 9.86 * 13.5 ** 20.5 **
[0.04] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00]
                     For Rainfall shocks 3.13 4.80 0.95 1.90
[0.21] [0.09] [0.62] [0.39]
                     For Road dummies
C 6.69 7.46 5.09 7.31
[0.24] [0.19] [0.41] [0.20]
                     For Regional dummies  22.2 ** 7.22 10.1 * 7.16
[0.00] [0.12] [0.04] [0.13]
Log likelihood -181.5 -151.8 -123.6 -170.3 -135.1 -104.6
Observations 348 348 348 348 348 348
Note: * indicates 5% significance; ** indicates 1% significance.  Numbers in parentheses are z-values.  Numbers in brackets are p-values.  A) Reported
coefficients are changes in marginal probability.  B) At least one household received FD (or FFW) for 4 years in last 4 years, and  so on.                       C)
Coefficients of road dummies are not reported.  D) Omitted region is “South.” 35Although Figure 6 suggests that wereda food for work receipt is a concave function of long-run median rainfall,
quadratic terms, when tried, were only significant when history variables are added.  They are not reported here.
36We experimented with quadratic terms in both rainfall shocks, thinking that larger shocks might elicit a larger
response.  In the case of free distribution that turned out to be the case for the 1995 shock, but the opposite held true
for the 1994 shock.  The marginal effects are 5.73e-5 (z-statistic of 0.28) and -6.07e-7 (z-statistic of 1.86) for 1995
and -3.5e-4 (z-statistic of 1.10) and 1.21e-6 (z-statistic of 1.71) for the 1994 shock.  The joint chi-square statistic is
10.32, which is significant at the .05 level.  For FFW, the rainfall shock variables remain not jointly significant at
standard levels, a chi-square statistic of 5.65 with 4 degrees of freedom.
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inequality variable has a z-score over 1 is in the base case for free distribution.  The mean log
income marginal probability rises to -.118 (z-statistic of 2.25) and the marginal probability for
the variance of log per capita income is -.12 (z-statistic of 1.86).  Now the predicted probability
of wereda receipt of free distribution at the 90
th percentile of mean log per capita income is
20.3%, almost the same as in the specification without variance of log per capita income.  So,
apparently it is the case that the income targeting is incomplete.  It is interesting that increasing
income inequality, holding mean log incomes constant, has the effect of lowering the wereda
participation probability.  This result implies that comparing two weredas with equal mean log
incomes, the one with a higher proportion of households with low incomes was less likely to
receive free distribution.
Median Meher season rainfall from 1988-95 is negatively (significant at the .10 level) related to
the chance of weredas receiving food aid, even controlling for other observables.  The mean of
median Meher rainfall across weredas is 843mm, a fairly high amount.  There is a great deal of
dispersion, however, for instance the 25
th percentile is 672mm and the 75
th percentile, 1047mm. 
Changing median long-run rainfall from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile lowers the average
probability of a wereda receiving free distribution by 7.9 percentage points, to 23.0%.  For food
for work average probabilities are lowered from 24.8% to 15.3%.  So there is some targeting of
food aid by long-run regional rainfall levels, more so in the case of food for work.
35
The zone-level rainfall deviation variables (for 1994 and 1995) are not jointly significant in
either the free food or food for work case, although rainfall shocks in 1995 has a negative
marginal probability almost identical to that on long-run rainfall for free food, and it is
significant at the 10% level.
36
Of the plot-level shock variables, farmer reports of having too much rain is positively related to
both free distribution and participation in FFW at the wereda level and reports of too much rain
are positively related to receiving FFW, each significant at 5%.  The disease and pest shock
variables do not significantly affect food aid receipt.  Moving from the 25
th to the 75
th percentiles
of each of the plot drought and flood percent of area affected variables results in the probabilities
of free distribution increasing from 24.5% to 27.1% for drought and from 26.5% to 27.5% for
flood.  Food for work probabilities increase from 18.0% to 20.5% and from 18.9% to 20.7% for
droughts and floods.  The fact that these changes in odds of wereda participation are not large,
stems in part from the fact that the inter-quartile range is small, from 0% to 7.5% of 37Chi-square statistics testing the two interaction terms jointly are 2.05 and 0.97 for free distribution and food for
work respectively.
38The chi-square statistic for those three interactions is 9.55.
39This also means that the impact of flooding on receiving aid is greater for higher income weredas.
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area for drought problems, and 0% to 4% for flooding.  Of course, if the changes in percent of
plot area affected are larger, so too will be increases in the probabilities of reception.
Specifications were tried that included interactions between long-term rainfall and the two
rainfall shock variables and separately, between long-run rainfall and plot-level shocks.  None of
these proved jointly significant.  In addition, we interacted mean wereda per capita income with
each set of shock variables separately.  Neither was close to significant in the case of rainfall
shocks,
37 while plot-shock-income interactions were jointly significant at the .05 level for free
distribution.
38  The major effect is that the negative influence of mean income on the probability
of receiving aid is lessened when the wereda has more flooding.
39
Among other covariates, elevation is positively (and significantly at the .05 level) related to
receipt of food aid, but the road dummy variables tend not to be significant.  The interpretation
of the elevation variable is not straightforward, but may be related to the fact that highland areas
tend to suffer from greater land degradation and population pressure compared to lowland areas. 
As a result, they tend to be more intensively targeted in food assistance programs.
The Tigray marginal probability is almost unchanged for free distribution when covariates are
added, but actually increases for FFW.  One can conclude that these observable covariates do not
help explain why weredas in Tigray are so likely to receive food aid.  As shown in Table 1, per
capita incomes in Tigray during the survey year were actually 12% higher than the national
average, and the proportion of households in Tigray that fell into the bottom national income
quartile was only 15%.
Once we control for the wereda's recent history of receiving food aid, which we do in columns 3
and 6 of Table 2, the regional effects lose their explanatory power in the case of free distribution. 
The Tigray "marginal" probability falls from .5 to .12 and loses all statistical significance.  In
contrast, the Tigray effect on FFW hardly shrinks and remains significant.  Marginal impacts of
being in other regions also shrink towards zero for free food.
The history dummy variables have extremely large "marginal" effects that swamp all else.   The
single most important factor determining current year probability of receiving aid is how
commonly it was received in the past.  Interestingly, the "cross-program" effect (e.g., the change 
in marginal probability of receiving FFW resulting from receiving free food in the past) is 40We have tried disaggregating the food for work history dummy variable in the same way as we do the free
distribution variables, when estimating the free distribution receipt probits (and visa versa), but it does not make
much difference.
41When we analyze households with wereda fixed effects, the fixed effects will capture any wereda-level
unobserved effect.  However, there may be unobserved household-level effects that remain.
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positive and significant at the .01 level for both free food and food for work.
40  The pattern of
allocation by government indicates that it does not view the two programs as substitutes.
The interpretation of these "own" and "cross" program effects is tricky because these history
variables are effectively lagged endogenous variables.  One can usefully think of the problem as
one of separating the impacts of unobserved heterogeneity from history, or state dependence
(see, for instance, Heckman 1981).  Equation 1 is a prototype example in which the regression 
 Y i,t = Yi,t-1 + X + µi + i,t [1]
includes a lagged dependent variable, Yi,t-1 while the unobserved error term includes a part, µi,
which is time-invariant, but differs by weredas or households and a part, , that is independent
over time and across weredas.
41  The problem is that Yi,t-1 is correlated with µi, though it is
independent of i,t, so that OLS (or simple probit) estimates of  are inconsistent as estimates of
the true history effects, so long as µ exists.  Another way of looking at the problem is that our
usual estimates of  can't distinguish between whether the impact of Yi,t-1 represents a true
history effect or the effect of the omitted unobserved heterogeneity term, µi.  The error
component µi can usefully be thought of as arising from time-invariant unobserved variables at
the wereda (or household) level, such as may be related to long-run neediness.  Real effects of
Yi,t-1, can be usefully thought of as representing inertia.  From these probit results we
unfortunately can't distinguish between the two, although later we will use what we consider to
be a good proxy for µi in an attempt to do so.
Note that once we include the food aid history variables, other covariates that had significant
impacts in our earlier specification become insignificant and have marginal effects that shrink
towards zero, particularly for income and long-run median rainfall, in both the free distribution
and food for work equations.  An important exception occurs for the plot-level shocks in both FD
and FFW probits, which maintain the magnitude of their marginal impacts and their significance
levels.  This finding is somewhat important because it implies that even controlling for past
receipt of aid, plot-level water shocks will increase the chance of remaining an aid recipient. 
This implies that some flexibility exists, despite history.  However, this apparent flexibility may
arise entirely because the volume of food aid in Ethiopia has declined in recent years.  Fixed
costs should matter much less for phasing out programs than they would for starting programs in
new weredas, however the magnitudes are small.  For FFW, increasing the percent of fields
damaged by too little rain from the 25
th to the 75
th percentiles would increase the probability of
having aid from 18.0% to 20.5%; for too much rain, from 18.9% to 20.7%.  For free distribution
food the same changes in plot drought would change the probabilities from 24.7% to 27.0%, and   32
for changes in plot flooding, from 26.0% to 27.3%.  Even so, these impacts are trivial compared
even to having had food aid in one of the last five years.
6.1.2.  Values of Food Aid Received by Weredas
In addition to exploring whether weredas received food aid, it is of interest to explore the
determinants of how much food aid was received per household.  The decision rules applied may
be quite different than the ones used to determine whether a wereda should receive any aid.  For
example, if the fixed costs of moving aid programs across weredas are very high, one wouldn't
expect programs to move rapidly as new information, such as on new rainfall shocks, became
known.  However, it is plausible that fixed costs related to changing throughput may be less,
especially for reducing throughput.  Consequently, it is possible that the impact of shocks, even
conditional on past history, may be larger for the amount of aid per household than it is on the
probability that weredas are dropped or added to the programs.
In this analysis, we exclude weredas that received no food aid because we want to concentrate on
the decisions made regarding amounts, which as discussed in Section 2 seem to differ from those
having to do with who gets any.  Table 3 contains the truncated OLS results for free distribution
and food for work respectively.  The table is organized similarly to Table 2.  The sample sizes
are small, and hence nothing is estimated with precision.  Indeed F-tests of all coefficients jointly
passes at just under and just over the .10 level for free distribution and food for work
respectively.  Among the individual coefficients that are significant at the .10 level, mean wereda
per capita income negatively affects the value of free distribution received per capita, while a
higher proportion of elderly positively affects the value of free food received.   Having more area
affected by diseases also raises the amounts per capita that are received.  In the case of mean
income, a large change, from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile, would lower the mean per capita
value received by approximately 15.4 birr, just over 60% of the 24.9 mean per capita value of
free distribution received in the 96 weredas that receive FD.  A shift, equivalent to the inter-
quartile range in the percent of area affected by disease, would increase mean value of free food
aid received by 13.5 birr, also a substantial amount.  For food for work, increases in rainfall in
1995 above the 1988-1995 median actually raises the value of FFW coming in.  Interestingly, for
both types of food aid, the effect of getting some food aid of either type in the past has no
relationship to how much comes in now.  33
Table 3. Determinants of the Value of Food Aid Distributed to Weredas that Received Aid (Truncated OLS)
Free Distribution
 (Mean Per capita value received in Birr) 
Food for Work
 (Mean Per capita value received in Birr) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln (Per capita Income) -20.62 -16.61 -6.057 -6.032
(1.92) (1.48) (1.49) (1.37)
Fraction of households with some
education
-0.326 -1.757 16.92 17.57
(0.01) (0.07) (1.73) (1.72)
Mean household size 3.705 7.405 -1.700 0.368
(0.54) (0.99) (0.55) (0.11)
Mean % of children (0-9 yrs) in
households
-0.110 -0.064 0.197 0.045
(0.16) (0.09) (0.61) (0.12)
Mean % of elder (over 55) in households  1.632 1.552 -0.063 0.044
(2.05)* (1.82) (0.20) (0.13)
Fraction of female headed, not married 19.04 21.02 22.92 16.14
(0.59) (0.58) (1.19) (0.80)
Fraction of female headed, married -27.90 -12.40 -28.21 -31.77
(0.46) (0.19) (1.11) (1.15)
Mean size of land owned 2.639 3.635 -0.813 -0.504
(0.30) (0.41) (1.19) (0.70)
Fraction of Muslim households -9.260 -8.978 -5.920 -6.019
(0.53) (0.50) (0.83) (0.76)
Fraction of Protestant households -0.559 -2.682 -3.722 4.159
(0.02) (0.08) (0.25) (0.25)
Fraction of livestock households -37.68 -13.92 -29.99 -38.05
(0.40) (0.14) (0.55) (0.68)
Mean % of plot area with shortage of rain 0.163 0.090 0.147 0.180
(0.64) (0.33) (1.32) (1.45)
Mean % of plot area with flood -0.011 0.081 -0.010 0.053
(0.03) (0.19) (0.06) (0.27)
Mean % of plot area with crop disease or
insect problems
1.175 1.043 0.046 0.157
(2.03)* (1.74) (0.20) (0.62)
Average rainfall 1988-95 (mm) *10e-2 1.170 1.474 1.988 1.381
(0.34) (0.42) (1.53) (0.89)
Rainfall shocks in 1994 (mm) *10e-2 -1.230 -0.498 -0.162 0.076
(0.40) (0.15) (0.12) (0.05)
Rainfall shocks in 1995 (mm) *10e-2 -2.323 -0.194 3.268 2.682
(0.51) (0.04) (2.47)* (1.87)
Elevation  *10e-2 -0.229 -0.450 -0.265 -0.166
(0.19) (0.36) (0.48) (0.29)
History of Receiving Food Aid
A
4 years in last 4 years  (0,1) 14.35 12.68
(0.74) (1.55)
3 years in last 4 years  (0,1) -2.347 4.935
(0.11) (0.54)
2 years in last 4 years  (0,1) -10.41 8.241
(0.58) (0.94)
1 year in last 4 years  (0,1) -15.08 9.048
(0.86) (1.37)





C 30.88 7.948 -2.866 18.11 12.25 19.94
(2.18)* (0.35) (0.12) (3.34)** (1.11) (1.55)
Amhara 34.77 36.12 30.03 1.650 -7.389 0.048
(2.53)* (1.54) (1.19) (0.30) (0.68) (0.00)
Oromiya -3.331 8.131 5.218 -1.966 1.073 3.304
(0.23) (0.39) (0.25) (0.38) (0.11) (0.32)
Other Killils 3.513 5.992 3.899 -2.854 -2.640 -0.072
(0.20) (0.23) (0.15) (0.39) (0.19) (0.00)
Constant 8.067 109.9 72.67 10.87 37.06 22.83
(0.74) (1.36) (0.82) (2.75)** (1.25) (0.62)
F tests:  For History variables 0.83 0.76
[0.51] [0.56]
               For Plot level shocks 1.82 1.15 0.63 0.91
[0.15] [0.34] [0.60] [0.44]
               For Rainfall shocks 0.20 0.01 3.11 1.76
[0.82] [0.99] [0.05] [0.18]
               For Road dummies
B 1.10 0.81 1.06 0.47
[0.37] [0.55] [0.40] [0.79]
               For Regional dummies  0.69 0.61 1.05 1.14
[0.60] [0.66] [0.39] [0.35]
R square 0.138 0.377 0.410 0.223 0.46 0.51
Observations 96 96 96 75 75 75
Note: * indicates 5% significance; ** indicates 1% significance.  Numbers in parentheses are absolute t-values.  Numbers in brackets are p-values.   A) At least
one household received FD (or FFW) for 4 years in last 4 years, and so on.  B) Coefficients of road dummies are not reported. C) Omitted region
is “South.”42These tobits include weredas in which 100% of households receive aid, 15 weredas for free distribution and 9 for
food for work.
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6.2.  Household Allocations Within Weredas
We now turn to the allocation of food aid to households within weredas.  We condition these
samples on weredas that have some food aid of the same type available in the same year.  This is
done to identify the inferred criteria driving allocations to households, which, as discussed in
Section 2, are made by local committees, not by the central government.  Of the households in
these weredas, only 40% received free distribution and 40% food for work.  As before, we model
receipt of food aid separately from the value received.
We report three specifications.  One contains wereda-level covariates and killzone-level dummy
variables.  For these regressions there is variation in covariates both within and between
weredas. Two additional specifications use wereda dummy variables (with and without
household-level history variables), so that only within wereda variation exists.  For the probits
this means that only weredas in which household participation is incomplete are used in the
estimation, hence, sample size is smaller than for the first two specifications.  Of course, this is
not true for the truncated OLS regressions.
As an additional set of regressions, we estimated upper-censored tobits at the wereda level,
42 for
which the dependent variable is the proportion of households within the wereda that receive food
aid of a particular type.  The results are close enough to the conditional household probits that
we do not report them here.
6.2.1.  Probability of Receiving Food Aid
Table 4 contains the probit results for the probability of a household's receiving free food and
food for work (within weredas where this type of aid was distributed).  Higher household per
capita income reduces the chance of receiving free distribution and accepting food for work. 
Households at the 25
th percentile of national log per capita income have an average probability of
41.6% of receiving free food and 41.8% of participating in food for work.  At the 75
th income
percentile these probabilities fall to 35.3% and 35.7%.  For relatively high income households, at
the 90
th percentile, the probabilities are still 32.6% and 33.2%.  Thus, the probability that a
household at the 25
th per capita income percentile would receive free food or food for work is
only 9 percentage points different from a household at the 90
th  income percentile.
Again, we are confronted by the finding that the probability of receiving food aid is quite low
even for very poor households (below the 25
th per capita income percentile) in weredas where
food aid is distributed.  If we use Dercon and Krishnan’s (1998) 1995 rural poverty line estimate
of roughly 600 birr per capita as a rough indicator, the findings suggest that well under half of
these households received any type of food aid – even for those households in weredas where  35
Table 4. Determinants of Food Aid Allocation:  Household Level  (Probit
A) 
Free Distribution
 (1 if the household received FD)
Food for Work
 (1 if the household participated FFW)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln (Per capita Income) -0.071 -0.092 -0.103 -0.061 -0.002 0.009
(3.12)** (3.73)** (4.01)** (2.36)* (0.07) (0.29)
Household head has some education  (0,1) -0.075 -0.130 -0.124 -0.025 -0.066 -0.078
(1.73) (2.88)** (2.73)** (0.53) (1.24) (1.47)
Household size -0.003 -0.018 -0.019 -0.006 -0.005 -0.000
(0.34) (1.66) (1.76) (0.55) (0.40) (0.02)
Percentage of children 
(0-9 yrs)
0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(1.63) (2.30)* (2.38)* (0.38) (0.44) (0.35)
Percentage of elder 
(older than 55 yrs)
0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003
(0.63) (0.77) (0.49) (1.63) (1.79) (1.80)
Female headed household, not married 
(0,1)
0.166 0.105 0.098 -0.031 -0.009 -0.004
(2.90)** (1.69) (1.57) (0.49) (0.13) (0.06)
Female headed household, but head is
married  (0,1)
0.076 0.082 0.084 -0.102 -0.143 -0.146
(0.92) (0.95) (0.96) (1.17) (1.62) (1.65)
Land owned in ha 0.004 -0.001 -0.002 0.025 0.015 0.015
(0.41) (0.10) (0.12) (0.80) (1.05) (0.95)
Muslim household  (0,1) 0.011 0.049 0.037 -0.081 -0.041 0.022
(0.20) (0.45) (0.34) (1.19) (0.31) (0.16)
Protestant household  (0,1) 0.170 0.187 0.159 -0.113 -0.111 -0.109
(2.39)* (2.19)* (1.83) (1.49) (1.20) (1.30)
Livestock household  (0,1) -0.041 -0.088 -0.121 0.079 -0.061 0.028
(0.27) (0.54) (0.79) (0.44) (0.34) (0.15)
Percentage of area with shortage of rain 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(1.83) (1.09) (1.47) (0.70) (1.47) (1.31)
Percentage of area with flood 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.13) (0.98) (0.92) (0.31) (0.02) (0.08)
Percentage of areas with crop disease or
insect problems
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.002
(0.20) (0.32) (0.31) (1.72) (0.83) (1.25)












Elevation *10e-2 0.001 0.009
(0.26) (1.26)
History of Receiving Food Aid
4 years in last 4 years  (0,1) 0.190 0.389
(1.41) (2.07)*
3 years in last 4 years  (0,1) -0.112 -0.052
(1.13) (0.36)
2 years in last 4 years  (0,1) -0.167 -0.027
(2.76)** (0.23)
1 years in last 4 years  (0,1) -0.157 -0.125
(3.21)** (2.21)*



















Dire Dawa -0.326 0.348
(3.00)** (2.16)*
Wald tests: For History variables 19.4 ** 10.4 **
[0.00] [0.00]
      For Plot level shocks 3.37 2.04 2.91 3.10 3.77 4.39
[0.34] [0.56] [0.41] [0.38] [0.29] [0.22]
      For Rainfall shock 8.12 * 2.62
[0.02] [0.27]
      For Road dummies
B 9.45 7.49
[0.09] [0.19]
      For Regional/Wereda dummies  69.8 ** 169.3 ** 171.4** 64.6 ** 138.2 ** 137.8**
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Number of observations  938 838 838 714 681 681
Note: * indicates 5% significance; ** indicates 1% significance.  Numbers in parentheses are z-values.  Numbers in brackets are p-values. 
A) Reported coefficients are changes in marginal probability.   B) Coefficients of road dummies are not reported. 43 Obviously zero households under the poverty line received food aid in the roughly 70% of weredas nationwide
where food aid was not distributed.
44However, when income is omitted from the household probit with wereda fixed effects, still the plot-level shock
variables are not close to being jointly significant; see Appendix Table 2.
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food aid was distributed.
43  These findings suggest that the amount of food aid distributed in
1995/96 was inadequate to meet the needs of all households under the poverty line or even under
the 25
th per capita income percentile.
When we look exclusively within weredas (columns 2, 3, 5, and 6) the negative income effect
remains significant in the case of free food, even when history variables are added.  There is a
predicted difference of 8.1 percentage points when one moves from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile
of log per capita income, although, again, even at the 90
th percentile, the predicted participation
rate is still 23.4%.  In the case of FFW, wereda fixed effects shrink the income coefficient to near
zero.  The results generally indicate that income targeting does play an important, but incomplete
role in allocating free food to households.  In the case of FFW, households in weredas with lower
incomes apparently are more likely to accept.  However, since even high income households
have a non-trivial chance of receiving food aid, aid is clearly targeted very incompletely by
income.
Education of the household head also has a negative impact on households receiving free
distribution, independent of income.  Education of the household head has no independent effect
on receiving FFW.  Households with a higher proportion of children and households with
currently unmarried female heads are more likely to obtain free food, as are Protestant
households.  Controlling for wereda fixed effects, household size is weakly negatively related to
the probability of getting free food.  Households with more elderly members are less likely to
engage in food for work.
In terms of shock variables, plot-level drought shocks have a weak positive impact on receiving
free food, but only when wereda-level differences are not being controlled.  Positive rainfall
shocks in 1994 are associated with lower odds of receiving free distribution food.  For FFW,
having a higher percent of cropped area affected by disease and pests raises the probability of
participation, although when wereda fixed effects are being controlled the impact is estimated
only imprecisely.
With wereda fixed effects included, we have a good test of whether free food aid is being used to
insure against idiosyncratic plot-level shocks.  The fact that we do not observe significant plot
shock impacts on free distribution suggests that this form of aid is not being used for insurance
purposes.  On the other hand, these results are derived holding income constant.  As discussed
above, income does have a significant negative impact on the likelihood of households receiving
free distribution within weredas.  Furthermore, income has both permanent and transitory
components, so it may be that transitory income movements are smoothed by free food
allocations within villages.
4445A quadratic term in household size is significant in the food for work truncated regressions.  The shape of the
relationship is negative and convex.
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Instead of insuring against negative weather or pest shocks, the results indicate that food aid is
going to households that received it chronically, for all 4 years in the prior 4 years to 1995,
possibly reflecting long-run need.  This is true regardless of whether wereda-level fixed effects
are included in the model.  The effects of past household receipt seem to be stronger in the case
of FFW.  In the FFW regressions, the coefficients of other covariates, particularly income, shrink
toward zero as the history variables are used.  There is a positive cross-program effect of
receiving free food on the probability of participating in food for work, though not the reverse. 
The key question, as it was in the wereda-level analysis, is whether history is important because
these are the truly needy households, or whether there is inertia in changing allocations.
6.2.2.  Values of Food Aid Received By Households
Table 5 contains the truncated OLS results for households living in weredas participating in food
aid programs.  Higher per capita incomes reduce the value of free food received per capita,
conditional on getting some.  Comparing households at the 25
th and 75
th percentiles, free food 
received per capita declines by 20.8 birr.  The effect of income on the amount of free food
received declines by 20% when history variables are added, and declines substantially, 45%,
when wereda dummy variables replace wereda and higher level covariates.  In the case of food
for work, log of per capita income has no impact unless wereda dummy variables are added, in
which case income has a small, but imprecisely estimated impact.
The coefficients on the history variables differ from the wereda results.  Both the individual
coefficients and the group are only significant in the case of FFW.  With wereda dummies, the
magnitude is only large if the household has been a chronic receiver of food aid (in three or four
of the past four years), in which case FFW increases by between 24 and 37 birr per year.
The major result, for both free distribution and food for work value received is the very strong
negative relationship with household size.  Within weredas, adding one person (in the age
proportions as currently exist) lowers the value of free distribution by 6.1 birr per capita. 
Remembering that the average value consumed is 18 birr, this is a substantial impact.  For FFW,
the magnitude of the effect is smaller, 4.2 birr less for every additional household member, but is
still highly significant.
45
The negative impact of household size on food aid within weredas is intriguing.  The Sharp
Report (1997) suggests that local authorities in some areas limited participation in FFW
programs to only one member per household.  To test this, we reran the food for work truncated
regressions, defining the dependent variable as the total value of food for work received by the   38
Table 5. Determinants of the Value of Food Aid Received Among Households Who Received (Truncated OLS)
Free Distribution
 (The amount received in Birr) 
Food for Work
 (The amount received in Birr) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln (Per capita Income) -18.35 -9.281 -7.618 -1.443 -4.076 -2.892
(3.26)** (1.58) (1.28) (0.56) (1.34) (0.95)
Household head has some education  (0,1) 6.797 11.89 11.02 10.07 10.66 9.213
(0.57) (0.99) (0.92) (2.06)* (1.95) (1.69)
Household size -6.120 -8.655 -8.809 -4.224 -4.802 -4.661
(2.36)* (3.47)** (3.52)** (3.96)** (4.50)** (4.43)**
Percentage of children 
(0-9 yrs)
0.030 0.048 0.062 -0.030 -0.045 -0.020
(0.13) (0.23) (0.29) (0.29) (0.45) (0.21)
Percentage of elder 
(older than 55 yrs)
0.640 0.048 -0.021 0.016 0.014 -0.006
(2.64)** (0.21) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.04)
Female headed household, not married 
(0,1)
-1.420 3.105 -0.877 3.109 -11.90 -11.85
(0.11) (0.24) (0.07) (0.45) (1.53) (1.55)
Female headed household, but head is
married  (0,1)
-10.92 1.327 2.478 0.767 0.093 -1.937
(0.54) (0.07) (0.13) (0.08) (0.01) (0.19)
Land owned in ha -0.770 -0.686 0.278 -0.211 0.548 0.620
(0.15) (0.12) (0.05) (0.79) (0.15) (0.17)
Muslim household  (0,1) -1.467 -1.050 0.575 -4.475 11.17 9.107
(0.10) (0.05) (0.03) (0.62) (0.69) (0.57)
Protestant household  (0,1) -15.98 0.187 -3.387 11.24 16.86 7.586
(0.80) (0.01) (0.15) (1.32) (1.70) (0.74)
Livestock household  (0,1) -6.020 10.08 12.60 5.842 12.41 18.55
(0.17) (0.28) (0.35) (0.43) (0.88) (1.32)
Percentage of area with shortage of rain -0.051 0.001 0.046 0.007 0.072 0.078
(0.31) (0.01) (0.26) (0.09) (0.76) (0.84)
Percentage of area with flood 0.118 0.486 0.495 -0.085 0.124 0.101
(0.44) (1.68) (1.72) (0.68) (0.81) (0.67)
Percentage of areas with crop disease or
insect problems
0.180 0.041 0.044 -0.123 -0.040 -0.006
(0.79) (0.18) (0.20) (1.16) (0.34) (0.06)
Average Rainfall 1988-95 (mm) *10e-2 1.072 2.744
(0.27) (1.94)
Rainfall shocks in 1994 (mm)  *10e-2 1.106 -0.273
(0.37) (0.21)




History of Receiving Food Aid
4 in last 4 years  (0,1) 57.59 24.03
(2.52)* (2.20)
3 years in last 4 years  (0,1) 7.794 33.51
(0.41) (2.98)**
2 years in last 4 years  (0,1) 2.034 4.500
(0.15) (0.45)
1 years in last 4 years  (0,1) 10.91 -0.021
(0.81) (0.00)



















Dire Dawa 72.02 9.472
(1.28) (0.63)
Constant 192.9 178.4 163.3 82.69 93.7 79.37
(3.78)** (2.73)** (2.44)* (3.60)** (3.74)** (3.03)**
F tests: For History variables 1.65 3.11*
[0.16] [0.02]
     For Plot level shocks 0.30 0.95 1.01 0.59 0.58 0.43
[0.82] [0.42] [0.39] [0.62] [0.63] [0.73]
     For Rainfall shocks 0.37 7.51 **
[0.69] [0.00]
     For Road dummies
A 2.88* 4.20 **
[0.01] [0.00]
     For Regional/Wereda dummies  1.16 3.16 ** 2.49** 0.33 2.90** 2.95**
[0.32] [0.00] [0.00] [0.95] [0.00] [0.00]
Note : * indicates 5% significance; ** indicates 1% significance.  Numbers in parentheses are absolute t-values.  Numbers in brackets are p-values.                     
A) Individual coefficients of road dummies are not reported. Number of observations are 372 for column 1, 2, and 3, and 286 for column 4, 5, and 6. 46Then log of per capita income coefficient becomes more negative and is significant at the .10 level.
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household instead of per capita value.  This turns the household size coefficient positive and still
significant at the .05 level when wereda dummy variables are used.
46  This result implies that
either the limits on one person per household are not widely enforced, or that participant workers
with large families tend to work for longer periods in FFW programs.
The plot-shock covariates are never significant in the truncated OLS regressions explaining per
capita values received; the F-statistics are 0.6 for free distribution and 0.5 for FFW.  Hence there
is no evidence for food aid being used for insurance purposes in terms of amounts received.
6.3.  Robustness Checks
As discussed above, the income figures are incomplete in that they do not cover the secondary
Belg harvest.  This second cropping season is used only when the monthly rainfall distribution is
double-peaked, which happens in a minority of areas in Ethiopia.  As a robustness check on the
income (and other) coefficients we drop weredas from areas with Belg production from the
analyses.  The results, reported in Appendix Table 1 for wereda and household levels, are
broadly the same as the base results, particularly for income; for instance for the wereda results
without history variables, a -.096 marginal probability excluding the south versus -.102 including
it.
Some differences in results might be expected if allocation rules are different across regions. 
The biggest differences we find are in the household-level results, which reflects decisions
within local weredas.  As can be seen, however, the differences are in general not large.  The fact
that the wereda results in Appendix Table 1 are so close to the base results (Table 2) indicates
that the central government uses essentially the same considerations in apportioning aid across
all of Ethiopia.  The truncated OLS results are also very close to the base case.  They are
available upon request.
As a second check we run the regressions without income.  This specification is important
because arguably the influence of factors such as shock variables may be understated when we
hold income constant, if part of their influence comes through income.  The results are reported
in Appendix Table 2.  Here the results are remarkably similar to those of the base specification. 
We conclude that the base case results are quite robust and unaffected by the inclusion or
exclusion of endogenous income and areas with bi-modal rainfall patterns.47The Southern Region is formally called the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region.
48While it would have been interesting to also examine how food aid was allocated to weredas within each region
(inferring the allocation criteria of the federal authorities), there were insufficient weredas within each region to do
this.
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7.  RESULTS: REGIONAL LEVEL
This section examines potential regional differences in food aid targeting.  Because of limited
degrees of freedom, we do not run wereda-level probit regressions for each region.  Rather, we
confine our analysis to the household level in each of the four regions where adequate household
observations were available: Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya, and the South.
47  Further, within these
four regions, we confine the analysis to households in weredas where food aid was distributed. 
This is done to identify the inferred criteria driving allocations within weredas, which, as
discussed in Section 2, are made by local committees, not by the central government.
48  This
procedure resulted in 106 (68) valid observations for free distribution (food for work) in Tigray
Region; 200 (184) for free distribution (food for work) in Amhara Region; 122 (136) in
Oromiya, and 179 (149) in the South.
Figure 7 shows how the probability of receiving food aid varies with the log of per capita income
in each region.  Figure 8 shows how per capita amounts received (conditional on positive
receipt) vary with the log of per capita income.   These household-level graphs are conditioned
on living in weredas that have some sample households receiving aid. 
The figures indicate large differences in the probability of receiving free food and food for work
across regions.  For example, a household with log per capita income of 5 (which corresponds to
148 birr per capita, and is below the 25
th per capita income percentile in each region except
Southern), has a probability of about 60% of receiving free food if that household lived in Tigray
(in a wereda where free food was distributed).  A household with the same per capita income
level in Amhara (and living in a wereda where free food was distributed) had a probability of
near 75% of receiving free food, but this declined to 40% or less for households of the same
income level living in either Oromiya or Southern Region.  These results highlight several
points: first, free food was distributed to a greater percentage of households within receiving
weredas in Tigray and Amhara than in the other two regions; second, and relatedly, the
proportion of relatively high-income households that received free food was markedly higher in
Tigray and parts of Amhara than in the other regions.  For example, the probability that
households over the 75
th per capita income percentile would receive free food in Amhara (within
weredas receiving free food) was over 50%, while in Southern Region it was under 20%.
There are also major differences across regions in the probability of receiving FFW for a given
level of household income.  For example, at a log per capita income of 5, the probability of a
household receiving FFW (again in weredas were FFW was operating) was near 75% in Tigray,
40% in Amhara, 50% in Oromiya, and less than 40% in the South.    41
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Figure 7. Free Distribution and Food for Work Distribution by Region
Note: Dotted lines are drawn at the 25
th and 75
th percentiles of ln pre-aid per capita income, corresponding to
214 and 612 birr for Tigray, 214 and 601 birr for Amhara, 240and 731 birr for Oromiya, and 131 and 443 birr
for Southern. 
Samples in all panels include all households residing in weredas where FD or FFW were distributed.
Perhaps surprisingly, the probability that households in the lowest income quartile would receive
food aid was higher in the regions where per capita incomes were also relatively high.
There also appear to be major differences in the extent of income-based targeting of free food
within regions.  For example, within weredas in Tigray in which free food was distributed, the
probability that a household will receive free food is near 100% at very low income levels, but is
relatively constant at about 45% for households beyond the 25
th per capita income percentile. 
The probability of receiving free food in the Southern Region is about 45% for the bottom 25
th
income percentile and declines to about 20% for households at the 75
th income percentile.  In
Amhara and Oromiya regions, the probability of receiving free food is relatively flat over the
lower half of the per capita income distribution, and then declines more markedly over the upper
half of the income distribution.    42




































































































































By contrast, there is little discernable income-based targeting of food for work (within weredas
where FFW was in operation) in any of the regions except Oromiya.  In Tigray, participation in
FFW is largely invariant to income over the bottom half of the income distribution (ranging from
roughly 75 to 400 birr per capita), but declines moderately over the upper half of the income
distribution.
Figure 8 shows how the value of free food and food for work varies with income (for those
households that received aid).  These figures indicate a mixed record of income-based targeting. 
Only in the case of free distribution in Amhara was the value of food aid inversely related to per
capita income.  In some areas, e.g., Tigray Region, the value of aid received was actually
positively related to household per capita income  (for both FD and FFW).  The allocation of aid
in Oromiya and Southern Regions were basically unrelated to income (for both FD and FFW).  
Figure 8. Value of Food Aid Received Among Households Who Received by Region
Note: Dotted lines are drawn at the 25
th and 75
th percentiles of ln pre-aid per capita income, corresponding to
214 and 612 birr for Tigray; 214 and 601 birr for Amhara; 240and 731 birr for Oromiya; and 131 and 443 birr
for Southern.
Samples in each panel include all households that received FD or FFW.  43
However, these relationships are only bivariate, and we now examine through conditional probit
models whether they hold after controlling for other household covariates and wereda-level
effects.
We present two different probit specifications for FD and FFW in each region.  We use
household-level covariates and wereda-level dummy variables, first without household-level
food aid history variables and then with them.  In both cases, the models measure within-wereda
determinants of FD and FFW allocation by wereda and PA authorities.
7.1.  Targeting of Free Food
Table 6 contains the probit results for the probability of receiving free food for households
residing in weredas in which free food was distributed.  The results show large regional
differences in the degree of income-based targeting.  Targeting according to income was most
evident in Amhara Region, and this was the only region where the relationship between the log
of per capita household income and receipt of free food was statistically significant at the 0.10
level or below.  Households at the 25
th percentile of log per capita income in weredas where free
food was distributed in Amhara had an average probability of 78% of receiving free food; the
probability declined to 62% and 56% for households at the 75
th and 90
th income percentile,
respectively.  There was little or no relationship between income and the probability of receiving
food aid in the South and in Tigray.  In the South, for instance, the average probability of
receiving free food in weredas where free food was distributed was constant at 36% for
households at the 25
th, 75
th, and 90
th log per capita income percentiles (Table 7).   In Tigray
Region, the probability of receiving free food declined from 58% (for households at the 25
th
income percentile) to 55% and 53% for households at the 75
th and 90
th income percentile.  The
results indicate that the significant and moderate degree of within-wereda income-based
targeting found in the household probits using the national level sample in Table 4 were driven
largely by impressive income targeting of free distribution by peasant association authorities in
Amhara Region.  For each region, the predicted probabilities of receiving free distribution for
households at various income levels is presented in Table 7.  These predicted probabilities are
derived after 
holding all other covariates constant at their wereda-level means.  Consistent with earlier
findings in Section 6, the probability of a Tigray household at the 90
th income percentile
receiving free food is higher than the probability of receiving for a household at the 25
th
percentile nationwide.
The results in Table 6 also show regional differences in the kinds of criteria employed by local
authorities in allocating free food.  For example, there were four statistically significant (at the
0.05 level) household-level indicators of who received free food in Tigray: female-headed
households/not married; percentage of family members over 55 years; percentage of crop area in
which the household head reported a shortage of rain; and percentage of crop area in which the
household head reported crop disease.  In Amhara region, non-livestock households and
households who stated that a large share of their crop area suffered from disease and/or pests  44
Table 6. Determinants of Free Distribution by Region:  Household Level Results (Probit
A) 
Free Distribution
 (1 if the household received FD) 
Tigray Amhara Oromiya Southern
ln (Per-capita Income) -0.105 -0.061 -0.262 -0.265 -0.092 -0.093 -0.004 -0.024
(0.81) (0.39) (3.82)** (3.54)** (1.40) (1.42) (0.13) (0.78)
Household head has some education 
(0,1)
-0.356 -0.362 -0.228 -0.226 -0.008 -0.029 -0.125 -0.132
(1.65) (1.55) (1.84) (1.74) (0.08) (0.28) (2.36)* (2.49)*
Household size 0.015 0.019 -0.050 -0.038 -0.052 -0.058 0.002 0.001
(0.39) (0.36) (1.26) (0.89) (1.85) (1.99)* (0.15) (0.05)
Percentage of children 
(0-9 yrs)
0.005 0.009 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.002 0.002
(1.02) (1.52) (1.56) (1.18) (2.06)* (1.86) (1.87) (1.72)
Percentage of elder 
(older than 55 yrs)
0.015 0.020 -0.001 -0.001 0.004 0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(2.37)* (2.65)** (0.33) (0.32) (1.31) (1.07) (0.96) (0.93)
Female headed household, not married 
(0,1)
0.732 0.880 -0.106 -0.077 0.233 0.267 -0.036 -0.049
(3.03)** (3.54)** (0.63) (0.42) (1.43) (1.67) (0.50) (0.70)
Female headed household, but head is
married  (0,1)
0.384 0.628 -0.008 -0.103 -0.030 -0.092 0.014 0.003
(0.92) (1.43) (0.03) (0.32) (0.19) (0.66) (0.16) (0.04)
Land owned in ha -0.082 -0.033 0.075 0.069 -0.084 -0.071 -0.007 -0.006
(0.29) (0.10) (0.65) (0.57) (1.02) (0.92) (0.52) (0.47)
Muslim household  (0,1) 0.847 0.877 0.409 0.446 0.449 0.440 -0.376 -0.357
(0.00) (0.32) (1.66) (1.70) (2.21)* (2.20)* (3.52)** (3.60)*
*
Protestant household  (0,1) 0.589 0.713 -0.045 -0.000
(1.33) (1.57) (0.79) (0.00)
Livestock household  (0,1) -0.515 -0.517
(2.03)* (2.39)*
Percentage of area with shortage of
rain
0.009 0.010 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.005 -0.011 -0.009
(2.26)* (2.02)* (0.13) (0.67) (1.89) (1.97)* (2.17)* (1.97)*
Percentage of area with flood -0.005 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 0.005 0.006 0.003 0.002
(0.73) (0.23) (0.17) (0.07) (1.51) (1.53) (1.39) (0.93)
Percentage of areas with crop disease
or insect problems
0.013 0.018 -0.005 -0.006 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.002
(2.89)** (3.04)** (2.16)* (2.51)* (0.93) (1.27) (1.43) (1.10)
History of Receiving Food Aid
4 years in last 4 years  (0,1) 0.460 0.034
(1.29) (0.11)
3 years in last 4 years  (0,1) -0.156 0.040
(0.43) (0.15)
2 years in last 4 years  (0,1) -0.164 -0.199
(0.60) (1.39)
1 years in last 4 years  (0,1) 0.301 -0.363
(1.00) (3.07)**
At least 1 year in last 4 years   (0,1) -0.054 -0.071
(0.37) (1.09)
Previous participation in FFW (0,1) 0.730 -0.226 0.303 -0.136
(2.31)* (1.56) (1.86) (2.33)*
Wereda Dummies – Wereda dummies – 
Wald tests: For History variables 2.35 10.9*
[0.67] [0.03]
                      For Plot level shocks 10.8* 10.7* 5.16 7.75 5.89 6.18 8.50* 5.80
[0.01] [0.01] [0.16] [0.05] [0.12] [0.10] [0.04] [0.12]
                      For Wereda dummies  18.0 16.1 46.34** 46.1** 25.5 24.9 21.5* 27.4**
[0.52] [0.52] [0.00] [0.00] [0.08] [0.10] [0.04] [0.01]
Log likelihood -34.8 -29.0 -97.6 -91.0 -45.3 -43.5 -77.3 -73.9
Number of observations  106 106 200 200 122 122 179 179
Notes: * indicates 5% significance; ** indicates 1% significance.  Numbers in parentheses are z-values.  Numbers in brackets are p-values. 
Conditional on households being in Weredas with  one or more households receiving Food Aid.  Dummy variables for ‘Protestant household’ and
‘Livestock households’ are excluded in some areas because of small numbers of observations. For Oromiya and Southern, ‘At least one year...’ is
used instead of ‘4 years ...’ or ‘3 years...’ because of small numbers of observations.  A) Reported coefficients are changes in marginal
probability.    45
Table 7. Predicted Probabilities of Receiving Free Distribution and Predicted Per capita
Values Received, for Households in Weredas Where Free Food Was Distributed
(Derived from Results in Tables 6 and 8)
Predicted Probability of Receiving FD for households in weredas where





National 42 35 33 38
    Tigray 58 55 53 56
    Amhara 58 40 34 50
    Oromiya 31 21 17 26
    Southern 31 30 30 30
Predicted amount received (birr per capita) by recipient households,





National 43 22 13 32
    Tigray 69 76 80 72
    Amhara 58 41 34 50
    Oromiya 17 11 9 14
    Southern 12 14 15 13
 
were more likely to receive free food.  In Oromiya Region, households with many members and
a high percentage of young children were more likely to receive food aid.  Also in Oromiya
Region, Muslim households were much more likely to receive free food than Orthodox
households.  And in the Southern Region, the most significant indicators of who received free
food were households in which the family head had no formal education, households that were
not Muslim, and, ironically, households that reported relatively little crop damage from
inadequate rainfall.  These results indicate that the PA leaders who are distributing food aid to
recipient households at the local level are generally using some criteria for determining who
receives.  And most (not all) of these criteria appear to be reasonable, in the sense that they are
generally considered to be correlated with need.  In Section 10 we examine the extent to which
these indicators actually are correlated with wereda and household income.49These predicted probabilities are derived after holding all other covariates constant at their wereda-level means. 
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After including the household-level food aid history variables, there was generally little change
in the magnitude and significance of the household covariates.  The major observation that
emerges from this set of specifications is that households that previously participated in FFW
were substantially more likely to also receive free food in Tigray and Oromiya (the latter
measured imprecisely) and less likely to receive free food in Amhara and the South.  While we
cannot account conclusively for these contrasting results across regions, they clearly reflect
differences in the ability of local authorities to partition beneficiaries between the two types of
programs.  An analysis of field-level implementation in the various regions may help identify the
attributes of successful targeting programs in areas where targeting is found to be relatively
effective so that they can be replicated more widely throughout the country.
Turning to the amounts of free food received by recipients (Table 8), we find that few of the
available household indicators explained how much free food was received per capita in any of
the four regions.  Per capita income was not significantly associated with amounts received in
any region, although it was close to being so in Amhara.  For each region, the predicted amounts




th per capita income percentiles in Table 7.
49  These results again show that the per
capita amounts received by Tigrayan households at all income percentiles is higher than
households at the 25
th income percentile in all other regions.  These findings corroborate earlier
results that, if targeting according to income was an objective, a disproportionate amount of free
food aid was allocated by the federal authorities to Tigray.
Amounts received per capita were inversely related to household size in all four regions,
although earlier tests indicated that when the models were respecified in terms of total amounts
received by the household, family size became a positive and generally significant indicator of
amounts received.  Only in the Southern Region was the amount of free food received inversely
related to landholding, and even here, the effect was very small.  Households with two hectares
of land received only five birr per capita less over the entire year (about 2 kgs of wheat) than
households that had one hectare.
7.2.  Targeting of Food for Work
Major regional differences in targeting effectiveness also emerge from the food for work results
(Table 9).  Authorities in Tigray and Oromiya Regions were reasonably successful in
encouraging participation among relatively poor households and in screening out households
with relatively high incomes.  For example, households at the 25
th percentile of log per capita
income in Tigray and Oromiya had an average probability of 61% and 42%, respectively.  These
probabilities decline to 47% and 31% in the two regions at the 75
th income percentile.  In
contrast, there was virtually no relationship between household income and the probability of
receiving FFW in either Amhara Region or the South.  In both regions, the probabilities of
receiving FFW declined by 2% or less between the 25
th and 90
th income percentiles.  47
Table 8. Determinants of the Value of Free Distribution  Received by Recipients, by
Region:  Household Level (Truncated OLS) 
Free Distribution
(Value received in Birr Per capita) 
Tigray Amhara Oromiya Southern
ln (Per-capita Income) 7.944 -24.95 -17.09 -14.49 -5.355 -7.735 1.628 1.306
(0.17) (0.43) (1.92) (1.58) (0.43) (0.52) (0.79) (0.62)
Household head has some education 
(0,1)
114.8 140.3 4.942 0.363 -51.25 -36.27 -2.404 -3.109
(1.07) (1.21) (0.30) (0.02) (1.76) (0.85) (0.65) (0.80)
Household size -33.91 -51.06 -8.487 -8.787 -8.680 -6.338 -1.781 -1.677
(2.51)* (3.00)** (2.13)* (2.22)* (1.49) (0.75) (2.53)* (2.35)*
Percentage of children 
(0-9 yrs)
-1.865 -3.222 -0.002 -0.054 0.085 0.276 0.053 0.021
(1.33) (1.73) (0.01) (0.18) (0.24) (0.60) (0.79) (0.30)
Percentage of elder 
(older than 55 yrs)
-1.372 -2.495 0.009 -0.122 1.123 1.952 -0.383 -0.320
(1.17) (1.74) (0.03) (0.40) (1.01) (1.19) (2.20)* (1.77)
Female headed household, not married 
(0,1)
-9.965 -67.80 -7.170 -12.81 -65.46 -77.83 0.961 0.898
(0.15) (0.72) (0.40) (0.71) (1.61) (1.39) (0.21) (0.18)
Female headed household, but head is
married  (0,1)
-1.474 -8.727 -14.16 -9.482 -149.1 -118.3 -2.614 -4.335
(0.02) (0.08) (0.38) (0.26) (0.81) (0.54) (0.56) (0.86)
Land owned in ha -23.33 -35.11 -1.266 0.425 11.71 9.725 -4.799 -4.361
(0.23) (0.33) (0.12) (0.04) (0.54) (0.37) (2.22)* (1.99)
Muslim household  (0,1) -290.1 -571.8 -10.60 -9.475 -30.17 -28.12 -18.32 -18.74
(1.08) (1.74) (0.38) (0.34) (0.93) (0.71) (1.69) (1.66)
Protestant household  (0,1) 13.87 -134.3
(0.07) (0.56)
Livestock household  (0,1) -0.266 -1.050 -0.111 -0.121 1.658 1.322 -0.224 -0.189
(0.31) (1.05) (0.45) (0.49) (0.61) (0.39) (2.12)* (1.68)
Percentage of area with shortage of
rain
3.482 4.911 0.322 0.355 -3.413 -3.934 0.083 0.078
(1.27) (1.54) (0.90) (0.99) (0.75) (0.68) (1.09) (0.95)
Percentage of area with flood 0.954 1.003 -0.497 -0.506 1.134 1.009 0.052 0.060
(1.07) (1.06) (1.55) (1.58) (2.85)* (1.79) (0.46) (0.53)
Percentage of areas with crop disease
or insect problems
0.013 0.018 -0.005 -0.006 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.002
(2.89)** (3.04)** (2.16)* (2.51)* (0.93) (1.27) (1.43) (1.10)
History of Receiving Food Aid
4 years in last 4 years  (0,1) -182.2 85.77
(1.50) (2.63)**
3 years in last 4 years  (0,1) -55.19 4.222
(0.51) (0.19)
2 years in last 4 years  (0,1) -164.1 4.992
(1.43) (0.28)
1 years in last 4 years  (0,1) -138.1 20.06
(1.53) (1.19)
At least 1 year in last 4 years   (0,1) 12.83 -7.265
(0.35) (1.40)




Regional Dummies – Wereda dummies – 
F tests: For History variables 1.04 1.96 0.53 1.04
[0.42] [0.10] [0.66] [0.37]
              For Plot level shocks 0.88  1.25 1.30 1.44 4.03 3.00 2.06 1.48
[0.47] [0.33] [0.28] [0.23] [0.11] [0.26] [0.13] [0.24]
              For Wereda dummies  1.09 1.00 5.87 4.71 0.81 0.63 11.5 11.5
[0.43] [0.52] [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.67] [0.77] [0.00]** [0.00]**
R squared 0.65 0.72 0.58 0.60 0.92 0.95 0.89 0.89
Number of observations  56 56 186 186 37 37 60 60
Notes: * indicates 5% significance; ** indicates 1% significance.  Numbers in parentheses are z-values.  Numbers in brackets are p-values. 
Conditional on households being in weredas with  one or more households receiving Food Aid.  Dummy variables for ‘Protestant household’ and
‘Livestock households’ are excluded in some areas because of small numbers of observations. For Oromiya and Southern, ‘At least one year..’ is
used instead of ‘4 years ...’ or ‘3 years...’ because of small numbers of observations.   48
As with free distribution, criteria used to determine eligibility for, and participation in, FFW also
vary by region (Table 9).  For example, in Tigray Region, households with low per capita
income, female headed households with no referent male in the family, smaller families, and
households with a small proportion of elderly have a higher probability of participating. 
Households that reported more crop damage due to flood or crop disease were actually less
likely to participate in FFW in Tigray, but more likely to do so in Oromiya Region and, to some
extent, the South.  Participation in FFW in Oromiya was negatively related to the percentage of
small children in the household, education of the household head, and female-headed
households.  While there was a relatively small percentage of Muslim households sampled in
Oromiya, Muslim households were substantially more likely to participate in FFW in this region. 
In Southern Region, the only significant factor having an important and significant effect on the
probability of FFW participation was landholding.  Households with relatively large land-
holdings were substantially more likely to participate in FFW programs.
Findings from Table 10 show the factors associated with the value of food received through
participation in FFW.  These findings raise cause for concern.  Amounts received are negatively
related to log per capita income only in Amhara Region, and are actually positively related to
income in Tigray.  No covariates included in the model were significantly associated with per
capita amounts received through FFW programs in any region except family size.  As with free
distribution, the predicted amounts of food distributed to households at the 90
th income
percentile in Tigray were substantially higher than amounts received by beneficiaries at the 25
th
income percentile in the other three regions (Table 11).  The results again point to FFW
resources targeted to Tigray region in excess of what would be justified based solely on the
geographic incidence of poverty.  49
Table 9. Determinants of Food for Work by Region:  Household Level Results   (Probit
A) 
Food for Work
 (1 if the household received FFW) 
Tigray Amhara Oromiya Southern
ln (Per-capita Income) -0.374 -0.432 0.011 0.004 -0.171 -0.187 -0.023 -0.026
(1.92) (1.98)* (0.17) (0.05) (1.92) (2.07)* (0.27) (0.28)
Household head has some education 
(0,1)
0.250 0.190 0.080 0.061 -0.337 -0.341 0.122 0.122
(0.90) (0.66) (0.80) (0.62) (2.90)** (2.94)** (0.85) (0.85)
Household size -0.166 -0.186 0.000 0.012 -0.009 -0.013 -0.048 -0.049
(1.98)* (1.47) (0.00) (0.39) (0.30) (0.45) (1.43) (1.41)
Percentage of children 
(0-9 yrs)
0.008 0.005 0.002 0.001 -0.010 -0.010 -0.004 -0.003
(1.43) (0.94) (0.70) (0.60) (3.07)** (3.10)** (1.25) (1.09)
Percentage of elder 
(older than 55 yrs)
-0.013 -0.024 -0.001 -0.001 -0.007 -0.007 -0.002 -0.003
(1.75) (1.96)* (0.46) (0.44) (1.68) (1.75) (0.38) (0.51)
Female headed household, not
married  (0,1)
0.636 0.487 -0.018 -0.018 -0.318 -0.323 0.178 0.189
(2.28)* (1.63) (0.13) (0.13) (2.15)* (2.23)* (1.06) (1.17)
Female headed household, but head
is married  (0,1)
-0.378 -0.760 0.105 0.182 -0.304 -0.301 0.001 -0.020
(0.82) (1.49) (0.49) (0.79) (2.70)** (2.65)* (0.00) (0.09)
Land owned in ha 0.758 0.712 -0.131 -0.178 0.196 0.210 0.373 0.425
(1.54) (1.42) (1.58) (1.96)* (1.75) (1.89) (3.07)** (3.33)**
Muslim household  (0,1) 0.996 0.998 0.096 -0.113
(3.15)** (4.92)** (0.30) (0.34)
Protestant household  (0,1) 0.716 0.734 -0.039 -0.074
(1.69) (1.66) (0.27) (0.49)
Percentage of area with shortage of
rain
-0.011 -0.013 -0.002 -0.001 0.004 0.004 -0.003 -0.003
(1.91) (1.91) (0.97) (0.81) (1.14) (1.13) (0.72) (0.65)
Percentage of area with flood -0.018 -0.016 0.001 0.002 0.027 0.027 -0.003 -0.002
(2.00)* (1.62) (0.58) (0.79) (3.10)** (3.13)** (0.46) (0.32)
Percentage of areas with crop
disease or insect problems
-0.021 -0.028 0.000 0.001 0.013 0.013 0.011 0.012
(1.88) (2.16)* (0.21) (0.43) (2.80)** (2.65)** (2.01)* (2.06)*
History of Receiving Food Aid
3 or 4 years in last 4 years  (0,1) 0.259 0.306
(0.82) (1.73)
1 or 2 years in last 4 years  (0,1) -0.758 -0.026
(2.15)* (0.17)
At least 1 year in last 4 years  (0,1) -0.265 -0.158
(2.42)* (1.45)
Previous reception of free food
(0,1)
0.768 0.262 0.056 0.167
(2.16)* (2.64)** (0.36) (1.22)
Wereda Dummies – Wereda dummies – 
Wald tests: For History variables 5.53 4.11
[0.06] [0.13]
                      For Plot level shocks 6.15 5.32 1.43 1.56 11.4** 11.1 4.81 4.78
[0.10] [0.15] [0.0.70] [0.67] [0.01] [0.01] [0.19] [0.19]
                      For Wereda dummies  9.81 9.85 18.4 18.4 71.1** 93.1** 25.2* 22.1
[0.55] [0.54] [0.24] [0.24] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.05]
Log likelihood -24.3 -17.8 -105.6 -99.6 -48.2 -47.1 -60.6 -58.0
Number of observations  68 68 184 184 136 136 149 149
Notes: * indicates 5% significance; ** indicates 1% significance.  Numbers in parentheses are z-values.  Numbers in brackets are p-
values. 
Conditional on households being in weredas with  one or more households receiving Food Aid.   Dummy variable for ‘livestock
households’ is excluded from all models because of small numbers of observations.  Dummy variables for ‘Protestant household’ and
‘Muslim households’ are excluded in some areas because of small numbers of observations. For Amhara and Oromiya, ‘At least one
year..’ is used instead of ‘3 or 4 years ...’ or ‘1 or 2  years...’ because of small numbers of observations. For Tigray and Southern, ‘3 or 4
years ..’ and ‘2 or 1 years..’ are used instead of individual dummy variables for each year dummy because of small numbers of
observations.  A) Reported coefficients are changes in marginal probability.    50
Table 10. Determinants of the Value of Cereal  Received by FFW Participants by Region:
Household Level (Truncated OLS) 
Food for Work
(The amount received in Birr)
Tigray Amhara Oromiya Southern
ln (Per-capita Income) 21.54 19.70 -15.53 -21.61 -4.214 -4.269 -3.504 -4.178
(1.92) (1.64) (1.40) (1.79) (0.77) (0.74) (0.54) (0.61)
Household head has some education 
(0,1)
15.98 17.39 23.08 23.92 -1.762 -1.023 -1.837 -0.702
(1.08) (1.18) (1.76) (1.80) (0.19) (0.10) (0.11) (0.04)
Household size -2.785 -3.712 -12.69 -13.81 -2.004 -2.266 -8.157 -8.157
(0.97) (1.27) (3.76)** (3.93)** (0.87) (0.94) (3.55)** (3.42)**
Percentage of children 
(0-9 yrs)
0.090 0.299 0.164 0.218 -0.112 -0.129 -0.249 -0.295
(0.33) (0.97) (0.67) (0.87) (0.48) (0.53) (1.08) (1.14)
Percentage of elder 
(older than 55 yrs)
-0.093 -0.047 -0.276 -0.210 0.146 0.159 -0.227 -0.210
(0.30) (0.15) (0.71) (0.50) (0.40) (0.42) (0.42) (0.38)
Female headed household, not
married  (0,1)
-3.471 -20.08 6.649 4.991 -22.98 -23.02 -28.13 -28.43
(0.19) (0.97) (0.31) (0.23) (0.80) (0.77) (1.90) (1.84)
Female headed household, but head
is married  (0,1)
43.90 32.70 -26.38 -25.04 3.598 -3.667 -7.710 -8.351
(1.50) (1.09) (1.26) (1.18) (0.17) (0.15) (0.36) (0.38)
Land owned in ha -3.458 -11.13 1.070 2.276 0.783 0.848 6.927 7.466
(0.22) (0.66) (0.10) (0.20) (0.14) (0.14) (0.76) (0.75)
Muslim household  (0,1) -25.62 -27.34 14.18 5.287 15.23 19.61
(0.84) (0.88) (0.47) (0.14) (0.64) (0.75)
Protestant household  (0,1) 40.25 45.75
(0.87) (0.99)
Percentage of area with shortage of
rain
0.041 0.065 -0.245 -0.348 -0.056 -0.042 0.469 0.492
(0.18) (0.28) (1.00) (1.28) (0.30) (0.21) (1.27) (1.28)
Percentage of area with flood -0.003 -0.263 -0.090 -0.144 0.263 0.294 0.237 0.215
(0.01) (0.50) (0.36) (0.57) (0.63) (0.67) (0.58) (0.50)
Percentage of areas with crop
disease or insect problems
0.138 0.011 -0.387 -0.459 -0.184 -0.181 -0.056 -0.088
(0.51) (0.04) (1.34) (1.47) (0.59) (0.55) (0.14) (0.19)
History of Receiving Food Aid
3 or 4 years in last 4 years  (0,1) 34.45 -12.76
(1.43) (0.64)
1 or 2 years in last 4 years  (0,1) -1.061 6.915
(0.07) (0.52)
At least 1 year in last 4 years  (0,1) -1.153 -3.382
(0.09) (0.24)
Previous reception of the other type




F tests: For History variables 1.27 0.70
[0.30] [0.50]
                      For Plot level shocks 0.09 0.11 0.66 0.87 0.53 0.54 0.62 0.62
[0.96] [0.95] [0.58] [0.47] [0.67] [0.66] [0.61] [0.61]
                      For Wereda dummies  2.31 2.38 3.90 3.70 0.46 0.44 1.04 0.89
[0.02]* [0.02]* [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.95] [0.96] [0.45] [0.58]
Log likelihood 0.67 0.70 0.71 0.73 0.42 0.43 0.67 0.67
Number of observations  58 58 70 70 58 58 55 55
Notes: * indicates 5% significance; ** indicates 1% significance.  Numbers in parentheses are z-values.  Numbers in brackets are p-
values. 
Conditional on households being in weredas with  one or more households receiving Food Aid.   Dummy variable for ‘livestock
households’ is excluded from all models because of small numbers of observations.  Dummy variables for ‘Protestant household’ and
‘Muslim households’ are excluded in some areas because of small numbers of observations. For Amhara and Oromiya, ‘At least one
year..’ is used instead of ‘3 or 4 years ...’ or ‘1 or 2  years...’ because of small numbers of observations. For Tigray and Southern, ‘3 or 4
years ..’ and ‘2 or 1 years..’ are used instead of individual dummy variables for each year dummy because of small numbers of
observations.   51
Table 11. Predicted Probabilities of Participation in Food for Work and Predicted Per
capita Value Received, for Households in Weredas Where Food for Work Programs Were
Operating (derived from Results in Tables 9 and 10)
Predicted probability of receiving food from FFW for households in






National 42 36 33 39
    Tigray 61 47 39 55
    Amhara 35 36 37 36
    Oromiya 42 31 26 36
    Southern 37 36 35 37
Predicted amount received (birr per capita) by recipient households,





National 31 29 30 30
    Tigray 41 60 72 50
    Amhara 37 21 15 30
    Oromiya 21 16 14 18
    Southern 30 25 24 27  52
8.  PROGRAM EXIT AND CHRONIC PARTICIPATION
The results presented so far identify factors associated with current participation in food aid
programs.  We can actually do somewhat more.  While we do not have panel data, we do know
whether households received free food or food for work in the five-year period before June 1995,
and how many years out of that period.  We can therefore analyze factors associated with past
participation and whether the household (or wereda) is a chronic participant.  Moreover, as
shown in Figure 2, there is a current trend toward using less food aid in Ethiopia.  We can
identify the inferred criteria used to allocate reduced amounts of food aid, both at wereda level
and household level.  We do the latter in this section and explore determinants of past food aid in
the following sub-section.
8.1.  Program Exit Probabilities
To explore the attributes of weredas and households that have exited from food aid programs, we
condition on those households that participated in the past.  We split the analysis into two parts:
households that exit because the wereda seems to get no allocations; and  exiting households that
live in weredas still having some aid delivery.  The first part corresponds to estimating exit
probits at the wereda level for those weredas that had households that previously participated. 
The second amounts to restricting the sample to those weredas that still have households
participating, and estimating exit probits for those households that had previously participated. 
If a household or wereda exited, we do not know in which year.  Because of that, our income and
shock variables are measured with error, which should bias their coefficients towards zero. 
Since the shock coefficients are never significant in these probits we drop them.  Other than that
difference, the variables are the same.  For the household analysis we use wereda fixed effects.
Results are presented in Tables 12 and 13.  We start out showing different wereda exit
probabilities by region in Table 12.  Weredas in Tigray and the “other regions” category
(containing Gambela, Dire Dawa, and Harari) are less likely to exit free distribution programs,
even after controlling for observed household and area covariates.  Weredas in these regions
were also less likely to exit from FFW as well (with the exception of Tigray).  The strongest
result among weredas receiving both free distribution and food for work is that a greater share of
plots having drought problems in the 1995 Meher growing season is associated with a lower
probability that food aid distribution is stopped.  In the case of FFW, also having larger fractions
of the population that are elderly, or Islamic, and having bad roads are all associated with higher
exit probabilities.  Having higher mean per capita incomes is associated with a greater likelihood
of exiting, however, this effect is imprecisely estimated.  Weredas that are chronic past recipients
(3 or 4 years for free food, 4 years for food for work) are substantially less likely to be dropped. 
Interestingly, having had food for work programs in the past is negatively related to wereda exit
probabilities for free distribution.  However, past availability of free food makes it more likely
that a wereda will be dropped from receiving food for work.  53
Table 12. Determinants of Exit from Food Aid:  Wereda-Level Results  (Probit
A)
Free Distribution
(1 if no household received in 1995/96, but at
least one household received previously)
Food for Work
(1 if no household received in 1995/96, but at
least one household received previously)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln (Per capita Income) 0.115 0.084 -0.015 -0.057
(1.05) (0.68) (0.11) (0.35)
Fraction of households with some
education
0.292 0.249 -0.489 -0.396
(1.19) (0.85) (1.38) (0.93)
Mean household size 0.041 0.001 -0.016 0.008
(0.63) (0.01) (0.15) (0.07)
Mean % of children (0-9 yrs) in
households
0.014 0.011 0.010 0.017
(1.95) (1.36) (1.14) (1.66)
Mean % of elder (over 55) in households  0.006 0.005 0.026 0.032
(0.65) (0.45) (2.34)* (2.60)**
Fraction of female headed, not married -0.374 -0.450 0.121 0.478
(0.92) (0.94) (0.22) (0.75)
Fraction of female headed, married 0.118 -0.118 -1.131 -0.952
(0.19) (0.19) (1.27) (0.94)
Mean size of land owned 0.038 0.047 0.126 0.110
(0.87) (0.60) (1.00) (0.80)
Fraction of Muslim households -0.110 -0.120 0.997 1.023
(0.64) (0.57) (3.44)** (2.81)**
Fraction of Protestant households -0.036 -0.060 -0.196 -0.227
(0.12) (0.18) (0.43) (0.44)
Fraction of livestock households 0.797 0.553 3.140 4.014
(1.11) (0.71) (1.72) (1.76)
Mean % of plot area with shortage of rain -0.009 -0.009 -0.016 -0.023
(2.32)* (2.17)* (2.95)** (2.66)**
Mean % of plot area with flood -0.008 -0.012 -0.009 -0.005
(1.31) (1.84) (1.08) (0.44)
Mean % of plot area with crop disease or
insect problems
0.002 0.003 -0.003 -0.002
(0.44) (0.46) (0.43) (0.29)
Average rainfall 1988-95 (mm)   *10e-2 -0.048 -0.090 0.100 0.104
(1.32) (1.96)* (1.97)* (1.66)
Rainfall shocks in 1994 (mm)  *10e-2 -0.027 -0.072 -0.072 -0.059
(0.78) (1.71) (1.45) (1.02)
Rainfall shocks in 1995 (mm)  *10e-2 -0.064 -0.078 -0.054 -0.061
(1.56) (1.71) (1.13) (1.08)
Elevation   *10e-2 -0.027 0.031 0.039 -0.058
(2.06)* (2.04)* (2.02)* (2.21)*
History of Receiving Food Aid
B
4 years in last 4 years  (0,1) -0.596 -0.667
(3.07)** (2.44)*
3 years in last 4 years  (0,1) -0.319 -0.132
(1.54) (0.50)
2 years in last 4 years  (0,1) -0.085 -0.191
(0.57) (0.87)





D -0.374 -0.390 -0.082 0.123 0.339 0.382
(2.78)** (1.63) (0.27) (0.79) (1.02) (0.95)
Amhara -0.263 -0.037 0.264 0.183 -0.031 -0.235
(2.09)* (0.15) (1.00) (1.25) (0.09) (0.59)
Oromiya 0.238 0.186 0.232 0.108 -0.573 -0.721
(1.93) (1.00) (1.19) (0.76) (2.17)* (2.47)*
Other Killils -0.292 -0.500 -0.472 0.024 -0.689 -0.712
(1.78) (2.28)* (2.04)* (0.12) (2.83)** (3.11)**
Wald tests: For History variables 10.1* 6.13
[0.02] [0.11]
                 For Plot level shocks 6.66 7.41 9.07 * 7.08
[0.08] [0.06] [0.03] [0.07]
                 For Rainfall shocks 2.92 5.23 2.97 2.08
[0.23] [0.07] [0.23] [0.35]
                 For Road dummies
C 3.38 3.96 6.13 6.68
[0.64] [0.56] [0.29] [0.25]
                  For Regional dummies  15.9** 9.58* 10.9 * 11.0 *
[0.00] [0.05] [0.03] [0.03]
Log likelihood -86.5 -71.5 -60.8 -76.5 -46.2 -40.3
Observations 150 150 150 112 112 112
Note: * indicates 5% significance; ** indicates 1% significance.  Numbers in parentheses are z-values.  Numbers in brackets are p-values. 
A) Reported coefficients are changes in marginal probability.  B) At least one household received FD (or FFW) for 4 years in last 4 years, and  so on.   C)
Coefficients of road dummies are not reported. D) Omitted region is “South.”50Note that this is not because there are no leavers within these weredas, 38% of households that had participated in
the past have not in the current year.
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For households living in weredas that did not exit the free distribution program (Table 13),
having higher per capita income and having a head with some education are both associated with
higher exit probabilities.  A change in log of per capita income from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile
raises the exit probability from 50.0% to 68.1%.  Having a head with some schooling raises the
exit probability by even more.  Having a head who is Protestant is related to much lower exit
probabilities.  Having been a chronic recipient of free food in the past is also highly related to
lower exit probabilities, and having been a participant in a FFW program raises the exit
probability, just as it does for wereda probabilities.
In the case of FFW, there is little that explains household exit conditional on wereda fixed
effects and being a chronic past participant.
50
8.2.  Chronic Aid Recipients
Chronic recipients of food aid may be at risk of becoming dependent on aid, changing their
behavior significantly.  For this analysis we define chronic use as whether a wereda or household
has been a recipient of aid for 3 or more of the past five years.   We use the same specifications
used for the exit probits, except that obviously we do not include any past receipt variables as
covariates.  Tables 14 and 15 present the results.  At the wereda level, we see that there is a
strong Tigray effect on chronic receipt of free food. Of the 67 sampled weredas that were chronic
recipients of free food, 30 of them are in Tigray.  The probability of a wereda being a chronic
recipient of free food is increased by 63 percentage points for weredas in Tigray.  Smaller but
significant regional effects are observed for Amhara and the South.  These findings are 
consistent with either the inertia hypothesis or the income transfer hypothesis, or both. 
However, no such regional effects are observed for food for work.  Remember that there is a
significant Tigray effect on current year FFW, which suggests FFW is becoming more
concentrated in Tigray within the five year recall period (1991/92-1995/96).
Higher mean log per capita income lowers the probability of a wereda receiving chronic food
aid, with a larger and more precisely estimated impact on FFW.  An increase from the 25
th  to the
75
th income percentile lowers the predicted probability that a wereda is a chronic recipient of
FFW from 10.4% to 7.0%, the mean rate being 8.9%; the income effect is smaller for free food. 
Having more heads of households with some education also lowers the likelihood of chronic
receipt.  Being in an area with higher long-run rainfall also significantly lowers the chances of
being a chronic recipient, the impact being more precisely estimated for food for free.  In that
case, predicted probabilities of receiving FD at the inter-quartile range of long-run rainfall are
16.2% and 7.5%.  55
Table 13. Determinants of Exit From Food Aid:  Household Level  (Probit
A) 
Free Distribution
( 1 if the household did not receive in 1995/96, but
received previously )
Food for Work
( 1 if the household did not receive in 1995/96, but
received previously )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln (Per capita Income) 0.132 0.269 0.334 -0.040 -0.129 -0.185
(3.13)** (3.88)** (4.11)** (0.78) (1.26) (1.70)
Household head has some education 
(0,1)
0.205 0.429 0.494 0.002 0.009 0.079
(2.51)* (3.46)** (3.65)** (0.02) (0.05) (0.46)
Household size -0.009 -0.003 -0.014 -0.010 -0.060 -0.073
(0.47) (0.08) (0.36) (0.42) (1.54) (1.63)
Percentage of children 
(0-9 yrs)
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.007 0.007
(0.44) (0.46) (0.27) (0.77) (1.67) (1.62)
Percentage of elder 
(older than 55 yrs)
-0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.004 0.005 0.006
(0.90) (0.76) (0.30) (1.22) (0.91) (1.00)
Female headed household, not married
(0,1)
-0.110 0.013 -0.025 0.077 -0.323 -0.435
(1.12) (0.08) (0.14) (0.54) (1.48) (1.90)
Female headed household, but head is
married (0,1)
-0.090 -0.623 -0.619 0.435
(0.43) (3.47)** (3.27)** (2.40)*
Land owned in ha -0.066 -0.014 0.010 -0.029 0.040 -0.066
(1.55) (0.20) (0.12) (0.35) (0.29) (0.41)
Muslim household  (0,1) 0.114 -0.361 -0.662 0.058 -0.294 -0.414
(0.93) (0.80) (1.56) (0.29) (0.84) (1.11)
Protestant household  (0,1) -0.237 -0.584 -0.625 -0.186 -0.045 -0.083
(1.55) (2.53)* (2.94)** (1.15) (0.15) (0.23)
Livestock household  (0,1) 0.044 -0.485 -0.550
(0.15) (1.14) (1.67)
Percentage of area with shortage of rain 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.003
(0.38) (0.19) (0.35) (0.23) (0.46) (0.89)
Percentage of area with flood 0.004 0.012 0.012 -0.002 0.004 0.006
(1.50) (2.23)* (2.07)* (0.92) (0.56) (0.77)
Percentage of areas with crop disease or
insect problems
0.001 0.005 0.008 0.002 0.008 0.006
(0.56) (1.99)* (2.63)** (0.79) (1.37) (0.96)
Average Rainfall 1988-95 (mm) -0.058 -0.018
(1.46) (0.47)
Rainfall shocks in 1994 (mm) 0.003 0.000
(0.11) (0.02)




History of Receiving Food Aid
4 in last 4 years  (0,1) -0.357 -0.585
(2.02)* (2.56)*
3 years in last 4 years  (0,1) -0.526 -0.347
(2.92)** (1.21)
2 years in last 4 years  (0,1) -0.296 -0.389
(2.14)* (1.80)










Southern (SNNPR/SEPA) -Omitted- - with Wereda dummies - -Omitted- - with Wereda dummies -
Gambela -0.309 0.363
(0.97) (0.92)
Harari - N.A. - 0.414
(1.72)
Dire Dawa 0.534 -0.382
(2.52)* (1.22)
Wald tests: For History variables 17.7** 22.4
[0.00] [0.17]
           For Plot level shocks 2.68 7.32 10.4 * 1.75 2.63 2.42
[0.44] [0.06] [0.02] [0.63] [0.45] [0.49]
           For Rainfall shocks 2.13 0.58
[0.35] [0.75]
           For Road dummies
B 13.1* 7.40
[0.02] [0.19]
          For Regional/Wereda dummies  13.0* 93.1** 92.7** 9.48 27.2
[0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.15] [0.06]
Log likelihood -190.2 -92.9 -82.0 -105.1 -48.7 -44.2
Number of observations 347 212 212 194 106 106
Note: * indicates 5% significance; ** indicates 1% significance.  Numbers in parentheses are z-values.  Numbers in brackets are p-values. 
“Livestock household” is excluded in column 4, 5, and 6 because of too few observations.  “Female headed household, but head is married” is excluded in column 5
and 6 for the same reason.  A) Reported coefficients are changes in marginal probability.   B) Coefficients of road dummies are not reported.   56
Table 14. Determinants of Chronic Food Aid: Wereda-Level Results (Probit
A)
Free Distribution
(1 if at least one household
received FD for more than 3 years
in last 5 years
B)
Food for Work
(1 if at least one household
participated FFW for more than 3
years in last 5 years
B)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln (Per capita Income) -0.028 -0.048
(1.56) (2.11)*




Mean household size -0.022 0.004
(1.91) (0.33)
















Mean size of land owned 0.002 -0.007
(0.39) (0.61)
Fraction of Muslim households 0.012 -0.054
(0.40) (1.49)
Fraction of Protestant households 0.120 -0.009
(1.97)* (0.15)
Fraction of livestock households -0.107 -0.098
(0.84) (0.52)




Elevation   *10e-2 0.000 0.003
(0.01) (1.27)
Tigray 0.517 0.633 0.051 0.033
(5.29)** (3.88)** (0.90) (0.53)
Amhara 0.091 0.364 -0.019 0.041
(1.77) (3.31)** (0.50) (0.79)
Oromiya -0.089 0.045 -0.087 -0.003
(1.80) (0.95) (2.26)* (0.07)
Other Killils 0.119 0.530 0.014 0.140
(1.41) (3.17)** (0.23) (1.36)
Wald tests: For Road dummies
C 10.8 4.73
[0.06] [0.45]
                  For Regional dummies  25.3 ** 3.65
[0.00] [0.46]
Log likelihood -105.5 -78.3 -99.1 -83.4
Observations 348 348 348 348
Note : * indicates 5% significance; ** indicates 1% significance.  Numbers in parentheses are z-values.   Numbers in brackets are p-values. 
A) Reported coefficients are changes in marginal probability.   B) Including 1995/96.  C) Coefficients of road dummies are not reported.   57
Table 15. Determinants of Chronic Food Aid:  Household-Level Results (Probit
A) 
Free Distribution
(1 if the household received FD for more
than 3 years in last 5 years
B)
Food for Work
(1 if the household received FFW for
more than 3 years in last 5 years
B)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln (Per capita Income) -0.132 -0.125 -0.082 -0.066
(4.03)** (3.86)** (2.75)** (2.16)*
Household head has some
education  (0,1)
-0.108 -0.121 0.054 0.020
(1.68) (2.12)* (0.89) (0.32)
Household size -0.003 -0.011 -0.014 -0.013
(0.23) (0.81) (1.12) (1.05)
Percentage of children 
(0-9 yrs)
-0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0.65) (0.16) (0.35) (0.69)
Percentage of elder 
(older than 55 yrs)
0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000
(1.28) (1.78) (0.15) (0.09)
Female headed household,
not married
0.161 0.151 -0.007 0.023
(2.13)* (1.98)* (0.09) (0.30)
Female headed household,
but head is married
-0.024 -0.032 -0.056 -0.052
(0.18) (0.25) (0.49) (0.49)
Land owned in ha 0.045 0.031 -0.004 -0.042
(1.56) (0.97) (0.10) (1.01)
Muslim household  (0,1) -0.336 -0.569 -0.125 -0.143
(2.50)* (5.29)** (1.70) (1.45)
Protestant household  (0,1) 0.037 0.031 0.105 0.185
(0.32) (0.29) (1.20) (1.76)
Livestock household  (0,1) 0.154 0.169 0.163 0.161


























13.5* 106.5 ** 20.1** 34.6
[0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.22]
Log likelihood -226.2 -174.2 -124.6 -113.1
Number of observations 425 408 308 303
Note: * indicates 5% significance; ** indicates 1% significance.  Numbers in parentheses are z-values.  Numbers in brackets are
p-values. 
A) Reported coefficients are changes in marginal probability.   B) Including 1995/96.  C) Coefficients of road dummies are not
reported.   58
For chronic recipient households, the analysis is confined to households that live in weredas
containing chronic recipients.  We find that households with low current per capita income, a
head without formal education, a high proportion of elderly members, and a female head without
a living spouse are all more likely to be chronic free food aid recipients.  Chronic participation in
food for work is negatively related to current income, conditional on wereda dummies, but to
little else.  These conditional household participation probabilities range from 32.5% to 19.7% at
the inter-quartile range for food for free, and from 18.5% to 12.0% for FFW.  As mentioned, it is
likely that attenuation bias affects the current income variable, so that the true income effects are
likely to be larger in magnitude.  However, it is also possible that past food aid may raise
productivity among household workers which might raise current income, imparting a positive
bias.51The data cover the period from 1979 through 1988.  How "needs" are established by the RRC is unclear, but
according to Patrick Webb, a nutrition scientist who spent much time conducting field work in Ethiopia during the
mid- and late-1980s, they are an assessment of perceived food aid needs (personal communication).
52The program MapInfo was used to rescale maps with the current wereda boundaries to the same scale as the
hardcopy maps of the former ADs.  In about 80% of the cases, weredas were simply subsets of particular ADs, and
in these cases, the matching of former ADs to current weredas was straightforward.  In 20% of the cases, weredas
fell into 2 different ADs.  In most of these cases, it was clear that the wereda was almost exclusively or
predominantly in one AD.  After completing this exercise of allocating current weredas to particular ADs, we
compared our findings with those from an analogous exercise undertaken at IFPRI.  Of the 348 weredas used in our
study, there were 11 in which MSU and IFPRI differed in their wereda-to-AD allocation decision.  After checking
maps and populations again, we made a final determination.
53We also considered using the RRC variable as an instrument for the history variables, but since there are four of
those, we need additional instruments for identification.  Lagged rainfall deviations were tried, but did not explain
the history variables very well.  Furthermore, given that we do not measure current needs completely, a lagged
needs measure would arguably be correlated with the omitted indicators of current needs in the allocation equations,
and hence produce biased estimates when used as an instrument.
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9.  DOES PAST RECEIPT OF FOOD AID REFLECT CHRONIC NEEDS OR INERTIA?
A major question raised by these results is whether current and chronic allocations of food aid to
particular areas reflect chronic need or other factors that impede changes in the location of
program operations, or both.  As discussed above, this is a very difficult question to answer
because of the problem of unobserved heterogeneity.  While we won't be able to claim to have
answered this question conclusively, we can shed some light on it by including one additional
variable: one showing food aid needs during the 1980s, as assessed by the Ethiopian RRC, the
precursor to the current DPPC.  RRC records at the old Administrative District (AD) level (there
are 93) indicate that agency's estimate of the severity of the food situation in each year, measured
as the proportion of the district population that "need" food aid.
51  We match the 1995/96 wereda
boundaries to those of the old ADs and then construct a variable that averages by AD the RRC
estimates of "needs" over the five year period 1984 to 1988.
52  By doing so, we create a  variable
that measures the food aid needs during and after the major 1984/85 famine.  We use this
variable as a proxy for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity, µi in equation [1], to try to
explain current year and chronic food aid receipt at the wereda level, adding this variable to our
base specifications in Tables 2 and 10.  We then add the wereda lagged receipt variables to see if
they are still significant.  To the extent that this RRC assessed needs variable, together with other
measured variables such as current mean log per capita income and region and plot-level water
shocks, adequately control for µi, this should greatly reduce, though possibly not eliminate, the
bias when using the history variables.
53
Before discussing the main results, it is useful to examine how much of the variation in RRC
needs assessments represents time-invariant versus time series variation.   If needs assessments
have a strong time-invariant component then we can use that variable, or its average over time,
as a measure (albeit imperfect) of unobserved time-invariant need.  In that case, if we continue to
find strong history effects when also controlling for the RRC needs assessment, that would be 54Using region dummies instead, we find  very strong effects for Tigray and Wello, the two most affected areas in
1984; coefficients of .39 for Tigray and .33 for Wello, with t-statistics of 8.6 and 8.2 respectively.  The only other
region with a coefficient significant at the .05 level is Harrage and its coefficient is only .09 with a t-statistic of 2.3.
55For food for work, the Tigray coefficient is near zero before the RRC variable is added so that this argument is not
relevant.
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evidence in favor of inertia in food aid program operations, since we would be controlling for
needs that are time-invariant. If on the other hand, perceived needs do change over time, then
one would have to worry more about controlling for current year needs when interpreting the
history variables.
To explore this question we take the raw RRC assessments of the percent of the AD population
that needs food aid, for each year of available data (1979-1988, giving 813 observations), and
regress these percentages on a set of AD dummy variables.  This is equivalent to an analysis of
variance, and it turns out that 52% of the needs variation is across ADs (that is the R
2 is .52), the
other 48% being over time, within districts.
54  Thus the RRC needs assessment variable does
have a strong time-invariant component to it, but it does vary over time as well.
Most of the ADs which were significant in this pooled regression equation, representing chronic
need, were in Wello and Tigray.   Only 5 of the 73 ADs outside of Tigray and Wello were found
to be chronically needy based on RRC needs assessment figures.  It should be kept in mind that
the 1979-1988 period in question coincided with severe civil disruption primarily in these
northern areas.
The wereda results using the RRC needs assessment variable are presented in Table 16.  We first
see that both chronic receipt of food for free and food for work are positively and significantly
related to the average RRC needs assessment from 1984 through 1988.  An increase in the
percent affected from 0% to 17% (the inter-quartile range) doubles the mean probability of
chronic free food receipt, from .05 to .10.  An increase of the percent of population assessed in
need to .44 (the 90
th percentile) raises the predicted wereda chronic probability to .24 (remember
that only 13.5% of weredas are chronic receivers, so that these are very large impacts).  For
FFW, the historical needs impact is smaller; a rise in predicted probability of chronic receipt
from .05 to .08 at the 25
th and 75
th percentiles of needs assessment, and to .16 at the 90
th
percentile (only 9% of weredas are chronic receivers of FFW).  Notice in the free distribution
food probit that the Tigray coefficient drops in half from roughly .6 to .29, being just significant
at the .05 level.
55   These results indicate that a large part of the Tigray Region’s chronic receipt
of free food during the early- and mid-1990s stems from perceptions of its neediness during the
1980s (when it experienced severe civil turbulence and famine).  We conclude that assessed food
aid needs during the 1984-1988 period does influence which weredas have remained chronic
recipients of food aid in the mid-1990s.
For free food it turns out that needs assessment during one year only, 1984, does as well as the
average from 1984-1988 in predicting chronic recipient weredas in the 1991/92-1995/96       61
Table 16. Determinants of Food Aid Allocation with 1980s Post-Famine Variable: Wereda Level Results  
(Probit
A)
Free Distribution Food for Work
Chronic Current  FD Chronic Current FFW
Average % of needy households in wereda
population, RRC 1984 - 88
0.217 0.518 0.072 0.166 0.526 0.271
(2.95)** (2.25)* (0.29) (1.93) (2.75)** (1.76)
ln (Per capita Income) -0.028 -0.092 -0.019 -0.045 -0.101 -0.043
(1.54) (1.79) (0.35) (2.02)* (2.46)* (1.31)
Fraction of households with some
education
-0.81 -0.062 0.035 -0.048 0.147 0.158
(1.84) (0.05) (0.27) (0.92) (1.51) (2.09)*
Mean household size -0.013 0.013 0.044 0.009 0.018 0.030
(1.15) (0.43) (1.33) (0.73) (0.73) (1.48)
Mean % of children (0-9 yrs) in
households
-0.001 -0.006 -0.005 0.002 -0.008 -0.006
(1.17) (1.87) (1.35) (1.37) (2.90)** (2.88)**
Mean % of elder (over 55) in households  -0.000 -0.004 -0.004 0.000 -0.006 -0.005
(0.07) (1.10) (0.81) (0.27) (1.77)* (1.72)
Fraction of female headed, not married -0.019 0.265 0.358 0.036 -0.001 -0.130
(0.30) (1.35) (1.66) (0.46) (0.01) (1.00)
Fraction of female headed, married -0.037 0.123 0.010 0.048 0.541 0.371
(0.30) (0.45) (0.03) (0.40) (2.50)* (2.08)*
Mean size of land owned -0.002 -0.017 -0.029 -0.007 0.005 0.008
(0.49) (0.94) (1.05) (0.61) (0.64) (1.35)
Fraction of Muslim households -0.009 0.083 0.121 -0.060 –0.091 -0.094
(0.31) (1.01) (1.38) (1.70) (1.35) (1.68)
Fraction of Protestant households 0.092 0.046 0.032 -0.011 0.084 0.128
(1.55) (0.32) (0.21) (0.17) (0.73) (1.30)
Fraction of livestock households -0.108 -0.575 -0.558 -0.081 -0.533 -0.475
(0.78) (1.45) (1.25) (0.43) (1.27) (1.39)
Mean % of plot area with shortage of rain 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003
(2.41)* (2.67)** (2.52)* (3.30)**
Mean % of plot area with flood 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.005
(1.19) (1.99)* (2.46)* (3.07)**
Mean % of plot area with crop disease or
insect problems
0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.65) (0.23) (0.57) (1.11)
Average rainfall 1988-95 (mm)   *10e-2 -0.003 -0.011 0.003 -0.004 -0.011 0.000
(0.41) (0.77) (0.20) (0.47) (0.85) (0.04)
Rainfall shocks in 1994 (mm)  *10e-2 0.019 0.028 0.018 0.015
(1.05) (1.45) (1.25) (1.33)
Rainfall shocks in 1995 (mm)  *10e-2 -0.029 -0.028 -0.015 -0.013
(1.96)* (1.78) (1.24) (1.38)
Elevation   *10e-2 -0.002 0.011 0.013 0.003 0.015 0.016
(0.65) (1.83) (2.09)* (0.97) (3.02)** (3.81)**
History of Receiving Food Aid
4 years in last 4 years  (0,1) 0.788 0.858
(4.19)** (4.21)**
3 years in last 4 years  (0,1) 0.505 0.257
(2.82)** (2.72)*
2 years in last 4 years  (0,1) 0.288 0.396
(2.63)** (3.36)**
1 year in last 4 years  (0,1) 0.171 0.300
(2.28)* (4.36)**




Tigray 0.291 0.266 0.098 -0.026 0.076 0.127
(2.03)* (1.47) (0.57) (0.55) (0.53) (0.90)
Amhara 0.139 -0.023 -0.091 -0.022 -0.008 0.047
(1.56) (0.19) (0.72) (0.45) (0.08) (0.49)
Oromiya 0.023 -0.016 -0.045 -0.021 0.102 0.123
(0.49) (0.17) (0.48) (0.51) (1.29) (1.74)
Other Killils 0.287 0.379 0.278 0.052 0.251 0.230
(2.07)* (2.23)* (1.54) (0.65) (1.59) (1.51)
Wald tests: For History variables 22.3** 32.3**
[0.00] [0.00]
                     For Plot level shocks 6.53 9.54* 11.5** 18.3**
 [0.09] [0.02] [0.01] [0.00]
                     For Rainfall shocks 4.57 4.81 2.80 3.35
[0.10] [0.09] [0.25] [0.19]
                     For Road dummies
B 8.96 5.12 7.43 3.99 4.32 7.73
[0.11] [0.40] [0.19] [0.55] [0.50] [0.17]
                     For Regional dummies  7.93 11.6* 6.92 1.96 4.72 4.48
[0.09] [0.02] [0.14] [0.74] [0.32] [0.34]
Observations 348 348 348 348 348 348
Note: * indicates 5% significance; ** indicates 1% significance.  Numbers in parentheses are z-values.  Numbers in brackets are p-values. 
A) Reported coefficients are changes in marginal probability.   B) Coefficients of road dummies are not reported. 56The marginal probability for free food is .517 with a t-statistic of 3.15.  For food for work the coefficient is .097
with a t-statistic of only 0.69.
57Predicted probabilities at the inter-quartile range of the RRC variable range from 20.7% to 28.1% for free
distribution and from 13.7% to 21.7% for food for work. 
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period.
56  The first year of the mid-80s major famine in Ethiopia was 1984, so that evidently, free
food programs initiated after the famine operated recurrently in those areas for at least a decade. 
Food for work programs became more prominent later in the 1980s, which is why the 1984-1988
average and not the 1984 variable explains chronic placement in that case.
Not only is the 1980s needs assessment variable associated with chronic wereda food aid receipt,
it is also significantly associated with current year receipt as well, as shown in columns 2 and 5.  
These impacts are also large, as they are in the case of chronic receipt.
57  Note, too, that the
Tigray coefficients greatly shrink towards 0: it halves for food for free and shrinks almost to 0 in
the case of FFW.  Thus, the 1980s needs assessment variable is having a very similar impact to
the 1990s lagged receipt variables.  This is exactly what we would expect if unobserved, time-
invariant heterogeneity is important; that is Yi,t-1 and µi have similar impacts when entered
separately into the probits.
To distinguish the separate influences of lagged receipt and time-invariant needs, we add the
lagged receipt variables to the current year wereda receipt probit.  As one can see in columns 3
and 6, the coefficient on the historical needs variable drops to near 0 in the free food probit, and
it is positive, but half the magnitude for FFW.  On the other hand, comparing the magnitudes of
the receipt history coefficients to their values in Table 2, one can see that the two are very close,
and that the history coefficients are still jointly highly significant when the RRC needs variable
is introduced.
We conclude from this exercise that the very large wereda-level impacts of lagged receipt of
food aid is only in small part a reflection of persistent need from the 1984-1988 period.  While
chronic food aid allocations during the 1991/92-1994/95 period are affected by assessed needs
during the 1984 famine period and after, much of their influence on survey year 1995/96
allocations is evidently independent of past assessed needs, since the lagged receipt variables
remain significant despite the inclusion of the RRC needs variable.  On the other hand, our
results show that past needs, while having a strong time-persistent component, do vary over
time.  Therefore it is possible that part of the effect of lagged receipt on current year receipt of
aid may be capturing some unmeasured dimensions of current needs that persist through the
1990s, but that are different from needs as measured by the RRC during the 1984-1988 period. 
However, remember that we do control for certain measures of current needs, such as current
year income, plot-level shocks and regional rainfall shocks, so that any such unmeasured
variables would have to be different.58Even when we drop the areas of north and south Wello in addition to Tigray, the overall pattern of results stays the
same (results available from the authors).  This result means that even in areas less affected by the 1984/85 famine,
receipt during recent years greatly affects current year receipt.
  63
Given the large current and historical allocations of per capita food aid to Tigray and the Wello
areas of Amhara, one might speculate whether the finding of inertia holds nationwide or is
driven primarily by these areas.  If the finding of inertia were being driven by these northern
areas, then we wouldn't expect these influences to persist when we drop Tigray from the
analysis.  However, as can be seen in Appendix Table 3, the impact of the history variables,
alone and with the RRC needs assessment variable, are quite close to the results in Table 16. 
Hence the key findings hold outside of Tigray as well as within it.
58   Hence while not absolutely
conclusive, the evidence is consistent with the premise that inertia in the spatial allocation of
food aid operations is an important part of the story explaining current year allocations
throughout Ethiopia.  64
10.  POTENTIAL STRATEGIES FOR IDENTIFYING LOW-INCOME WEREDAS
AND HOUSEHOLDS FOR FOOD AID TARGETING
This section is designed to identify easily measurable indicators and strategies for improving
targeting of food aid in the future.   As described in Section 2, food aid in Ethiopia is allocated in
two basic steps: (1)  Federal authorities allocate quantities for distribution to regions and
weredas within regions; and (2)  Wereda authorities provide the food aid to local peasant
authorities to allocate to needy households.  The results presented in this section have
implications for both stages of targeting.
10.1.  Wereda-level Targeting
Recent policy statements by the federal Government of Ethiopian indicate that its targeting
priority will be on Step 1 – identifying the needy weredas – and if need is equated with low
incomes, then most of the nation’s poorest households will receive assistance.  This strategy of
targeting needy weredas rather than worrying about distribution within weredas is built on the
premise that there is greater variability in incomes and need across than within these geographic
areas.  To examine this premise, we ranked all weredas in the national sample (n=348) according
to their mean per capita income and plotted these values against the percentage of households in
each wereda falling into the bottom per capita income quartile ranked nationally.   Figure 9
shows the expected negative relationship, but also shows a high degree of variability in the
relationship.  For example, roughly 30% of the households in weredas at the 25
th percentile of
mean per capita income fell into the bottom national income quartile on average.  But in other
weredas at 25
th mean income percentile, as many as 60% or as little as 15% of the households
belonged to the poorest national income quartile.  Because of the wide within-wereda variation
in per capita income, it is the case that during the 1995/96 sample year, the poorest 25% of the
weredas in the country were found to contain only 54% of the nation’s poorest households (those
falling into the bottom per capita income quartile, ranked nationally).  The other 45% of
households in the bottom national income quartile were scattered throughout the other 75% of
the weredas.   These findings indicate that there are many relatively poor people that are not
located in the poorest weredas in the country, and that a targeting strategy that focused only on
relatively poor weredas would miss a large percentage of needy people.
However, identifying and including the poorest weredas for food aid distribution is clearly an
important element of a well-targeted food aid program.  Of the 348 weredas in our national
sample, 127  had at least one household receiving FD or FFW.  Out of these 127 weredas, only
47 were contained in the poorest mean wereda income quartile.   Of course, even if income were
the sole criterion used to determine which weredas should receive food aid, we would expect to
see less than 100% targeting of poor weredas due to a lack of information on wereda incomes at
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* “Poor” defined as falling in the poorest 25% of all households in the national sample.
Figure 9. Poor Households Relative to Mean Wereda Per Capita Income
Referring back to Table 1, the national survey data from 1995/96 indicate that the greatest
incidence of poverty was in the Southern and “other” regions (e.g., Gambela, Beneshangul, Dire,
and Dawa), which, for the most part, were not the areas that received the highest amounts of
food aid.  This raises the question of whether there exist observable indicators that can be used to
target vulnerable regions more precisely.
Addressing this question requires us to understand the factors associated with wereda-level
poverty,  so we regressed wereda-level income (both mean per capita income and mean total
household income) on household and locational variables, using OLS.  Incomes were comprised
of crop income, non-farm income, and a fraction of animal assets.  Results are presented in Table
17.  66
Table 17. Determinants of Mean Wereda Income (OLS)
Mean Per capita Income Mean Total Household Income
Fraction of Household Head with Some Education 47.10 116.6
(0.66) (0.33)
Mean Household Size -25.57 347.6
(1.44) (3.95)**
Mean % Children (0-9 yrs)  in Households -2.758 -13.69
(1.48) (1.48)
Mean % of Elderly (over 55 yrs) in Households 2.303 9.029
(1.05) (0.83)
Fraction of Female Headed, not married -189.3 -830.4
(1.67) (1.48)
Fraction of Female Headed, married -93.20 -547.5
(0.59) (0.70)
Mean Size of Land Owned, splined at 3 ha 77.51 448.7
(2.92)** (3.42)**
Mean Size of Land Owned, above 3 ha -90.68 -526.9
(2.93)** (3.44)**
Fraction of Muslim Households -59.20 -233.0
(1.23) (0.98)
Fraction of Protestant Households -107.4 -455.0
(1.26) (1.08)
Mean % of Plot Area with Shortage of Rainfall -2.122 -10.63
(2.08)* (2.11)*
Mean % of Plot Area with Flood -0.634 -5.377
(0.41) (0.70)
Mean % of Plot Area with Crop Disease/Insect Problems -2.324 -12.38
(1.57) (1.69)
Average Rainfall 1988-95 (mm) * 10 e-2 13.31 58.48
(1.54) (1.37)
Rainfall Shocks in 1994 (mm) * 10 e-2 3.445 4.601
(0.34) (0.09)
Rainfall Shocks in 1995 (mm) * 10 e-2 12.40 42.21
(1.45) (1.00)
Elevation * 10 e-2 2.652 20.88
(0.75) (1.20)
Average % of Needy Households, RRC 1984-88 -102.2 -428.6
(0.73) (0.62)
Road dummy 1 (the best road) 115.5 586.6
(2.84)** (2.91)**
Road dummy 2 53.66 216.9
(1.00) (0.82)
Road dummy 3 3.687 6.238
(0.09) (0.03)
Road dummy 4 -63.69 -187.7
(1.50) (0.89)








Southern (SNNPR/SEPA) – Omitted –  – Omitted –




F tests For 
                  Plot Level shocks 2.12 [0.10] 2.29 [0.08]
                  Rainfall shocks 1.15 [0.32] 0.51 [0.60]
                  Road dummies 2.03 [0.07] 1.85 [0.10]
                  Prices ofcereals 0.74 [0.57] 0.37 [0.83]
                  Regional dummies 4.67 [0.00]** 3.97 [0.00]**
R squared 0.27 0.33
Observations 348 348
Note: Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 5% level; ** indicates significant at 1% level. Prices of four cereals are included but
not reported. None of the prices are significant.   67
At the wereda-level, a common set of variables emerged as important determinants of both mean
per capita and total household income models.  First of all, after controlling for observed
household characteristics, average annual rainfall, recent rainfall shocks, elevation, cereal prices
(for teff, maize, and wheat), and road infrastructure, households in Tigray Region (and to a lesser
extent, Oromiya Region) had significantly higher income levels than in the rest of the country.  
Proximity to tarmac roads (road dummy 1) also appeared to be associated with higher income
levels.  Other factors constant, weredas containing a tarmac road were associated with mean
wereda incomes of 115 birr per capita higher than in weredas not having tarmac roads.  This
amount (115 birr per capita) is the amount separating households at the 25
th income percentile
and the 40
th income percentile.  Weredas with tarmac roads also had total household incomes
almost 600 birr higher than those that did not, controlling for other factors.  The second best road
type (all-weather dirt) also had a positive but less dramatic and precisely estimated effect on
income levels.  Average long-run rainfall was associated with 13.3 birr per capita higher mean
wereda incomes for every additional 100 mm of rainfall, but this effect was not significant at
even 0.10.  Rainfall shocks (deviation from long-run average rainfall) in the preceding year were
also not closely associated with current year wereda incomes.  
The most important household variable explaining the variation in wereda level incomes (both
per capita and total household incomes) was mean size of landholdings – up to three hectares.  A
bivariate scatterplot showed that per capita incomes increase sharply with landholding size up to
three hectares (which accounts for about 95% of all households), and then is basically flat
beyond 3 hectares (Figure 10).  Based on this relationship, we modeled land size as a spline
function in the model.  Table 17 shows that each additional one hectare increase in average
wereda landholdings (up to 3 hectares) is associated with a 77 birr increase in wereda per capita
income (and a 448 birr increase in average household income).  Other household-level
characteristics associated with variations in wereda mean incomes were the fraction of female
headed households with no referent male, and the mean percentage of cropped area in which
rainfall shortages or crop diseases or pests were reported.  All these variables had the same
directional effects of both per capita and total household incomes.  The only variable that had
different qualitative effects on the two measures of income was, as expected, mean household
size.  The association between mean household size and per capita income was negative but not
significant, but each additional family member was significantly associated with 347 birr
increase in total mean household income at the wereda level.   By contrast, mean wereda income
over the entire sample was 488 birr per capita.  Thus, larger family sizes are associated with
smaller wereda per capita incomes, but larger total household incomes.
Thus, for purposes of identifying low-income weredas, both per capita and total household
income, the following indicators appear to be important: weredas in the Southern and Amhara 
regions, weredas lacking all-weather roads, weredas in which a large portion of cropped area
suffers from crop damage, weredas with relatively small average land holdings, and female-
headed households with no adult male in the family.  68
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       Note: The dotted lines indicate 75
th  and 95
th percentile of land owned.
Figure 10. Relationship Between Per capita Income and Land Owned, National Level
10.2.  Household-level Targeting
This section identifies household and locational characteristics associated with variations in
household incomes.  As with the wereda-level models, we estimate household-level models for
both income per capita and total household income.  For each of these different formulations of
income, we estimate models with regional dummies and wereda-level rainfall shocks, cereal
prices, and road types, as well as wereda-fixed effects models (which focus on intra-wereda
variations in income).  Results for each of these models are presented in Table 18.
The models with regional and wereda-level effects showed a similar set of indicators being
associated with low-income households (in both per capita and total terms).  These were:
households located in the Southern Region as well as in Beni-Shangul, Somalie, Gambela, and
Dire Dawa Regions; low average rainfall; lack of good roads in the wereda; percentage of
cropped area affected by crop disease and drought; low household landholding; female-headed
households with no adult male in the family; and  the percentage of family members that are
young children.   The wereda-fixed effects models showed an almost identical set of household
variables explaining the variation in within-wereda household incomes.   69
Table 18. Determinants of Household Income (OLS)
Per capita Income Total household Income
Wereda Fixed Effect Wereda Fixed Effect
Household Head’s Education (0,1) 43.137 30.563 216.630 190.982
(1.81) (1.22) (1.87) (1.57)
Household Size -46.251 -47.633 266.088 263.712
(8.86)** (8.77)** (10.48)** (10.05)**
Percentage of children (0-9 yrs) -2.991 -2.996 -12.511 -12.332
(5.47)** (5.31)** (4.70)** (4.53)**
Percentage of elder (55 yrs over) 0.312 -0.013 -1.729 -3.778
(0.51) (0.02) (0.58) (1.25)
Female headed, not married (0,1) -135.669 -120.014 -408.495 -279.609
(4.14)** (3.55)** (2.56)* (1.71)
Female headed, married (0,1) -61.358 -61.200 -199.205 -150.518
(1.33) (1.29) (0.89) (0.66)
Land owned in ha 124.736 147.717 647.180 765.523
(8.79)** (8.33)** (9.37)** (8.93)**
-133.127 -155.173 -689.722 -804.963
(8.91)** (8.37)** (9.49)** (8.98)**
Muslim household (0,1) 8.543 59.329 86.805 278.163
(0.31) (1.26) (0.64) (1.22)
Protestant household (0,1) -76.503 -71.645 -404.501 -390.507
(2.16)* (1.70) (2.35)* (1.92)
Percentage of areas with shortage of rain -1.248 -0.644 -5.910 -3.162
(2.59)** (1.09) (2.52)* (1.10)
Percentage of areas with flood -0.518 -1.446 -4.144 -8.033
(0.74) (1.74) (1.22) (2.00)*
Percentage of areas with crop disease -1.191 -0.772 -6.295 -3.764
(2.03)* (1.18) (2.20)* (1.19)
Average rainfall 1988-95 (mm)  * 10e-2 11.766 62.845
(2.11)* (2.32)*
Rainfall shocks in 1994 (mm)  * 10e-2 3.517 -0.289
(0.53) (0.01)
Rainfall shocks in 1995 (mm)  * 10e-2 9.276 38.831
(1.46) (1.26)

















Addis Ababa 704.9 2927
(7.92)** (6.76)**





           Plot level shocks 3.27 [0.02]* 1.65 [0.18] 3.58 [0.01]* 1.97 [0.12]
           Rainfall shocks 1.29 [0.28] 0.79 [0.45]
           Cereal prices 1.90 [0.11] 1.07 [0.37]
           Road dummies
A 4.31 [0.00]** 2.91 [0.01]*
           Regional/Wereda dummies 15.1 [0.00]** 11.9 [0.00]**
R-squared 0.15 0.08 0.18 0.12
Observations 2867 2867 2867 2867
Note:  Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. * indicates  significant at 5% level; ** indicates significant at 1% level. Prices of four cereals and five orad
dummies are included in the models but not reported.  A) Coefficients of road dummies are not reported.  70
10.3.  Alternative Indicators of Need
As noted elsewhere in this report, current income is an incomplete indicator of need.  Nutritional
information is another clear criterion of need, but at this time such information was not available. 
Ownership of animal assets is another reasonable indicator of need, as it is the most important
stock of wealth in most areas of Ethiopia.  To examine the robustness of the findings above
concerning indicators of need, we also specified several models in which the value of household
animal ownership (including cattle, sheep, goats, poultry, pigs, donkeys, and horses) was
specified as the dependent variable.  Results of these models are contained in the annex (Table
A4 and A5).
Factors explaining wereda-level variations in the mean value of animal assets were largely but
not entirely similar to those explaining wereda-level variations in income.  The common set of
variables associated with need in both the income and animal asset models were mean size of
landholdings (up to 3 hectares), mean percentage of cropped area with disease and pest
problems, and household size on total mean value of animal ownership (Table A4).  However,
there were a few striking differences.  First, weredas in Amhara region tended to have lower
accumulated animal assets than those in other regions, and weredas in Oromiya region tended to
have more animal assets than in other areas.  Second, weredas with a relatively large percentage
of elderly members tended to have a higher value of animal assets, both in terms of per capita
and total value per household.  Also, and most interesting, the average percentage of needy
households as identified by the RRC in 1984 to 1988 (which might be considered to control for
variations in historical need during the 1980s famine period) was positively associated with
wereda-level animal assets, and this association was significant in both the per capita and total
value models at 0.10.   One possible interpretation is that the historical famine areas have built
up higher than average stocks of animal assets that can be liquidated for cash to buy food during
periods of shortfall.  Another possible interpretation is that the areas of historical famine tended
to be pastoral areas where livestock activities are prominent.  It is noteworthy that neither
average long-term rainfall nor rainfall shocks in 1994 and 1995 were associated with current
animal wealth at the wereda level.
At the household level, there were striking similarities in the set of variables explaining
variations in income and animal wealth.  These were: household size; households with a
relatively large percentage of small children; female-headed households with no referent male;
size of landholding (up to 3 hectares); percentage of cropped area suffering from drought or
disease; proximity to all-weather roads; and  households residing in Tigray Region.  Wereda-
level cereal prices, often taken as a measure of need, were positively associated with animal
wealth.   Households in Oromiya, Somali, and Dire Dawa also tended to have more animal
assets, other factors constant, than households in other regions.  These findings indicate that, in
terms of the several ways in which need was measured in this section – per capita income, total
household income, per capita animal wealth, and total household animal wealth – there was a
small set of variables that consistently were associated with need.  These were household
members with a relatively large number of small children, female-headed households with no
adult male, size of landholding up to three hectares, road infrastructure, and households in the
Southern Region.  71
11.  CONCLUSIONS
Effective targeting of food aid recipients can contribute to improved nutrition, health and other
important welfare objectives.  But in spite of the large amount of international food aid flows
over the past thirty years, very little is known regarding the degree of targeting, if any, that is
used by recipient governments.  There is a dearth of empirical information on which to assess the
cost-effectiveness of alternative targeting programs that could provide useful feedback to
improve the design of food assistance programs in the future.  Importantly in the Ethiopian case,
neither food aid donors nor central government agencies determine how food aid is distributed in
local communities, nor do they generally have the means of determining the characteristics of
those who do and do not receive food aid.  
This report sheds light on how food aid was targeted in rural Ethiopia, and identifies the factors,
both at the regional and household level, that are correlated with low incomes. This information
can be used to identify low-income areas and low-income households within particular areas
more efficiently.  Moreover, while the allocation of food aid is a highly politicized issue, this
study reports simply on the outcome of the process – how food aid was allocated and the
regional and household-level characteristics with which it was correlated.  The results and their
implications may be useful for donors and NGOs in assessing the results of their food aid
programs and in their dialogue with government in improving the impacts of food aid in the
future.
Findings are based on analysis of national household-level survey data of over 2,200 households
in rural Ethiopia.  The survey was based on a sub-sample of the CSA’s 1995 Agricultural
Production Survey, and was designed to be representative of the four largest regions in Ethiopia. 
The surveys were implemented by CSA in 1995 and 1996.
The report highlights six major findings.  First, there is substantial relative variation in the extent
of poverty across weredas (local administrative units) and across households within weredas, as
measured by per capita income.  While the argument is often heard that targeting is not necessary
or cost-effective because the majority of rural Ethiopian households live in absolute poverty by
current world standards, our findings show that per capita incomes were three times higher at the
75
th per capita income percentile than at the 25
th percentile.  Per capita incomes were eight times
higher at the 90
th percentile than at the 10
th percentile.  These findings from Ethiopia are not
unique – almost all survey data from Sub-Saharan Africa show a high degree of relative variation
in incomes and assets across regions and across households within regions.   These findings
imply that targeting of food aid to the poorest of the poor remains an important objective in food
aid programs.
Second, we find evidence that, at the national level, food aid was targeted to some extent
according to income.  The poorer households and poorer weredas had higher probabilities of
receiving food aid than households or weredas with higher per capita incomes.  The probability
that a particular wereda (local administrative unit) would receive free food varies from 30.4% for
the 25
th percentile of wereda mean log per capita income, to 24.1% for the 75
th income  72
percentile, to 21.1% for the 90
th income percentile.  Assets, such as size of landholding and
livestock ownership, were not related to food aid allocations.  Long-term rainfall, in most of the
estimated models, was not correlated with food aid allocations, even though wereda-level
incomes were not significantly related to long-term rainfall.  The probability of receiving food
aid was higher in areas experiencing short-run shocks in rainfall, but not by much.  Amounts of
food aid received by beneficiaries, on the other hand, are not responsive to weather shocks. 
Within local areas it does not appear that field-level rainfall shocks affect local allocations to
households, so that a potential insurance role of food aid was not being used.
Third, the fact that only 30% of the poorest weredas received food aid indicates that, at least in
this particular year (1995-96) and using income as the criteria of need, there were very large
targeting errors of exclusion.  Over the national sample, the probability of receiving food aid was
35% or below, other factors held constant, even for the poorest weredas in the country.  Within
weredas where food aid was distributed (about 28% and 22% of the weredas sampled nationally,
for free food and food for work), well under half of the poorest 25% of households received any
type of food aid.  These findings suggest that the amount of food aid distributed in 1995/96 was
inadequate to meet the needs of households under the 25
th per capita income percentile.  The
finding of large targeting errors of exclusion is consistent with the findings of Clay, Molla, and
Debebe (1999).
Fourth, the amount of food received by households through FFW programs was not related to
per capita incomes.  This was in contrast to free distribution of food aid, which displayed more
effective income-based targeting.   However, there were wide variations in the extent of targeting
across regions.  Receipt of free food was most closely related to low per capita incomes in
Amhara Region, but not related to per capita incomes in the South.  Food for work participation
was confined to the poor most effectively in Tigray, but was almost totally unrelated to
household per capita incomes in Amhara and the South.  There are difficulties in accommodating
the dual objectives of FFW, which include development objectives as well as hunger alleviation. 
At policy levels, donors and government regard both objectives as important, but at the field
level there is often less emphasis on the need to promote these objectives simultaneously. 
Officials from one local donor agency involved in FFW programs in Ethiopia have stated that
their primary objective in implementing FFW was to use food as a means of financing local
development projects and did not contain an explicit targeting objective.   Targeting through
FFW activities also was likely to have been impeded by the practice of offering wages to
participants that typically exceeded prevailing agricultural labor wages.  Other studies have
examined the potential to improve food aid targeting through careful selection of cereals for
work rations whose consumption tends to be inversely related to incomes (e.g., Dorosh, Ninno,
and Sahn 1995; Jayne et al. 1996).
Fifth, there were significant differences in the amounts of per capita food aid allocated
regionally, which were not related to observable household and wereda level characteristics. 
Weredas in Tigray Region were more likely to receive both free food and food for work than
households in other regions even after controlling for income levels, assets, long-term rainfall
and short-term rainfall shocks, and other household and wereda characteristics.  However,   73
nutritional studies indicate that Tigray has somewhat higher levels of child stunting than the
national average, which may partially justify some increased amounts of aid to this region.
Sixth, the single most important factor associated with who received free food or food for work
was who received free food or food for work in the past.  This was true at both the wereda-level
and household-level.  On its face, it is unclear whether historical use should be interpreted as
indicating that inertia is driving current allocations, or whether unobserved, time-invariant
factors related to chronic needs are important.  In an attempt to differentiate, albeit imperfectly,
we find that the spatial pattern of food aid receipt during the early and mid 1990s is highly
correlated with assessments of food aid needs from 1984 through 1988, which we use as a proxy
for unobserved time-invariant needs.  The 1984/85 famine was a defining event that influenced
the subsequent location of investments of food aid operations in Ethiopia.  And the current
spatial allocation of food aid is highly correlated with the regions of greatest need during the
famine period.  However, the available survey data indicate that the poorest areas of the country
in 1995/96 were generally not the ones hardest hit by the famine.  Yet conditional on historical
needs during the 1980s, it is the recent 1990s pattern of food aid allocation that is most important
in determining receipt in the 1995/96 survey year; i.e., the 1980s pattern of vulnerability has
little explanatory power over and above the more recent pattern of allocation in the 1990s in
influencing current food aid allocations.
From these results, and the fact that current weather shocks have only a small impact on
allocations, we tentatively conclude that there is a degree of inertia, or time-invariant rigidity in
food aid distribution over time.  This rigidity in food aid distribution cannot be explained by
time-invariant or time-varying unobserved needs.  These findings are consistent with the view
that spatial inertia in program operations may be an important factor behind current year
allocations.  This may arise from high fixed program costs, rigidities in the governmental process
of determining food aid allocations to local administrative units, political income transfer
objectives, or possibly other reasons.  This spatial inertia, whatever the exact cause(s), is a factor
that has so far been ignored in both the theoretical targeting and the policy-related food aid
literatures.
What can be done to improve targeting effectiveness in the future?  Although policy statements
in Ethiopia are sufficiently clear that food aid should be targeted to only the neediest households,
they do not indicate specifically how to identify the needy – the guidelines to be used.  Our
analysis in Section 10 reveals that for purposes of identifying low-income weredas (both per
capita and total household income), the following indicators appear to be important: weredas in
the Southern Region; weredas lacking tarmac or all-weather roads; weredas in which a large
portion of cropped area suffers from crop damage; weredas with relatively small average land
holdings; and  weredas with a large percentage of female-headed households with no adult male
in the family.  Within particular weredas, relatively low-income households tended to be
associated with small landholdings, the percentage of household cropped area affected by
disease and drought, female-headed households with no adult male in the family, and the
percentage of family members that are young children.  74
In recent years in Ethiopia, government policy statements indicate a priority on targeting the
poorest weredas in the country and then distributing widely within these weredas.  However, this
study indicates that this approach may miss a large percentage of the poorest households. 
Because of wide within-wereda variation in per capita income, it is the case that during the
1995/96 sample year, the poorest 25% of the weredas in the country were found to contain only
54% of the nation’s poorest households (those falling into the bottom per capita income quartile,
ranked nationally).  The other 45% of households in the bottom national income quartile were
scattered throughout the other 75% of the weredas.   These findings indicate that there are many
relatively poor people that are not located in the poorest weredas in the country, and that a
targeting strategy that focused only on relatively poor weredas would miss a large percentage of
needy people.
There is still a great deal that is unknown about the actual implementation of food aid programs
in the field.  We observe that targeting effectiveness varies, sometimes greatly, between regions. 
But there is a dearth of insight on how food aid programs are actually implemented in the field,
and this kind of descriptive information could be usefully matched up with findings such as those
presented in this paper to better understand what kinds of operations lead to relatively effective
targeting and vice versa.  There may be high payoffs to comparative field-level analyses that
identify how indicators of targeting effectiveness vary with the actual implementation and
organization of food aid programs in particular locations.  This would shed considerable light on
the enduring “black box” stage of food aid programs – the criteria and forces driving food aid
allocation at the local level.  75
APPENDIX
Table A1. Wereda Level Food Aid Distribution, Excluding South (Probit 
A)
Wereda Level Household Level
FD FFW FD FFW
ln (Per capita Income) -0.096 -0.092 -0.125 -0.008
(1.62) (2.12)* (4.05)** (0.22)
Household head has some education  (0,1) -0.110 0.067 -0.153 -0.063
(0.80) (0.70) (2.81)** (1.03)
Household size -0.025 -0.005 -0.034 -0.002
(0.71) (0.20) (2.45)* (0.11)
Percentage of children 
(0-9 yrs)
-0.003 -0.008 0.002 0.000
(0.88) (2.65)** (1.75) (0.09)
Percentage of elder 
(older than 55 yrs)
-0.002 -0.005 0.001 -0.003
(0.37) (1.70) (0.76) (1.69)
Female headed household, not married 
(0,1)
0.183 -0.285 0.144 -0.083
(0.84) (1.77) (1.90) (1.04)
Female headed household, but head is
married  (0,1)
0.018 0.399 0.044 -0.192
(0.05) (1.65) (0.38) (1.84)
Land owned in ha -0.033 -0.067 0.014 -0.057
(0.90) (1.64) (0.40) (1.29)
Muslim household  (0,1) 0.174 -0.106 0.203 -0.149
(1.93) (1.54) (1.57) (0.94)
Protestant household  (0,1) 0.091 -0.227 0.766 -0.279
(0.44) (1.13) (4.24)** (1.94)
Livestock household  (0,1) -0.639 -0.590 -0.115 -0.148
(1.80) (1.32) (0.72) (0.82)
Percentage of area with shortage of rain 0.005 0.003 0.001 -0.002
(2.70)** (2.17)* (1.55) (1.50)
Percentage of area with flood 0.002 0.004 0.000 -0.001
(1.08) (2.26)* (0.27) (0.31)
Percentage of areas with crop disease or
insect problems
0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.41) (0.17) (0.23) (0.09)


















Oromiya -0.482 -0.101 –    with Wereda dummies   – 
(3.78)** (1.06)
Wald tests   For Plot level shocks 7.68 8.05* 2.47 2.45
[0.05] [0.05] [0.48] [0.48]
              For Rainfall shocks 6.67* 2.35
[0.04] [0.31]
              For Road dummies 
B 16.1** 3.69
[0.01] [0.60]
              For Regional/Wereda dummies  21.7** 3.54 156.5** 111.3**
[0.00] [0.32] [0.00] [0.00]
Log likelihood -110.5 -102.6 -271.8 -271.5
Observations 283 283 659 532
Note: * indicates 5% significance; ** indicates 1% significance.  Numbers in parentheses are z-values.  Numbers in brackets are p-values. 
A) Reported coefficients are changes in marginal probability. B) Coefficients of road dummies are not reported.   76
Table A2. Wereda Level Food Aid Distribution Model Without Income (Probit
A)
Wereda Level Household Level
FD FFW FD FFW
Household head has some education  (0,1) -0.097 0.128 -0.135 -0.066
(0.79) (1.30) (2.98)** (1.24)
Household size -0.001 0.003 -0.011 -0.005
(0.02) (0.11) (1.09) (0.40)
Percentage of children 
(0-9 yrs)
-0.006 -0.008 0.003 -0.000
(1.69) (2.70)** (2.74)** (0.44)
Percentage of elder 
(older than 55 yrs)
-0.005 -0.007 0.001 -0.003
(1.29) (2.12)* (0.76) (1.80)
Female headed household, not married 
(0,1)
0.238 -0.015 0.150 -0.008
(1.22) (0.10) (2.42)* (0.12)
Female headed household, but head is
married  (0,1)
-0.001 0.405 0.115 -0.143
(0.00) (1.88) (1.32) (1.62)
Land owned in ha -0.021 0.004 -0.005 0.015
(0.97) (0.55) (0.39) (1.06)
Muslim household  (0,1) 0.154 -0.050 0.043 -0.041
(1.94) (0.72) (0.39) (0.31)
Protestant household  (0,1) 0.102 0.116 0.207 -0.111
(0.73) (1.00) (2.41)* (1.20)
Livestock household  (0,1) -0.552 -0.506 -0.020 -0.059
(1.40) (1.18) (0.11) (0.33)
Percentage of area with shortage of rain 0.004 0.004 0.001 -0.002
(2.75)** (3.29)** (1.22) (1.46)
Percentage of area with flood 0.003 0.005 0.002 -0.000
(1.39) (2.62)** (1.07) (0.02)
Percentage of areas with crop disease or
insect problems
0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.96) (0.17) (0.51) (0.84)




















Other Killils 0.464 0.359 –    with Wereda dummies   – 
(2.86)** (2.24)*
Wald tests   For Plot level shocks 8.80* 15.2** 2.55 3.78
[0.03] [0.00] [0.47] [0.29]
              For Rainfall shocks 3.59 1.06
[0.17] [0.59]
              For Road dummies
B 9.16 7.93
[0.10] [0.16]
              For Regional/Wereda dummies  21.8** 7.50 167.3** 141.7**
[0.00] [0.11] [0.00] [0.00]
Log likelihood -153.8 -139.3 -386.6 -386.9
Observations 348 348 838 681
Note: * indicates 5% significance; ** indicates 1% significance.  Numbers in parentheses are z-values.  Numbers in brackets are p-values. 
A) Reported coefficients are changes in marginal probability.  B) Coefficients of road dummies are not reported.   77
Table A3. Wereda Level Food Aid Distribution Without Tigray   (Probit 
A)          
Free Distribution
(1 if at least one household in the Wereda
received FD)
Food for Work
(1 if at least one household in the Wereda
received FFW)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln (Per capita Income) -0.004 -0.057 -0.002 -0.048 -0.099 -0.041
(0.07) (1.15) (0.03) (1.70) (2.52)* (1.46)
Fraction of households with some
education
0.033 -0.095 0.035 0.156 0.143 0.159
(0.27) (0.78) (0.29) (2.23)* (1.49) (2.31)*
Mean household size 0.028 0.001 0.029 0.019 0.015 0.023
(0.98) (0.02) (1.01) (1.12) (0.64) (1.34)
Mean % of children (0-9 yrs) in households -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.006 -0.003
(0.56) (1.26) (0.55) (1.79) (2.38)* (1.78)
Mean % of elder (over 55) in households  -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004
(0.19) (0.73) (0.19) (1.63) (1.68) (1.53)
Fraction of female headed, not married 0.483 0.385 0.488 -0.022 0.083 -0.011
(2.33)* (2.01)* (2.35)* (0.19) (0.53) (0.09)
Fraction of female headed, married -0.103 0.012 -0.097 0.225 0.441 0.230
(0.37) (0.04) (0.35) (1.40) (2.19)* (1.45)
Mean size of land owned -0.021 -0.014 -0.021 0.004 0.003 0.004
(1.19) (0.98) (1.19) (0.95) (0.35) (0.92)
Fraction of Muslim households 0.100 0.062 0.095 -0.047 -0.075 -0.052
(1.37) (0.84) (1.28) (1.00) (1.20) (1.12)
Fraction of Protestant households 0.005 0.024 0.005 0.076 0.054 0.077
(0.04) (0.19) (0.04) (0.94) (0.52) (0.97)
Fraction of livestock households -0.610 -0.513 -0.613 -0.428 -0.421 -0.391
(1.29) (1.30) (1.29) (1.21) (0.99) (1.16)
Mean % of plot area with shortage of rain 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002
(2.66)** (2.47)* (2.63)** (3.40)** (2.48)* (3.15)**
Mean % of plot area with flood 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003
(1.96)* (1.18) (1.92) (2.73)** (1.86) (2.60)**
Mean % of plot area with crop disease or
insect problems
0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.08) (0.40) (0.07) (0.33) (0.04) (0.40)
Average rainfall 1988-95 (mm)   *10e-2 0.002 -0.008 0.004 -0.000 -0.007 0.003
(0.15) (0.62) (0.25) (0.11) (0.65) (0.38)
Rainfall shocks in 1994 (mm)  *10e-2 0.015 0.011 0.016 0.005 0.016 0.006
(0.82) (0.65) (0.86) (0.47) (1.13) (0.62)
Rainfall shocks in 1995 (mm)  *10e-2 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 -0.010 -0.015 0.011
(1.51) (1.55) (1.53) (1.25) (1.34) (1.46)
Elevation   *10e-2 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.012 0.014 0.012
(1.09) (1.14) (1.10) (3.39)** (2.96)** (3.43)**
Average RRC 1984 -88 0.550 0.072 0.503 0.165
(2.28)* (0.28) (2.63)** (1.14)
History of Receiving Food Aid
B
4 years in last 4 years  (0,1) 0.749 0.742 0.850 0.837
(3.15)** (3.07)** (3.85)** (3.80)**
3 years in last 4 years  (0,1) 0.508 0.498 0.224 0.215
(2.36)* (2.29)* (2.15)* (2.09)*
2 years in last 4 years  (0,1) 0.264 0.256 0.592 0.572
(2.44)* (2.32)* (4.25)** (4.13)**
1 year in last 4 years  (0,1) 0.164 0.161 0.312 0.315
(2.38)* (2.33)* (4.51)** (4.55)**
Previous experience with the other type of
food aid   (0,1)
0.234 0.232 0.073 0.063
(3.47)** (3.46)** (1.97)* (1.74)
Amhara -0.067 -0.072 -0.085 0.088 -0.024 0.028
(0.72) (0.65) (0.74) (1.17) (0.26) (0.36)
Oromiya -0.069 -0.042 -0.071 0.085 0.085 0.072
(0.87) (0.52) (0.90) (1.54) (1.21) (1.34)
Other Killils 0.197 0.280 0.183 0.211 0.196 0.156
(1.27) (1.77) (1.16) (1.56) (1.36) (1.26)
Wald tests: For History  variables 16.1** 14.7** 35.7** 34.9**
[0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00]
                     For Plot level shocks 9.50* 6.71 9.18* 15.6** 8.36* 13.9**
[0.02] [0.08] [0.03] [0.00] [0.04] [0.00]
                     For Rainfall shocks 2.77 2.63 2.84 1.70 2.67 2.34
[0.25] [0.27] [0.24] [0.43] [0.26] [0.31]
                     For Road dummies
C 6.10 4.35 5.96 7.13 3.48 7.80
[0.30] [0.50] [0.32] [0.21] [0.63] [0.17]
                     For Regional dummies  5.11 6.94 5.16 3.07 4.13 2.69
[0.16] [0.07] [0.16] [0.38] [0.25] [0.44]
Log likelihood -108.8 -133.1 -108.8 -85.4 -115.0 -84.7
Observations 317 317 317 317 317 317
Note: * indicates 5% significance; ** indicates 1% significance.  Numbers in parentheses are z-values.  Numbers in brackets are p-values. 
A) Reported coefficients are changes in marginal probability.  B) At least one household received FD (or FFW) for 4 years in last 4 years, and so on. 
C) Coefficients of road dummies are not reported.   78
Table A4. Wereda-Level Value of Animal Assets (OLS)
Mean Per capita Value of 
Animal owned
Mean Total Value of 
Animal owned
Fraction of Household Head with Some Education 129.4 979.7
(1.00) (1.37)
Mean Household Size 16.74 985.5
(0.51) (5.49)**
Mean % Children (0-9 yrs)  in Households -0.435 -10.21
(0.13) (0.54)
Mean % of Elderly (over 55 yrs) in Households 10.83 48.23
(2.69)** (2.17)*
Fraction of Female Headed, not married 111.7 719.3
(0.54) (0.63)
Fraction of Female Headed, married -61.94 -303.5
(0.21) (0.19)
Mean Size of Land Owned, splined at 3 ha 256.1 1,423
(5.28)** (5.31)**
Mean Size of Land Owned, above 3 ha -291.9 -1,640
(5.16)** (5.25)**
Fraction of Muslim Households -108.1 -717.6
(1.23) (1.48)
Fraction of Protestant Households -82.02 -542.4
(0.53) (0.63)
Mean % of Plot Area with Shortage of Rainfall 1.492 7.486
(0.80) (0.73)
Mean % of Plot Area with Flood 1.899 3.761
(0.67) (0.24)
Mean % of Plot Area with Crop Disease/Insect Problems -6.035 -31.76
(2.23)* (2.12)*
Average Rainfall 1988-95 (mm) * 10 e-2 -2.981 6.893
(0.19) (0.08)
Rainfall Shocks in 1994 (mm) * 10 e-2 22.19 136.7
(1.19) (1.33)
Rainfall Shocks in 1995 (mm) * 10 e-2 15.11 57.27
(0.96) (0.66)
Elevation * 10 e-2 18.76 84.89
(2.92)** (2.39)*
Average % of Needy Households, RRC 1984-88 479.8 2,601
(1.88) (1.85)
Road dummy 1 (the best road) 54.95 487.0
(0.74) (1.19)
Road dummy 2 60.37 178.6
(0.62) (0.33)
Road dummy 3 -54.43 -109.8
(0.74) (0.27)
Road dummy 4 -65.82 -296.1
(0.85) (0.69)








Southern (SNNPR/SEPA) – Omitted –  – Omitted –




F tests For 
                  Plot Level shocks 2.18 [0.09] 1.81 [0.15]
                  Rainfall shocks 1.28 [0.28] 1.19 [0.31]
                  Road dummies 0.50 [0.78] 0.50 [0.78]
                  Prices of cereals 0.79 [0.53] 0.81 [0.52]
                  Regional dummies 5.55 [0.00]** 5.21 [0.00]**
R squared 0.28 0.37
Observations 348 348
Note: Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 5% level; ** indicates significant at 1% level. Prices of four
cereals are included but not reported. None of the prices are significant.   79
Table A5. Household-Level Value of Animal Assets (OLS)
Per capita Value of Animal Owned Total Value of Animal Owned
Wereda Fixed Effect Wereda Fixed Effect
Household Head’s Education (0,1) 50.46 41.07 274.6 204.4
(1.24) (0.98) (1.39) (1.02)
Household Size -42.63 -48.73 644.7 606.6
(4.80)** (5.38)** (14.9)** (14.0)**
Percentage of children (0-9yrs) -6.174 -6.541 -24.65 -26.06
(6.63)** (6.96)** (5.44)** (5.79)**
Percentage of elder (55 yrs over) 2.311 1.418 6.266 2.644
(2.22)* (1.36) (1.23) (0.53)
Female headed, not married (0,1) -106.0 -116.0 -521.6 -530.1
(1.90) (2.06)* (1.92) (1.96)*
Female headed, married (0,1) -11.02 -15.73 105.2 126.7
(0.14) (0.20) (0.28) (0.34)
Land owned in ha, splined at 3 ha 260.4 254.5 1,407 1,444
(10.8)** (8.61)** (12.0)** (10.2)**
Land owned in ha, over 3 ha -271.0 -265.2 -1,469 -1,509
(10.7)** (8.58)** (11.9)** (10.2)**
Muslim household (0,1) -82.44 -51.59 -491.6 -185.2
(1.74) (0.66) (2.13)* (0.49)
Protestant household (0,1) -47.99 -31.69 -494.1 -536.7
(0.80) (0.45) (1.69) (1.59)
Percentage of areas with shortage of rain 2.187 2.242 10.18 9.784
(2.66)** (2.27)* (2.55)* (2.07)*
Percentage of areas with flood -0.375 -3.038 -6.504 -18.36
(0.31) (2.19)* (1.12) (2.76)**
Percentage of areas with crop disease -1.818 -0.206 -10.35 -4.068
(1.82) (0.19) (2.13)* (0.78)
Average rainfall 1988-95 (mm)  * 10e-2 -15.40 -49.64
(1.62) (1.07)
Rainfall shocks in 1994 (mm)  * 10e-2 10.46 56.24
(0.93) (1.03)
Rainfall shocks in 1995 (mm)  * 10e-2 8.132 -16.97
(0.75) (0.32)

















Addis Ababa 230.0 291.2
(1.52) (0.39)
Dire Dawa 368.6 1,062
(2.05)* (1.21)
Constant 676.6 1,042 -1,473 552.8
(3.96)** (15.5)** (1.77) (1.72)
F test For
                       Plot level shocks 3.98 [0.01]** 3.49 [0.02]* 4.66 [0.00]** 4.39 [0.00]**
                       Rainfall shocks 0.79 [0.46] 0.56 [0.57]
                       Cereal Prices 2.18 [0.07] 2.40 [0.05]*
                       Road dummies 1.06 [0.38] 2.27 [0.05]*
                       Regional dummies 8.23 [0.00]** 7.03 [0.00]**
R-squared 0.13 0.08 0.22 0.12
Observations 2867 2867 2867 2867
Note:  Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. * indicates  significant at 5% level; ** indicates significant at 1% level. Prices of four
cereals and five orad dummies are included in the models but not reported. 
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